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PUTTING EXPERT TESTIMONY IN ITS
EPISTEMOLOGICAL PLACE:
WHAT PREDICTIONS OF
DANGEROUSNESS IN COURT CAN
TEACH US
M. NEIL BROWNE ∗
RONDA R. HARRISON-SPOERL ∗∗
Judges and juries must make momentous and intricate decisions.
The temptation is overwhelming for the court to request assistance from
those who claim to know facts, interpretations, and explanatory models
1
that promise to make those decisions more accurate. As long as some
of us know more than others about specific probative matters, courts
will certainly seek to know what those experts know or, to anticipate,
what they claim to know.
But how can courts optimize their
consumption of this expertise?
The use of expert knowledge to settle legal disputes is not a new
2
phenomenon.
However, cases involving complex technical and
3
scientific issues are becoming increasingly common, prompting what
∗ Distinguished Teaching Professor of Economics, Bowling Green State University.
∗∗ Psychologist, Independent Practice, Tallahassee, Florida.
1. The desire for expertise to provide sure resolutions to human dilemmas is aptly
described in Faust. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, FAUST 3–9 (Bayard Taylor trans.,
MacMillian Co. 1930) (1870) (The discussion in the Prologue among the poet, the Stage
Manager and the Jester makes it clear that the poet has a more refined and nuanced
appreciation of the kinds of questions theatre presents than the masses whom he demeans as
he discusses the impending stage production.).
2. See Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert
Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 41 n.2 (1901) (tracing the use of expert testimony to the
thirteenth century); see also Steven R. Smith, Mental Health Expert Witnesses: Of Science and
Crystal Balls, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 145, 147 (1989).
3. See Ellen E. Deason, Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses: Scientific Positivism Meets
Bias and Deference, 77 OR. L. REV. 59, 60 (1998) (“Technical, scientific, and complex subjects
pose formidable challenges for the judicial system . . . .”); see also William W. Schwarzer,
Introduction to FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
1, 1 (1994) (asserting the need for courts to comprehend issues that are increasingly “esoteric
and complex”).
Although courts encounter complex scientific issues, many scholars suggest that the legal
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some would call a proliferation of experts in the courtroom. More
recently, judges have begun to recognize the potential for experts in
6
social science research to assist the trier of fact in both civil and
system is not the best way to resolve scientific controversies. See, e.g., Paul Roberts, Science
in the Criminal Process, 14 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 469, 469 (1994) (noting the problematic
relationship of science and law). For example, legal causation and scientific causation have
very different standards. See, e.g., Matthew J. Smith, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony
and the Toxic Tort, 15 J. PROD. & TOXICS LIAB. 97, 110 (1993) (describing the forms of
evidence that the scientific community requires to prove causation as opposed to causation
requirements in the legal standard of causation).
4. See James S. Laughlin, When Students Confront the Experts: Toward Critical
Thinking, 81 ENG. J. 72, 72 (1992).
We surrender our car to the auto-repair expert, we surrender our children
to the education specialist, we surrender our marriages to the sex
therapists, our diet to the health experts, our beaches to the oil-spill
experts, our defense to the military and foreign-policy experts in the
Pentagon, our tax policy to the corporate-supported economic experts,
[and] the administration of justice to the expert witnesses in the
courtroom.
Id. See generally STEVEN BRINT, IN AN AGE OF EXPERTS: THE CHANGING ROLE OF
PROFESSIONALS IN POLITICS AND PUBLIC LIFE (1994) (arguing, as the title suggests, that the
role of professionals in politics and public life today are signs of a new “age of experts”).
5. See DOUGLAS WALTON, APPEAL TO EXPERT OPINIONS 1 (1997), (“[N]early
everything we believe is believable because it is based on the opinion of experts. In this age
of specialization and professionalization, it is not possible to escape accepting things on the
basis of authority.”); see also Thomas L. Haskell, Introduction to THE AUTHORITY OF
EXPERTS: STUDIES IN HISTORY AND THEORY xii (Thomas L. Haskell ed., 1984) (“[E]xperts
have become so numerous and their knowledge and services have become so deeply
interwoven with the fabric of our existence that some writers regard our reliance on expertise
as the most distinctive feature of modern culture.”). James Laughlin agrees that “[a]
dominant characteristic of this age is the proliferation of experts.” See Laughlin, supra note 4,
at 72. Laughlin further argues, “Because we need those who can interpret this vast output of
information and because an increasingly technological society demands a specialized
workforce, the United States has come to rely on experts to guide the entire life of the
nation.” Id. These needs have led to the increasing power of the expert in society. Magali
Sarfatti Larson, The Production of Expertise and the Constitution of Expert Power, in THE
AUTHORITY OF EXPERTS: STUDIES IN HISTORY AND THEORY, supra, at 28 (“Expertise . . .
increasingly provides a base for attaining and exercising power by the people who can claim
special knowledge in matters that their society considers important.”). See also Michael D.
Bayles, Professional Power and Self-Regulation, 5 BUS. & PROF. ETHICS J. 26, 29 (1986)
(arguing that much of the reason experts have power over non-experts is that in a majority of
the situations in which an expert opinion is needed, non-experts are experiencing some type
of a crisis). “The professional has the specialized knowledge and means to diagnose the
problem, determine the alternative approaches to resolving it, and then take the necessary
steps. This knowledge gives a professional power over an individual.” Id.
6. Perhaps the first recognition of social science research by courts was in Muller v.
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) and the “Brandeis Brief,” which was used to support the decision
that regulation of the working hours of women was a legitimate governmental interest. See
id. at 419 & n.†. Another notable early case, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
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7

criminal proceedings.
8
9
Despite its frequent use, applying social science knowledge to legal
10
Scholars have vigorously
questions entails persistent difficulties.
(1954), and its acclaimed footnote eleven cited Kenneth Clark and other social psychologists’
work on the detrimental effects of segregation. Id. at 494 n.11. See also NOREEN L.
CHANNELS, SOCIAL SCIENCE METHODS IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 5 (1985), for a discussion of
both Muller and Brown.
7. Experts have been called to testify on such widely diverse issues as eyewitness
testimony, child abuse accommodation syndrome, post-traumatic stress disorder, and
discrimination issues. See, e.g., United States v. Coleman, 41 M.J. 46, 47 (C.M.A. 1994)
(involving an expert on child sex abuse); United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392, 394 (C.M.A.
1993) (describing rape trauma syndrome); United States v. Suarez, 35 M.J. 374, 375 (C.M.A.
1992) (involving descriptions of child abuse accommodation syndrome). See generally Saul M.
Kassin et al., The “General Acceptance” of Psychological Research on Eyewitness Testimony:
A Survey of the Experts, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1089 (1989); Christopher Slobogin,
Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Trials: To Junk or Not to Junk?, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1
(1998). Additionally, some experts have been called to testify as gang experts in gang
injunction cases. See, e.g., Plácido G. Gómez, It Is Not So Simply Because an Expert Says It Is
So: The Reliability of Gang Expert Testimony Regarding Membership in Criminal Street
Gangs: Pushing the Limits of Texas Rule of Evidence 702, 34 ST. MARY’S L.J. 581, 605 (2003).
Gómez argues that expert testimony to identify gang members relies heavily on experience
and observation, and it is not reliable and thus should not be admissible. Id.
8. See Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Julius G. Getman, Social Science in Legal DecisionMaking, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 581, 581–88 (Leon Lipson & Stanton Wheeler
eds., 1986) (discussing the frequency and variety of social science interactions with the law);
Sharon D. Herzberger, Social Science Contributions to the Law: Understanding and Predicting
Behavior, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1067, 1067 (1993) (describing the “substantial involvement of
social scientists” in the legal arena).
Expert testimony may be used in various ways. See, e.g., L. Grant Foster, Comment, A
Case Study in Toxic Tort Causation: Scientific and Legal Standards Work Against Recovery
for Victims, 19 ENVTL. L. 141, 149 (1988) (explaining how expert testimony is often used to
link an injury to exposure to a toxic substance). However, scholars often lament the use of
expert testimony in the courtroom because their testimony often allows “junk science” into
the courtroom. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of
Experts: Deference or Education?, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1131, 1131 (1993) (noting the
“increasingly controversial” nature of expert testimony).
9. See, e.g., Bruce D. Black, The Use (or Abuse) of Expert Witnesses in Post-Daubert
Employment Litigation, 17 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 269, 283 (2000). With regard to social
sciences, Black says, “[T]he research, theories and opinions cannot have the exactness of hard
science methodologies.” Id. (quoting Jensen v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287, 1297
(8th Cir. 1997)).
10. See M. Neil Browne et al., The Epistemological Role of Expert Witnesses and Toxic
Torts, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 39–40 (1998) (contrasting the legal system’s methods for obtaining
truth with truth that is sought by scientific processes); Sheila Jasanoff, What Judges Should
Know About the Sociology of Science, 77 JUDICATURE 77, 80 (1993) (“[T]he ultimate goal of
the courts is the attainable one of dispensing justice, not the impossible one of finding
objective truth.”); see also Peter W. Sperlich, The Evidence on Evidence: Science and Law in
Conflict and Cooperation, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 325,
337–342 (Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman eds., 1985) (describing jurists’ concerns
about scientific evidence); Thomas M. Crowley, Help Me Mr. Wizard! Can We Really Have

BROWNE_HARRISON-SPOREL_-_13

1122

7/5/2008 2:34:02 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[91:1119

debated the extent to which courts should rely on mental health
11
professionals’ predictions of violence.
The introduction of these
12
professionals’ predictions of violence has become a generally accepted
13
practice, and yet, an examination of “dangerousness” research reveals
“Neutral” Rule 706 Experts?, 1998 DET. C.L. MICH. ST. U. L. REV. 927, 928–30 (asserting the
danger of deluding oneself into thinking that any expert can be truly neutral); Emily C.
Lieberman, Forced Medication and the Need to Protect the Rights of the Mentally Ill Criminal
Defendant, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 479, 480 (2007) (discussing the difficulty
of predicting dangerousness).
11. See, e.g., JOHN W. PARRY, NATIONAL BENCHBOOK ON PSYCHIATRIC AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY 20 (1998); Charles P. Ewing, “Dr. Death” and
the Case for an Ethical Ban on Psychiatric and Psychological Predictions of Dangerousness in
Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 8 AM. J.L. & MED. 407, 409 (1983) (“Over the past two
decades, empirical research has consistently demonstrated that psychiatric and psychological
predictions of dangerousness generally prove to be inaccurate.”); Eric S. Janus & Paul E.
Meehl, Assessing the Legal Standard for Predictions of Dangerousness in Sex Offender
Commitment Proceedings, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 33, 35 (1997) (“There is continuing
debate about whether predictions of dangerousness are accurate enough to support
deprivation of liberty.”); Thomas Regnier, Barefoot in Quicksand: The Future of “Future
Dangerousness” Predictions in Death Penalty Sentencing in the World of Daubert and Kumho,
37 AKRON L. REV. 469, 476–77 (2004); Gary Gleb, Comment, Washington’s Sexually Violent
Predator Law: The Need to Bar Unreliable Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness from
Civil Commitment Proceedings, 39 UCLA L. REV. 213, 222–28 (1991) (describing psychiatric
predictions of long-term dangerousness as “highly unreliable and prejudicial evidence”);
Eugenia T. La Fontaine, Note, A Dangerous Preoccupation with Future Danger: Why Expert
Predictions of Future Dangerousness in Capital Cases Are Unconstitutional, 44 B.C. L. REV.
207, 229–35 (2002) (arguing that expert testimony about future dangerousness is unreliable,
inaccurate, and unconstitutional). But see Alexander D. Brooks, The Constitutionality and
Morality of Civilly Committing Violent Sexual Predators, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 709,
736–40 (1992) (suggesting that mental health professionals can accurately predict future
sexual violence).
12. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307–09, 321 (2002) (remanding a case in
which a mentally retarded individual was sentenced to death for a capital crime, based in part
on predictions of “future dangerousness”); United States v. Wattleton, 296 F.3d 1184, 1192–94
(11th Cir. 2002) (acquitting Defendant Wattleton on grounds of insanity, but committing him
on grounds of dangerousness).
13. Many commentators have criticized the use of the word “dangerousness” as
problematic. See John Monahan, Introduction to THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT
BEHAVIOR: CRIME AND DELINQUENCY ISSUES 4–5 (1981) (“‘Dangerousness’ confuses
issues regarding what one is predicting with the probability one is assigning to its
prediction.”); Edwin I. Megargee, The Prediction of Dangerous Behavior, 3 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 3, 5 (1976) (“‘Dangerousness’ is an unfortunate term, for it implies there is a trait of
‘dangerousness’ which, like intelligence, is a relatively constant characteristic of the person
being assessed. However, the degree of danger an individual represents to himself or others
varies markedly as a function of a number of variables.”); see also Thomas Grisso & Paul S.
Appelbaum, Is It Unethical to Offer Predictions of Future Violence?, 16 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 621, 623 n.3 (1992).
Future discourse in this area might be facilitated by ridding ourselves of
the phrase predictions of dangerousness. It has no logical meaning in the
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the problems inherent in the field and in social science literature as a
whole.
This Article challenges the widely held assumption that social
science evidence generally, and predictions of violence specifically, are
sufficiently objective, neutral, or “true” to warrant anything but a wary
14
acceptance in the judicial system. Our argument will follow two paths.
The first is the more abstract argument based on philosophy of science
notions about what science is and what it can offer. When we examine
the case law relevant to expert witnesses, we will see how the standards
for admissibility of this testimony fail to adequately consider how
15
scientific pronouncements are shaped by the “argumentative aspects of
16
Science is more appropriately conceived of as a
social life.”
17
contextually based, social endeavor and is not capable of providing the
18
19
objective, universal truths that justify presentation by a single expert.
context of the behavioral and social sciences. To “predict” is to make a
statement about the likelihood of a future event or behavior.
Dangerousness seems to refer not to an event or behavior, but to a
condition that exists as a function of the presence of someone or
something perceived as “dangerous.”
Id. at 623 n.3. For the purposes of this portion of the Article, the terms “violent behavior” or
“violence” will be used except when quoting sources.
14. The positivist perspective of science contends that the truth exists and is waiting for
humans to find it. See DONALD POLKINGHORNE, METHODOLOGY FOR THE HUMAN
SCIENCES 16–20 (1983) (describing the naturalism-empiricism-positivism tradition and its
proposition that experience of the senses is the only source of knowledge); Richard Rorty,
Science as Solidarity, in THE RHETORIC OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 38, 38–39 (John S. Nelson
et al. eds., 1987) (describing the notion that truth corresponds with reality); David C. Geary,
The Evolution of Cognition and the Social Construction of Knowledge, 51 AM. PSYCHOL. 265,
266 (1996) (describing the basic assumption “that all knowledge is culturally mediated and is
constructed through” social activities).
15. See Browne et al., supra note 10, at 72 (revealing that scientific knowledge is created
in a social context that is full of power struggles).
16. MICHAEL BILLIG, ARGUING AND THINKING: A RHETORICAL APPROACH TO
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 4 (1987); see also Jeanine Czubaroff, The Deliberative Character of
Strategic Scientific Debates, in RHETORIC IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES 28, 28–29 (Herbert W.
Simons ed., 1989).
17. See SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY
IN AMERICA 52–53 (1995). “The authority of scientific claims derives, according to the
sociological account, not directly, from the representation of physical reality, but indirectly,
from the certification of claims through a multitude of informal, often invisible, negotiations
among members of relevant disciplines.” Id. at 52.
18. See Bert Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for
Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715, 765 (1994). Black points out that law and science
have different ends. He admonishes, “Lawyers and judges need to understand that the
scientific landscape encompasses many hypotheses that lie between the poles of speculative
conjecture and established scientific fact. There is no absolute level of certainty that makes a
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The second component of this argument will demonstrate that, even
accepting the logical empiricists’ position that “truth” exists and can be
revealed through scientific methodology, violence predictions have not
attained the degree of objectivity, neutrality, or universalism frequently
posited, and thus, need for presentation of multiple expert opinions
exists in this particular illustration of social science expertise. Thus,
Parts V and VI familiarize the reader with the empirical literature on
the prediction of dangerousness and challenge some of the
misconceptions about mental health professionals’ ability to predict
20
future violence. We begin by providing a brief history of the “first21
generation”
dangerousness prediction literature and the legal
community’s response to this research. Part V includes a representative,
although not comprehensive, review of recent methodological
22
improvements in “second-generation” research, followed by an
analysis of the current empirical evidence.
A key component in this discussion is the description and
23
24
comparative analysis of clinical and actuarial prediction strategies
proposition scientific.” Id.
Additionally, see Philip Mirowski, The Rhetoric of Modern Economics, 3 HIST. HUM.
SCI. 243, 246 (1992), which recounts Descartes’ inclination to “redefine rationality so as to
isolate it from all emotional attachment[].” Id. By doing so he hoped to establish thought in
the mind that would be as orderly and dependable as the natural order of numbers. Id. This
yearning for certitude is both old and understandable, but yearning does not ipso facto create
fulfillment of the desire.
19. Experts who suggest that experts are truth dispensers, rather than thoughtful people
presenting an argument, are probably persuasive to uninformed listeners. But see ROBYN M.
DAWES, HOUSE OF CARDS: PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY BUILT ON MYTH viii
(1994) (arguing that any mental health expert taking a position of certainty regarding the
future behavior of a particular individual is “by definition incompetent” given the
documented inability of such experts to justifiably make such a claim).
20. Inaccuracies in the literature concerning prediction accuracy abound. See infra notes
229–30 and accompanying text.
21. See John Monahan, The Prediction of Violent Behavior: Toward a Second
Generation of Theory and Policy, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 10, 10 (1984). Professor Monahan
coined this phrase—“first-generation”—to refer to the five seminal studies conducted in the
early 1970s examining the accuracy of mental health professionals’ predictions of violence.
Id.; see infra notes 245–51 and accompanying text.
22. Monahan, supra note 21, at 10 (describing the methodological limitations of
dangerousness research and calling for empirical research to address these methodological
problems); see infra Part V.C.
23. Clinical prediction relies upon information gathered by an experienced clinician who
then forms an estimation of risk intuitively or subjectively based on the information obtained.
See infra Part VI.
24. Actuarial strategies rely on mathematical equations to predict violence based on the
presence or absence of factors previously identified to be correlated with future violence. See
infra notes 366–69. These equations produce numerical probability estimates describing the
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presently used to inform dangerousness decision making. Prediction
strategies have generally been divided into two types: clinical and
25
actuarial.
Early prediction studies relied exclusively on clinical
judgment while more recent research efforts have attempted to quantify
prediction methods with the use of mathematical equations.
Critics challenging proffered predictions of dangerousness have
based their objections on a few evidentiary doctrines including: the
26
27
relevancy doctrine, the reliability or “trustworthiness” standard
28
articulated in the Federal Rules of Evidence and elaborated in Daubert
29
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and the “unfair prejudice”
30
doctrine. The question of whether violence prediction testimony can
risk of future violent acts. Id. See generally infra Part VII.
25. This dichotomy is a vast over-generalization. Clinical judgments can be informed by
numerical probability estimates, while actuarial instruments can incorporate subjective
impressionistic data into the equation. See infra note 403 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 225–28 and accompanying text.
27. This requirement ensures that proffered testimony meets what the court considers as
minimum standards of reliability and validity. Critics of opposing expert dangerousness
predictions assert that existing data concerning violence prediction fails to demonstrate
accurate, valid, or reliable findings to meet these standards. See, e.g., George E. Dix, Expert
Prediction Testimony in Capital Sentencing: Evidentiary and Constitutional Considerations, 19
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 21 (1981) (“Increasingly it is agreed that [clinical dangerousness]
testimony, which is of dubious accuracy and questioned by the mental health professional
community, is unlikely to aid the trier of fact to a significant degree.”); Ewing, supra note 11,
at 409 (“[E]mpirical research has consistently demonstrated that psychiatric and
psychological predictions of dangerousness generally prove to be inaccurate.”).
28. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (“If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”). See also Harvey Brown, Eight Gates for
Expert Witnesses, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 743 (1999), for a comprehensive analysis of the
evidentiary requirements of proffered expert testimony.
An addendum to Rule 702 was passed by the Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States in 2002 that requires “(1) the
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to
the facts of the case.” FED. R. EVID. 702. This committee is composed of twenty-five federal
judges who determine the policy of United States courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2006).
29. 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993) (asserting that the Federal Rules of Evidence superceded
the Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), “general acceptance” standard for
evidence previously governing expert testimony); see also Frye, 293 F. at 1014. The Court
concluded Rule 702 mandates a gatekeeping role for the judiciary. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.
Judges performing this role are to ascertain whether proffered testimony provides a
sufficiently reliable foundation based on scientific knowledge. Id. at 590. This has become
known as the “evidentiary reliability” test. Id.
30. Courts are wary of the “aura of scientific infallibility” that may prejudice the trier of
fact. See Margaret A. Berger, Evidentiary Framework, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 3, at 37, 115. Both the Federal Rules of Evidence, FED. R.
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withstand these challenges is examined and leads to the authors’
conclusions that expert testimony based solely on clinical judgment
should frequently fail to meet admissibility standards.
Therefore, we contend that the party providing this testimony must,
on a case-by-case basis, bear the burden of proof in demonstrating the
31
efficacy of violence prediction testimony by the proposed expert.
Further, we acknowledge that empirical research supports the efficacy
32
of actuarial based predictions, but conclude that no single, universally
33
accepted actuarial instrument has been acknowledged at present.
Finally, the relative inefficacy of cross-examination to challenge
unreliable or arbitrary prediction testimony requires presentation of
opposing experts. Thus, we argue that the trier of fact must ascertain
the appropriateness of the instrument in the particular case, as well as
assess the competence of each proffered expert in using the assessment
instrument before admitting proffered testimony of this type.
We use illustrative cases as a vehicle to explore the application of
actuarial prediction testimony to statutory standards of proof
requirements. Recommendations are made concerning the kinds of
questions members of the judiciary should consider when evaluating
proffered expert violence prediction testimony. Some general maxims
are also provided concerning the types of questions and circumstances
that might lead the trier of fact to determine whether the testimony fails
to pass evidentiary muster.
I. SCIENCE MEETS LAW: THE ROLE OF EXPERTS IN THE COURTROOM
A. Legal and Scientific Discourse
Legal and scientific paradigms are separate and incongruous entities.
34
The legal system is adversarial in nature: each party in a dispute ideally
EVID. 403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.”), and Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595, provide for the
exclusion of relevant, but possibly prejudicial or misleading, evidence that may unduly sway
the trier of fact. See Brown, supra note 28, at 750.
31. For the courts, efficacy must be demonstrated by empirical evidence admissible
under the Federal Rules of Evidence. See infra Part II.
32. See infra notes 365–73 and accompanying text.
33. See VERNON L. QUINSEY ET AL., VIOLENT OFFENDERS: APPRAISING AND
MANAGING RISK 169 (1998) (discussing the selection criteria for choosing one actuarial
instrument over another).
34. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE
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has an equally skilled and knowledgeable advocate armed with the best
35
arguments for his side, and the jury arrives at the “just” conclusion by
36
watching the battle between the conflicting arguments.
Lawyers on each side of a case present only that evidence favorable
37
to their own clients. The legal system relies on the cross-examination
38
and refutation that takes place in the courtroom to clarify the evidence
and allow the jury to fill in the evidence gap on either side and make the
39
best decision. The “truth” that is sought by the legal process is thus
not simply the most objective or descriptive conclusion, but a conclusion
40
41
ensuring justice and fairness instead of some elusive “truth.”
LEGAL PROFESSION 56 (2000) (“The claim that adversarial clashes yield factually accurate
results is not self-evident.”)
35. See, e.g., ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES: THE MORALITY
OF ROLES IN PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL LIFE 3–13 (1999).
36. The “best” arguments as determined by a jury are defined from a legal perspective,
not an intellectual one. The adversarial principle is similar to the metaphor of the “market
place of ideas.” If everyone presents his or her “wares” in the market, we will have the best
opportunity to arrive at the “truth.” See Peter Huber, Junk Science in the Courtroom, 26
VAL. U. L. REV. 723, 733 (1992); Clifton T. Hutchinson & Danny S. Ashby, Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Redefining the Bases for Admissibility of Expert Scientific
Testimony, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1875, 1878–80 (1994). This “market place of ideas”
metaphor may not be appropriate for the courtroom, where there may not be equal
availability of expertise, whether from lack of ability or financial resources, to the particular
parties in the dispute. Such inequalities in representation would be not an equal exchange,
but an oligopolistic situation, invalidating the competitive metaphor.
37. See Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1481,
1587 (1995) [hereinafter Confronting the New Challenges].
38. Congress relied on this process when it enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence with
its lenient standards of admissibility. See Leslie A. Lunney, Protecting Juries from
Themselves: Restricting the Admission of Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Cases, 48 SMU L.
REV. 103, 105 (1994).
39. Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 37, at 1587 (citing a case where, because
lawyers failed to emphasize counterarguments, the jury believed that all asbestosis victims
would have identical symptoms).
40. See, e.g., Michael S. Jacobs, Testing the Assumptions Underlying the Debate About
Scientific Evidence: A Closer Look at Juror “Incompetence” and Scientific “Objectivity,” 25
CONN. L. REV. 1083, 1086 (1993).
41. See Browne et al., supra note 10, at 39 (recognizing that the legal system is in hot
pursuit of justice, and discussing that, if truth were sought in the courtroom, juries would
consist of the intellectual elite, not average members of the community); Jacobs, supra note
40, at 1086 (citing, e.g., Richard O. Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Let’s Not Rush
to Judgment, 80 MICH. L. REV. 68, 80–84 (1981)); ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA 295 (Vintage Books 1945) (1840). De Tocqueville writes,
The jury, and more especially the civil jury, serves to communicate the
spirit of the judges to the minds of all the citizens; and this spirit, with the
habits which attend it, is the soundest preparation for free institutions. It
imbues all classes with a respect for the thing judged and with the notion
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In contrast, science is a pursuit for more knowledge and better
understanding of the world, marked by openness and rational
42
deliberation by its participants, under few or no time constraints.
Objectivity and empirical observation are lauded as the prime
43
determiners of scientific fact.
When an expert enters the courtroom, the two worlds of science and
44
law are brought into play.
Despite the difference in approach and
45
standards of proof for the two disciplines, the specialized product

of right. If these two elements be removed, the love of independence
becomes a mere destructive passion. It teaches men to practice equity;
every man learns to judge his neighbor as he would himself be judged.
And this is especially true of the jury in civil causes; for while the number
of persons who have reason to apprehend a criminal prosecution is small,
everyone is liable to have a lawsuit. . . . It invests each citizen with a kind
of magistracy; it makes them all feel the duties which they are bound to
discharge towards society and the part which they take in its government.
By obliging men to turn their attention to affairs other than their own, it
rubs off that private selfishness which is the rust of society.
DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra,

at 295.
42. Science’s advantage of lack of time pressure illustrates differences between the legal
system and science. Unlike science, the legal system does face deadlines and short time
periods. But see Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 37, at 1533 (suggesting that the
distinction between the rigor required by law and science is a false dichotomy).
43. See Hutchinson & Ashby, supra note 36, at 1878–79. Although jurors may assume
that scientists embody these attributes, other commentators reject the view of science as
objective in any meaningful sense of that word; instead, a scientist in the courtroom is
considered a parallel to the advocacy approach to truth used in our legal system. Stephen J.
Gould is a prominent critic of claims of objectivity by scientists. See, e.g., STEPHEN J.
GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 20 (1981); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms.,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993) (“[T]here are no certainties in science.”); Allan Megill,
Introduction: Four Senses of Objectivity, in RETHINKING OBJECTIVITY 1, 5–8 (Allan Megill
ed., 1994).
44. See Eileen A. Scallen & William E. Wiethoff, The Ethos of Expert Witnesses:
Confusing the Admissibility, Sufficiency and Credibility of Expert Testimony, 49 HASTINGS
L.J. 1143, 1143–44 (1998) (“[T]he testimonial discourse of experts, though not cast in the
elegant form of oratory, has rhetorical tenor and effect. Expert testimony, even that based on
natural or social science, is argumentation, made for, and in, a unique context—the law
. . . .”).
. .
45 See, e.g., Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 37, at 1484. While considering
the “inherent inconsistency” between the demands of the legal and scientific worlds, Dan
Burk stated:
Lawyers, who dwell . . . in an adversarial realm, are governed by written
rules of professional conduct that require them to . . . act as zealous
advocates on their client’s behalf. . . . Scientists, on the other hand . . .
have developed strong unwritten professional rules—based on norms of
intellectual objectivity—that are different from those governing lawyers.

BROWNE_HARRISON-SPOREL_-_13

2008]

7/5/2008 2:34:02 PM

EXPERT PREDICTIONS OF DANGEROUSNESS
46

1129

47

offered by the expert —scientific knowledge —is in demand by the
48
legal system to provide necessary input on issues of scientific
49
complexity. As we seek an optimal role for experts in the legal system,
it is essential to inquire into the origins and attributes of their expertise.

Dan L. Burk, Using Scientists as Courtroom Witnesses: System Needs Improvement, THE
SCIENTIST, Oct. 26, 1992, at 11, 11.
Benjamin Cardozo, however, compared science to the legal system, saying, “The work of
a judge is in one sense enduring and in another sense ephemeral. . . . In the endless process of
testing and retesting, there is a constant rejection of the dross, and a constant retention of
whatever is pure and sound and fine.” BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 178–79 (1921) (quoted in Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597 n.13).
The legal system’s time constraints are illustrated by its regulations on the number of
experts who may testify and the time that may be given to hear their testimony. See, e.g., Jack
B. Weinstein, Scientific Evidence in Complex Litigation, in TRIAL EVIDENCE, CIVIL
PRACTICE, AND EFFECTIVE LITIGATION TECHNIQUES IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS
709, 726 (1991) (citing Flannigan v. GAF Corp., 904 F.2d 36 (6th Cir. 1990)). The Court in
Daubert also emphasized the legal system’s need to settle disputes “finally and quickly.”
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.
Unfortunately, the structure of the adversary system discourages honest skepticism and
reflection. See, e.g., Peter W. Huber, On Law and Sciosophy, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 319, 347
(1990) (“Any half-competent lawyer will prefer committed support from the fringe to even
the slightest ambivalence from the middle.”).
46. See, e.g., Robert Hairman, The Rhetoric of Inquiry and the Professional Scholar, in
RHETORIC IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES, supra note 16, at 211, 224 (“Disciplinary knowledge is
both a claim to know and a means of social control, . . . a body of knowledge and a
suppression of interpretive thinking.”).
47. “Scientific knowledge,” according to Daubert, is evidence derived by the scientific
method and supported by appropriate validation. 509 U.S. at 590. Evidence will assist the
trier of fact if it is relevant. Id. at 591. This relevancy requirement however is not sufficient
to meet the assistance criterion. Id. Instead, the evidence also must contain a “valid scientific
connection to the pertinent inquiry.” Id. at 592.
48. In some states, this appeal to expertise is mandatory. See Stephen D. Easton, “Yer
Outta Here!” A Framework for Analyzing the Potential Exclusion of Expert Testimony Under
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 8 (1998) (“In medical or other
professional malpractice actions based upon the law of some states, plaintiffs must present
admissible expert testimony about the standard of care and the defendant’s failure to meet
this standard.”).
49. As confusing as this input may be, the inadequacy of our personal knowledge base to
form adequate reasoning is highlighted by Haskell, supra note 5, at x, where he concedes that
If it could be done, I suppose all of us would prefer to base everything we
do and think on “good reasons” rather than expert authority. But the
conduct of everyday affairs requires us to hold so many opinions and
make so many decisions that we cannot possibly base them on the
personally examined evidence and the inwardly compelling logic that
“good reasons” imply.
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B. Expert Testimony: Uses and Misuses
Expert testimony in the courtroom is subject to certain pitfalls. A
brief look at the roles of jury, judge, and expert when such testimony is
heard gives a sense of the difficulty of evaluating expert testimony and
the need for a clearer understanding of the nature and origins of expert
50
testimony in what is essentially an epistemological issue. The difficulty
of sorting through expert testimony makes us wonder: Who should be
51
responsible for this evaluation? Different admissibility standards
52
produce different interpretative roles for the players.
High on the list of concerns associated with a court’s use of expert
testimony is misinterpretation of such testimony by the finder of fact.

Id.
50. By epistemology, we mean in this Article “How do we know what we think we
know?” rather than “How do we know the truth?” The latter question is from a realist
perspective we do not share, as will become plain.
51. However, as we shall see later, admissibility may not be the only, or even the prime
concern in a reevaluation of experts. Tweaking admissibility standards may not address a
more central issue: the origins of the evidence being admitted. See Scallen & Wiethoff, supra
note 44, at 1149 (“[C]ourts have focused on the issue of the admissibility of expert testimony
at the expense of understanding how issues of admissibility, sufficiency and credibility all
work together to determine the ethos of expert testimony presented at trial.”). The same
could be said of many legal scholars who focus excessively on issues of admissibility. Contra
Thomas D. Lyon & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Relevance Ratio: Evaluating the Probative Value
of Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 43 (1996) (arguing
that “[s]tandards pertaining to the admissibility of scientific testimony are critical to the
outcome in many trials.”). No doubt they are correct; however, the authors’ suggestions for
improving admissibility standards using a relevance ratio do not embrace the larger concerns
of expert witness testimony. See generally Michael H. Graham, The Expert Witness
Predicament: Determining “Reliable” Under the Gatekeeping Test of Daubert, Kumho, and
Proposed Amended Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 317
(2000). Graham points out significant ambiguities regarding the admissibility of expert
witnesses’ testimony in the courtroom, but he does not examine the consequences of expert
testimony per se. Id. But see generally Bruce Abramson, Blue Smoke or Science? The
Challenge of Assessing Expertise Offered as Advocacy, 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 723 (2001).
Abramson’s article is concerned with procedural issues aimed at keeping “bad science” out of
the courtroom. Despite the lack of attention to experts’ monopolization of the truth and the
moral hazard surrounding their practice, he recognizes that “[e]xpert testimony is inherently
problematic.” Id. at 765; see also Lorie S. Gildea, Sifting the Dross: Expert Witness Testimony
in Minnesota After the Daubert Trilogy, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 93, 93–94 (2000) (arguing
that Minnesota should change its expert witness testimony admissibility criteria to that of
Daubert).
52. The admissibility standards are based not only on a sense of roles, but of the legal
goals of those players. See Weinstein, supra note 45, at 730. The use of experts varies
depending on the legal goals; the goal of reducing litigation is served by a stringent standard
for admission, while the goal of obtaining compensation for deserving plaintiffs may
necessitate the admission of less pristine expertise. See, e.g., Allen & Miller, supra note 8, at
1131 (noting the “increasingly controversial” nature of expert testimony).
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Experts have been defined as follows:
[P]ersons who are qualified, either by actual experience
or by careful study, so as to enable them to form definite
opinions with respect to a division of science, branch of
art, or department of trade about which persons having
no particular training or special study are incapable of
forming accurate opinions or of drawing correct
53
conclusions.
This definition of expertise points to the usefulness of such
54
specialized knowledge as an aid to the jury in evaluating the evidence
55
in many legal controversies. However, the knowledge gap between
56
expert and juror that necessitates expert testimony leads to a different
problem: If the role of the expert is to enable the juror to assess the
evidence in the case, what happens when the juror is unable to assess the
57
testimony of the expert?

53. 31A AM. JUR. 2D Expert and Opinion Evidence § 1 (2002) (citations omitted).
54. See Eric G. Jensen, Comment, When “Hired Guns” Backfire: The Witness Immunity
Doctrine and the Negligent Expert Witness, 62 UMKC L. REV. 185, 186 (1993). Jensen
explains, “With the increase in legislation and government regulation over the last thirty
years, no one, not even a highly educated judge, can remain fully knowledgeable of all
pertinent issues. Thus, the testimony of expert witnesses is often needed and used to clarify,
explain and assist on many important issues.” Id. at 189–90 (citations omitted).
55. The role of expert as educator for the jury has been the predominant view. See, e.g.,
Allen & Miller, supra note 8, at 1131–33, 1141 (noting that the Federal Rules of Evidence
encourage the educational role of the expert).
56. Id. at 1133. This knowledge gap may be the largest in cases involving “novel
scientific testimony.” See id.
57. See Jacobs, supra note 40, at 1088 (stating “the oft-expressed notion that lay jurors
‘are incompetent to evaluate scientific proof critically’” (quoting Edward J. Imwinkelried,
Judge Versus Jury: Who Should Decide Questions of Preliminary Facts Conditioning the
Admissibility of Scientific Evidence?, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 577, 580 (1984))). Given this
inability to distinguish between “charlatans” and “Nobel prize winners,” presented with two
extremes, jurors are likely to presume the truth lies somewhere in between. Id. at 1088–89;
see also Browne et al., supra note 10, at 13 n.67 (“[D]enunciation of juror competence and
reliance on outside help to assess the reliability of the evidence should apply likewise to the
jury’s ability to evaluate the testimony that is admitted.”).
Vidmar and Diamond, on the other hand, argue that juries are competent:
Jurors appear motivated to critically assess the content of the expert’s
testimony and weigh it in the context of the other trial evidence, as they
are instructed to do. They appear to understand the nature of the
adversary process, at least in the context of their specific trial. Even
though many jurors may not have had prior exposure to the trial process,
it appears that they develop an understanding from the give and take of
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When the court hears the testimony of an “expert,” especially
someone recognized as a “scientific expert,” the jury may be overly
58
59
impressed by the credentials presented and terminology used by this
60
61
individual, hindering the jury’s ability to fully understand and
examination and cross-examination and exposure to opposing experts.
Indeed, rather than simply deferring automatically to experts, as critics
have claimed, the trial process appears to make them aware of the
fallibility of expert testimony. This is not to say that every juror is
motivated and grasps the expert testimony, because the data seldom shed
light on the thought processes of individual jurors, but the deliberation
process appears to result in closer examination of diverging views and
understandings—just as the legal system assumes it does.
Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV.
1121, 1174 (2001). Vidmar and Diamond describe another study conducted by Vidmar
involving five malpractice cases:
[These studies] show that the jurors were not passive in evaluating the
experts or their testimony. Indeed, one of the findings from the interviews
of jurors was that they clearly understood the adversary system. They
identified basic disagreements between the experts. They considered
absence of evidence and incompleteness of testimony. They scrutinized
possible motives behind each expert’s testimony such as money and the
possibility that an expert was giving testimony to support a fellow
physician. They had a basically solid understanding of burdens of proof
and where the expert testimony fit into assessing that burden. Most
importantly, the jurors in each case evaluated the testimony in the context
of other trial evidence.
Id. at 1141–42.
One recent proposal was to extend Frye and have the judge present the proffered
scientific evidence to a committee of scientists who would testify at trial as to its validity. See
Weinstein, supra note 45, at 728.
58. See PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 58 (Myra Bergman Ramos
trans., 1970) (stating that nonexperts are often led to act as “containers” or “receptacles to be
filled” by unexamined pronouncements of expert knowledge).
59. See, e.g., John W. Osborne, Judicial/Technical Assessment of Novel Scientific
Evidence, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 497, 501 (arguing that the jury may be more impressed by the
string of credentials than by the actual testimony of the expert).
60. See, e.g., IAN R. FRECKELTON, THE TRIAL OF THE EXPERT: A STUDY OF EXPERT
EVIDENCE AND FORENSIC EXPERTS 141 (1987) (describing how an expert can use technical
or foreign language, uncommon words, and complex sentences); see also Stephen A.
Saltzburg, Improving the Quality of Jury Decisionmaking, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL
JURY SYSTEM 341, 363 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993) (arguing that if a judge is unable to
comprehend expert or scientific testimony, she should assume that the jury is similarly
perplexed).
61. See Bayles, supra note 5, at 29 (“Because they allegedly lack the necessary
knowledge, laypersons cannot even evaluate professionals’ recommendations or actions.”).
The recognition of this paradox is, of course, nothing new. In his dialogue, Charmides, Plato
has Socrates address this very issue. After questioning one of his students, Socrates
eventually comes to conclude the following:
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63

evaluate the evidence presented by the expert. Commentators have
64
65
noted the “aura of scientific infallibility” that surrounds the expert,
especially when offering certain forms of evidence, such as statistical

Then assuredly, wisdom or temperance, if only a science of science, and of
the absence of science or knowledge, will not be able to distinguish the
physician who knows from one who does not know but pretends or thinks
that he knows, or any other professor of anything at all; like any other
artist, he will only know his fellow in art or wisdom, and no one else.
PLATO, Charmides, in THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 22 (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1937). What
Plato is arguing here is that those who are not physicians will never be able to distinguish
between the physician who really knows what she is talking about and the physician who does
not.
62. One expert in Texas, known as the “Doctor of Doom,” offered testimony in over
seventy capital punishment cases that the defendant was a dangerous “sociopath who would
kill again.” RHODE, supra note 34, at 104. Although this evidence was, in some cases, not
based on personal examination of the defendant by the expert, juries imposed the death
penalty in all but one trial. Id.
63. See Lunney, supra note 38, at 104–05; see also United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d
1224, 1236 (3d Cir. 1985) (recognizing that jurors may be swayed into believing that scientific
testimony is especially reliable and trustworthy). But see United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d
1194, 1199 (2d Cir. 1978) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the expert “awed [jurors]
by an ‘aura of mystic infallibility’”); Weinstein, supra note 45, at 711 (noting that the fear that
jurors will give too much weight to testimony from one labeled an “expert” has little evidence
to support it); Neil Vidmar, Pap and Circumstance: What Jury Verdict Statistics Can Tell Us
About Jury Behavior and the Tort System, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1205, 1205–06 (1994)
(arguing that statistics suggesting problems with jury decision making in tort cases are subject
to numerous methodological problems). See generally Augustine Brannigan & Michael
Lynch, On Bearing False Witness: Credibility as an Interactional Accomplishment, 16 J.
CONTEMP. ETHNOGRAPHY 115 (1987).
64. See Weinstein, supra note 45, at 723.
65. One commentator suggests that this aura could be mitigated by a revelation of
communications between experts and the attorneys for whom they testify. See Stephen D.
Easton, Ammunition for the Shoot-Out with the Hired Gun’s Hired Gun: A Proposal for Full
Expert Witness Disclosure, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 465, 508–09 (2000). Easton wants to limit the
partisanship of expert witnesses by making full disclosure of communication between expert
witnesses and attorneys mandatory, and he wants to end attorney-crafting of expert witness
testimony and give opposing lawyers assistance revealing expert witnesses’ biases. As Easton
says,
In a system which holds itself out as one that is designed to search for the
truth, one would expect that the substantial benefits enjoyed by experts
should be accompanied by increased reporting about the formation of
expert, as opposed to fact witness, testimony. Instead, as a practical
matter, reporting regarding the formation of expert testimony is often
more limited than discovery regarding the formulation of fact witness
testimony.
Id. (citation omitted).
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66

evidence.
When expert testimony from a single perspective is
67
presented, the jury may be influenced to regard such testimony as
68
69
indisputably accurate or decisive, thus abandoning its role as decision
70
When testimony from multiple perspectives is heard, the
maker.

66. See MORRIS E. CHAFETZ, THE TYRANNY OF EXPERTS: BLOWING THE WHISTLE
CULT OF EXPERTISE 103 (1996), where he points out that the average American is
particularly intimidated by mathematical and scientific knowledge. “A large part of the
population, when asked about their proficiency in the mathematics, confessed that they were
not ‘number people.’ They believe they cannot understand numbers and statistics, so they
invest in the incantations of those who purport to unravel the mysteries of the universe: the
scientists.” Id; see also WALTON, supra note 5, at 22 (“We tend to be intimidated by experts,
not only because they so often use technical jargon but because we ourselves . . . are not in a
good position to really understand the expert’s reasons for advocating a particular conclusion
or recommending a particular course of action.”).
67. See IRVING M. COPI & CARL COHEN, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 165 (10th ed.
1998).
ON THE

In attempting to make up one’s mind about some difficult or
complicated question, it is entirely reasonable to be guided by the
judgment of an acknowledged expert who has studied the matter
thoroughly. When we argue that a given conclusion is correct on the
ground that an expert authority has come to that judgment, we commit no
fallacy. Indeed, such recourse to authority is necessary for most of us on
very many matters. Of course, an expert’s judgment constitutes no
conclusive proof[,] . . . but expert opinion surely is one reasonable way to
support a conclusion.
Id.
68. But see, e.g., Franklin Strier, Making Jury Trials More Truthful, 30 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 95, 115 (1996) (“The adversary system is not a reliable means of bringing all the
relevant scientific data to the adjudicator’s attention or for separating valid research from
unwarranted conclusions.”) (citation omitted). Strier laments that because of the decision in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), “almost any practitioner’s
view, no matter how iconoclastic, may be welcome if reached via the scientific method.”
Strier, supra, at 115. He goes on to say that “[s]ocial scientists generally shirk the
responsibility to expose the limits of their own expertise.” Id.
69. See, e.g., Allan Raitz et al., Determining Damages: The Influence of Expert Testimony
on Jurors’ Decision Making, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 385 (1990). In a mock jury study, the
researchers found that “many jurors wholeheartedly accepted the figures proffered by the
expert for the plaintiff.” Id. at 390. Specifically, the jurors awarded the exact amount
mentioned by the plaintiff’s expert: “[T]he analyses of monetary awards indicated that expert
testimony influenced awards in an upward direction. Jurors unaided by expert testimony
awarded significantly less than those exposed to an expert.” Id. at 392; see also Weinstein,
supra note 45, at 712 (noting the potential impact of the “imprimatur of the trial judge’s
decision that [the person testifying] is an ‘expert’”).
70. Some scholars have proposed educational measures for juries to help them better
execute their role. See Keith Broyles, Note, Taking the Courtroom into the Classroom: A
Proposal for Educating the Lay Juror in Complex Litigation Cases, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
714, 745 (1996). Because “jurors do not enter the trial with a blank slate,” and they must
evaluate the testimony of expert witnesses, it is argued that they need assistance in their
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71

resulting jury confusion can impel such coping tactics as “splitting the
72
73
difference” between the two opinions.
Jurors may also be unduly

decision-making process. SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN
JURY ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 86 (1988). For example, in one case,
counsel furnished the jurors with definitions of all the exotic terms to be used in some patent
litigation. See CytoLogix Corp. v. Ventana Med. Sys., Inc., 424 F.3d 1168, 1170 (Fed. Cir.
2005). For example, Jack B. Weinstein has suggested the use of pedagogical aids to better
allow the jury to organize the information. Weinstein, supra note 45, at 728; see also Stanley
D. Davis, A Fresh Look at Hypothetical Questions and Ultimate Issues: The Kansas
Experience, 36 U. KAN. L. REV. 311, 353 (1988). Jurors awed by the mental prowess of
experts may not rely upon their own experience, even if they are instructed to do so. See
Hutchinson & Ashby, supra note 36, at 1878.
71. This confusion may be heightened by the belief Chafetz points out: “Many people
believe someone does, in fact, have answers that they do not possess. Because they want to
believe in that magical ‘someone,’ they are defenseless against those who claim to have
special knowledge.” CHAFETZ, supra note 66, at xiii.
[A]mong 170 million adult Americans, 27 million read below the fifthgrade level. Some 60 to 65 million read below the ninth grade level. To
comprehend public policy discussions on the op-ed pages of the New York
Times, the Washington Post, or the Wall Street Journal, a reader needs at
least a twelfth-grade reading level. In other words, nearly two out of five
Americans are ill-equipped to participate fully in public life. They do not
have the resources available to them should they wish to question the
scientists and would-be prognosticators.
Id. at 117–18.
Although courts and scholars may doubt the capabilities of the jury, protecting them
from scientific “banter” between opposing experts may lead the jury to view the expert’s
testimony as unquestionable. See Alan W. Tamarelli, Jr., Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals: Pushing the Limits of Scientific Reliability—The Questionable Wisdom of
Abandoning the Peer Review Standard for Admitting Expert Testimony, 47 VAND. L. REV.
1175, 1176 (1994) (arguing that other experts should make decisions about the reliability of
scientific evidence).
72. In a situation where jurors are faced with testimony from two or more conflicting
experts, each with his or her own “aura” of unquestionable accuracy and wisdom, they may
try to compromise by “splitting the difference” between the multiple viewpoints. See Richard
A. Epstein, A New Regime for Expert Witnesses, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 757, 758 (1992); Jacobs,
supra note 40, at 1090 (noting the concern that jurors may “split the intellectual difference”
between the “charlatans and Nobel prize winners”); Allen & Miller, supra note 8, at 1132.
The dichotomous thinking that presents scientific experts as either “charlatans” or “Nobel
Prize winners” is also reflected in the label “junk science.” Such hasty categorization restricts
the court’s understanding of expertise and its usefulness, and it substitutes for careful
consideration of the merits of such testimony, particularly when “junk science” is used as a
dismissal of the opponent’s testimony.
73. The response of jurors to conflicting opinions is described by Franklin Strier. Supra
note 68, at 115. He explains that in the O.J. Simpson criminal trial, People v. Simpson, No.
BA097211 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County 1995), jurors became visibly disinterested as experts
tepidly debated each other’s claims. Strier, supra note 68, at 115 n.65 (“What was supposed
to be educative was instead combative and confounding.”).
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influenced by the appearance or speaking ability of the experts.
Furthermore, there are concerns that jurors might be persuaded by
76
testimony from “hired guns” or experts whose opinions are based on
74. See David L. Wiley, Comment, Beauty and the Beast: Physical Appearance
Discrimination in American Criminal Trials, 27 ST. MARY’S L.J. 193, 234–35 (1995)
(considering how jurors discriminate according to physical appearance and suggesting that
some type of remedy should be made to ensure defendants are judged according to their
actions instead of their appearance).
75. See FRECKELTON, supra note 60, at 146. Freckleton refers to a study in which an
actor hired to play an expert giving a lecture was reviewed by three audiences of trained
educators. These audiences awarded the lecture favorable reviews, even though it contained
almost no substantive communication. FRECKELTON, supra note 60, at 146 (citing Donald H.
Naftulin et al., The Doctor Fox Lecture: A Paradigm of Educational Seduction, 48 J. MED.
EDUC. 630 (1973)). “This highlights the vital role that the presentation by the expert plays in
his or her effectiveness in purveying a point of view to the tribunal of fact.” Id.
An expert’s speaking abilities can also influence the juror’s acceptance of testimony. “If
witnesses are articulate and confident in their assertions, jurors are likely to attach much
more credibility to their testimony than if the witness speaks in a ‘powerless style.’” Id. at
147–48; see also Strier, supra note 68, at 114 (“Attention is too often focused on the personal
characteristics of expert witnesses instead of the quality of their evidence.”).
76. See Jensen, supra note 54, at 187; Lunney, supra note 38, at 110. Jensen explains,
“Trial, the magazine of the Association of Trial Lawyers, contains numerous experts’
advertisements proclaiming that they can bring in the highest judgments possible.” Jensen,
supra note 54, at 187; see also Easton, supra note 65, at 465. Lamenting the current rules of
expert witness testimony, Easton states, “In fact, it is difficult to imagine a system that would
lead to more biased testimony.” Easton, supra note 65, at 471; see also Justin P. Murphy,
Note, Expert Witnesses at Trial: Where Are the Ethics?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 217 (2000).
Murphy concludes, “Today, criticism of expert witnesses is widespread throughout the legal
community. One can find and hire an expert to testify on virtually any topic, and even simple
lawsuits often involve the testimony of an expert witness.” Murphy, supra, at 217–18
(citations omitted); see also L. Timothy Perrin, Expert Witness Testimony: Back to the Future,
29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1389, 1393 (1995). Perrin writes with a tone of disgust and outrage
toward the expert witness system. He states, “The combination of zealous advocates, paid
experts, liberal rules of admission, and untrained jurors raises the question of whether the
adversary system produces a reliable and accurate evaluation of expert witness testimony, and
whether it is capable of doing so.” Perrin, supra, at 1393; see also AM. MED. ASSOC., HOUSE
OF DELEGATES PROCEEDINGS, 147TH ANNUAL MEETING 75–78 (June 14–18, 1998),
[hereinafter AMA REPORT]. After stating that “medical witness[es] must not become an
advocate or a partisan in the legal proceeding,” the AMA Board states that “[e]conomic
incentives can color the nature of the physician expert’s testimony.” AMA REPORT, supra, at
77, 78; see also PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM 17 (1991). Objective truth might be the goal of the judicial process, but it is not
the goal of hiring an expert witness. Huber quotes a former president of the American Bar
Association who proclaimed, “I would go into a lawsuit with an objective uncommitted
independent expert . . . about as willingly as I would occupy a foxhole with a couple of
noncombatant soldiers.” HUBER, supra, at 18; see also Dick Thornburgh, Junk Science—The
Lawyer’s Ethical Responsibilities, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 449, 449 (1998). Former Attorney
General Thornburgh gives a straightforward condemnation:
A look at the classified section of any legal publication will produce
samples of a whole industry of “experts” advertising their abilities to
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77

“junk science.”
Should the judge be responsible for evaluating expert testimony
prior to trial? The current Federal Rules of Evidence require the judge
78
to determine whether an expert may testify.
Some commentators

provide a wide range of expert testimony. Many of them get right to the
point, highlighting jury awards or settlement amounts gained as a result of
their testimony. . . . Their business is litigation, not science. Their
motivation raises serious questions about the use of expert testimony
generally. Are these experts really seeking to assist the trier of fact, or are
they hired guns aiming at a pre-determined result?
Thornbrugh, supra, at 452; see also Daniel W. Shuman et al., An Empirical Examination of the
Use of Expert Witnesses in the Courts—Part II: A Three City Study, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 193,
205 (1994). Most experts are paid quite handsomely for their testimony. Shuman found that
the average fee charged by expert witnesses was $185 per hour, with a range from $50 per
hour to $500 per hour. Shuman et al., supra, at 205; see also Perrin, supra, at 1414. Perrin
concludes, “[N]o expert is immune from the bias that comes with compensation.” Perrin,
supra, at 1415. Similarly, Jeffrey L. Harrison argues that the preference for effective rather
than honest expert witnesses leads to social costs, including “wrong” decisions and excessive
costs in courts’ attempts to expose expert biases. See generally Jeffrey L. Harrison,
Reconceptualizing the Expert Witness: Social Costs, Current Controls and Proposed
Responses, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 253 (2001). These costs, which are not internalized by
experts themselves, must be absorbed in other parts of the judicial system. Id. at 259.
Harrison argues that several controlling devices on experts, such as excluding expert
testimony, “judicial shunning,” and legal action, are unlikely to reduce levels of dishonesty
and bias testimony because these devices are not internalized by the experts themselves. Id.
at 314. But see Miles J. Vigilante, Note, Screening Expert Testimony After Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 8 J.L. & POL’Y 543, 546 (2000) (acknowledging problems associated with the use
of expert testimony, but nevertheless, arguing that the current rules governing the
admissibility of expert testimony make for an adequate system); Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as
Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA.
L. REV. 1109 (1997). In his discussion of juries’ perceptions of witnesses in capital cases
Sundby concludes, “[E]xperts are only one of many tools necessary to build an effective case
in mitigation.” Id. at 1188. Sundby also found juries reported negatively evaluating
testimony of experts who they thought were biased. Id. at 1128. He found that defense
experts in capital murder cases were more likely to be viewed unfavorably than their
counterparts on the prosecution. Id. at 1123. Most importantly, his study of jurors found that
experts were criticized for being hired guns and jurors were “skeptical of experts and their
ability to explain human behavior.” Id. at 1125.
77. See, e.g., Browne et al., supra note 10, at 7; Thornburgh, supra note 76, at 467.
Thornburgh suggests that “if . . . attorney[s] were to be held accountable for introducing
evidence that later turns out to be junk science, attorneys would be less likely to risk the
introduction of junk science.” Thornburgh, supra note 76, at 467. But see David S. Caudill,
Advocacy, Witnesses, and the Limits of Scientific Knowledge: Is There an Ethical Duty to
Evaluate Your Expert’s Testimony?, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 341, 354–55 (2003) (arguing that
because the lawyer has a duty to act as a zealous advocate for her client, she should not be
responsible for preventing junk science from coming into court). See generally HUBER, supra
note 76 (decrying the presence of “junk science” in modern legal proceedings).
78. FED. R. EVID. 104. Rule 104(a) provides:
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argue that the judge, as the “gatekeeper,” is more capable of evaluating
79
the expertise than is the jury. Depending on the amount of trust they
put in their own evaluative capabilities regarding complex evidence and
80
testimony, judges may be more or less flexible in admitting evidence.
While judges are permitted to request help in evaluating an expert
81
witness’s testimony, some judges may simply rely on the adversarial
nature of court proceedings to elicit reliable testimony or rely on the

Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a
witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall
be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b).
In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except
those with respect to privileges.
This requirement means that the judge must consider whether the expert is proposing to
testify to scientific knowledge and whether that knowledge will assist the trier of fact. See
FED. R. EVID. 702.
79. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmeceuticals, Inc., the Court takes the position that
judges are more capable than juries to evaluate expertise. 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993). But see
id., at 599 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing doubts that
judges can understand areas of expertise in which they lack formal training); see also James J.
Elacqua & L. Gene Spears, Technical Trials Call for Unique Strategies, NAT’L. L.J., June 6,
1994, at C2 (“A jury, when properly educated through trial witnesses, argument and
instruction, is every bit as qualified as a judge to decide a technical case.”).
80. See, e.g., Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 37, at 1513. Some
commentators suggest that when a judge feels uncertain about his or her ability to evaluate
evidence, she may be more lenient in allowing the expert’s testimony. See, e.g., Zuchowicz v.
United States, 870 F. Supp. 15, 19 (D. Conn. 1994).
Jurors, however, may not be aware of this self-doubt, and may tend to regard testimony
admitted by the judge as endorsed thereby. See Easton, supra note 65, at 480.
Just in case the recitation of an expert’s credentials might not be enough
to elevate her to a special status above fact witnesses, in many courtrooms
this recitation is followed, sometimes even in the absence of an objection
to the expert’s opinion testimony, by a judicial declaration that the witness
is indeed an “expert” who is thereby specially qualified to “assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”
Id.
81. See generally Note, Improving Judicial Gatekeeping: Technical Advisors and
Scientific Evidence, 110 HARV. L. REV. 941 (1997) (examining and arguing for the use of
technical advisors by the courts to assist judges in weighing expert testimony). See also
Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 37, at 1517. Institutions are creating texts to aid
the judge in this task. For an argument based on optimism about judges’ abilities, see SHEILA
JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA 42, 68
(1995). Jasanoff suggests that judges should increase their scientific literacy to decrease the
distorting power of expert witnesses. Id. at 68. For example, given the frequency of toxic tort
cases, it may be extremely beneficial for judges to gain understanding of common medical
procedures and studies including cancer bioessays, risk analysis, and epidemiological studies.
Id.
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scientific community to help determine the admissibility of evidence.
In any case, the judge’s general understanding of expertise, as well as
83
the legal standards for regarding admissibility of expert testimony,
84
influence the judge’s ability to fulfill the role of gatekeeper.
Experts themselves may have a significant role in this process of
evaluating expert testimony. As we will see in our survey of the
historical treatment of experts in American courts, the admissibility
standards have been, at times, based heavily on a determination of
85
“general acceptance” within the specific discipline to which the expert
86
belongs. In other words, when the court allows testimony under the
criterion of “acceptance,” it is according deference to the determination
87
88
of the experts themselves about which testimony is appropriate.
82. See Kaushal B. Majmudar, Daubert v. Merrell Dow: A Flexible Approach to the
Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 187, 195–96 (1993).
83. David L. Faigman, Mapping the Labyrinth of Scientific Evidence, 46 HASTINGS L.J.
555 (1995). When considering admissibility standards, Faigman argues that the judges must
be “sophisticated consumers of science.” Id. at 556. He believes this sophistication should
come from understanding basic principles of statistics and research used by scientists. Id. at
558–59.
84. See, e.g., Allen & Miller, supra note 8, at 1144. Admitting or excluding evidence may
determine a case’s outcome. Wendy Fleishman & Russell Jackson, Challenges to the
Admissibility of Expert Testimony: What Works After Daubert?, 723 P.L.I. Comm. 121 (1995);
see also Rosen v. CIBA-GEIGY Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 318 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that excluding
the expert’s testimony regarding the role of a nicotine patch would have “doomed” the
plaintiff’s case).
85. The Frye standard offered the most comprehensive statement of this idea. See infra
Parts II.B.–D. and accompanying text.
86. Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 37, at 1511 (“[T]he community of
experts within a particular field is most qualified to assess the validity of an expert’s theory or
technique on that subject.”); see also United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743–44 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
87. A questionable idea, according to this quote by George Bernard Shaw: “All
professions are conspiracies against the laity.” See CHAFETZ, supra note 66, at 123 (citing
GEORGE BERNAD SHAW, THE DOCTOR’S DILEMMA (1906)).
88. The reaction of experts to each other may be used in other more obvious or
profitable ways. For one suggestion, see Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L.
REV. 1113. One of Gross’s many suggestions to improve the use of expert witnesses in the
legal system is to have opposing counsels’ experts present objections directly to each other,
with time to “respond intelligently or even revise their positions.” Id. at 1149. He believes
that this adjustment would lead to clearer presentation and overall higher quality expert
evidence. Id.; see also Perrin, supra note 76, at 1445–46; Strier, supra note 68, at 168–70
(stating that experts are better equipped to be fact finders than lay juries and discussing a
number of ways in which individuals with expertise could play a nonpartisan role in the
judicial system); Thornburgh, supra note 76, at 469 (“[T]he court should always reserve the
right to refer disputes over alleged ‘junk science’ to an independent panel of experts, not to
decide the question in controversy, but to assess the quality of the expertise as required under
the ‘gatekeeping’ regimen of Daubert.”).

BROWNE_HARRISON-SPOREL_-_13

1140

7/5/2008 2:34:02 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[91:1119

A major focus of this Article will be questioning the epistemological
assumptions about scientific knowledge that this role of the expert
entails. Seeing how the various players in the courtroom drama interact
with this expertise leads us to realize the importance of understanding
the nature of expert testimony as we seek to optimize its use in legal
controversies. As we will see in examining the evolution of the
American legal system’s guidelines for such testimony, this question of
roles has been central to the various standards held at one time or
another.
II. THE LAW REGARDING THE USE OF EXPERTS
A. The Historical Treatment of Experts
Historically, a witness was allowed to testify only to what he had
89
personally seen or heard and not to any inferences or opinions the
90
witness made from his or her observations. However, the expert was
91
not constrained by this restriction.
Although the expert was not
92
permitted to testify to the ultimate issue in the case, expert testimony
was generally admissible as long as it pertained to knowledge “‘not
93
within the common knowledge of the layman.’” For the testimony he

89. A “witness” is defined, in part, as “one who, being present, personally sees or
perceives a thing.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1603 (6th ed. 1990).
90. Although the categories of “facts” and “opinions” do not have a bright yellow line
painted between them to clearly discern their separate identities, this distinction in legal
thought continues to this day and plays a large part in the debate over legal testimony. See,
e.g., Allen & Miller, supra note 8, at 1132. By restricting the layperson from testifying to
opinions and inferences, the jury could gain closer access to the pure facts. Likewise, experts,
providing the court finds the “right” experts, are expected to dispense from the storehouse of
scientifically established truths. The difficulty comes, as we will see, when competing
scientific truth claims are brought to the courtroom. Jacobs, supra note 40, at 1089 n.27.
91. In the 1782 case of Folkes v. Chadd, Lord Mansfield equated an expert’s knowledge
in his field with personal knowledge, reconciling this deviation from the personal knowledge
requirement. (1782) 99 Eng. Rep. 589, 589–90 (K.B.).
Under the present Federal Rules of Evidence, a lay witness can testify to opinion or
inferences only if the opinions or inferences are rationally based on the perception of the
witness and helpful to create a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony or the
determination of a fact in issue. FED. R. EVID. 701. An expert, however, is not subject to this
restraint on opinion with some exceptions. Under the Rules, an expert may testify to
opinions so long as it will assist the trier of fact or determine a fact in issue. FED. R. EVID.
702.
92. Lee Waldman Miller, Comment, Cross-Examination of Expert Witnesses: Dispelling
the Aura of Reliability, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1073, 1076 (1988).
93. Id. at 1074 (citing Bridger v. Union Ry., 355 F.2d 382, 387 (6th Cir. 1966)). The
Federal Rules of Evidence eliminated the requirement that limited expert testimony to
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did offer, the expert had to state his qualifications, describe the facts
94
underlying his opinions, and explain the basis for these opinions. The
fact finder could then evaluate whether the testimony was consistent
95
with the data used by the expert.
B. The Frye Test
Under the common law, experts had to explain the facts underlying
their opinions. One particularly common, yet confusing, type of
evidence that experts have been asked to explain is scientific evidence.
The courts have treated novel scientific evidence differently from other
types of evidence since the 1923 Court of Appeals for the District of
96
Columbia decision in Frye v. United States.
This case posed a
confusing standard dictating that the science forming the basis of the
expert testimony is to be “generally accepted” in the scientific
97
community, placing the burden of demonstrating this standard upon
98
the expert. In spite of the uncertainty as to how the courts should
99
apply this standard, the precedent remained in place for the following
matters outside a layperson’s understanding. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (requiring only that the
testimony aid the trier of fact).
94. These facts had to be facts of which the expert had personal knowledge, eliminating
the dangers of hearsay testimony, and the facts, data, and opinions presented by the expert
had to be submitted as hypothetical questions. Miller, supra note 92, at 1074.
95. Id.
96. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In Frye, the defendant attempted to offer expert
witness testimony regarding the results of a systolic blood pressure deception test, a test
similar to a polygraph machine. Id. at 1013. The expert claimed that the results of the test
verified the defendant’s innocence. Id. at 1014.
97. Browne et al., supra note 10, at 10–11. The authors explain that this short, citationfree opinion was riddled with ambiguity. Id.; see also Frye, 293 F. at 1013–14. The court
determined that the deception test had not gained sufficient recognition with physiological
and psychological experts. Frye, 293 F. at 1014. According to Justice Van Orsdel,
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere
in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be
recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert
testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or
discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs.
Id.
98. Miller, supra note 92, at 1093; Browne et al., supra note 10, at 11.
99. Miller, supra note 92, at 1093–94. It is clear, however, that the acceptance of one, let
alone ten, qualified experts is not enough to make a scientific procedure admissible testimony
under this standard. See Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 37, at 1486. Moreover,
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100

C. Application of The Frye Test
The scope of the Frye decision is a matter of debate. The standard
for admissibility was created in the criminal context in relation to
scientific testimony, and most courts initially limited the decision to the
101
However, in 1984, Frye was first applied to the
criminal law setting.
102
civil context. The aspect of testimony under evaluation by the court is
both the scientific technique applied by the expert and the principles on
103
which the technique rests.
if there is a three-way tie among experts, under the Frye standard, there is no general
acceptance. Id. Professor McCormick has suggested a standard in which any relevant
evidence supported by a qualified expert would be admissible, a standard perhaps even more
permissive than the current standard. See Osborne, supra note 59, at 512 (citing CHARLES T.
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 363–64 (1954)).
100. See Clayton C. Skaggs, Evidence: Say Good-Bye to the Frye “General Acceptance”
Test, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 450, 450, 458 n.59 (1994); Miller, supra note 92, at 1075; Jon P.
Thames, It’s Not Bad Law—It’s Bad Science: Problems with Expert Testimony in Trial
Proceedings, 18 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 545, 549 (1995).
The Frye standard has been applied to various types of scientific evidence. See United
States v. Tranowski, 702 F.2d 668, 669 (7th Cir. 1983) (astronomer’s testimony dating
photographs by measuring lengths of shadows); Hughes v. Mathews, 576 F.2d 1250, 1258 (7th
Cir. 1978) (psychiatric testimony); United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1978)
(forward looking infrared imaging systems); Lindsey v. United States, 237 F.2d 893, 894 (9th
Cir. 1956) (sodium pentothal); United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(voice prints); People v. Palmer, 145 Cal. Rptr. 466, 472 (Ct. App. 1978) (scanning electron
microscope); People v. Slone, 143 Cal. Rptr. 61, 68 (Ct. App. 1978) (bite-mark comparisons);
People v. Alston, 362 N.Y.S.2d 356, 362 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (blood testing); State v. Smith, 362
N.E.2d 1239, 1246 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976) (gunshot residue tests).
Some of the areas to which the opinion has been applied are particularly remote. In one
context, courts have prohibited experts from testifying that an accused child molester deviates
from the profile of a child abuser because that testimony is infringing on the jurors’ role of
assessing the credibility of the abuser. See, e.g., People v. Berrios, 568 N.Y.S.2d 512, 513 (Sup.
Ct. 1991) (refusing to admit profile testimony of a child abuser).
The Frye standard was applied by courts even several years after the enactment of the
Rules. See, e.g., United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 60 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (application of Frye
standard subsequent to Rules’ enactment); United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 542 (6th
Cir. 1977) (applying Frye subsequent to enactment of the Rules).
101. See Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 37, at 1529 (citing Paul C.
Giannelli, “Junk Science”: The Criminal Cases, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 105, 111
(1993)); see also Huber, supra note 36, at 733.
102. See Paul C. Giannelli, “Junk Science”: The Criminal Cases, 84 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 105, 111 (citing Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 739 F.2d
1028 (5th Cir. 1984)).
103. See Melissa M. Horne, Note, Novel Scientific Evidence: Does Frye Require That
General Acceptance Within the Scientific Community be Established by Disinterested
Scientists?, 65 U. DET. L. REV. 147, 154–55 (1987) (citing Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility
of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV.
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Thus, the Frye test can be seen to possess some advantages. The
burden to evaluate complicated scientific evidence is removed from
104
judge and jury, consistency within the legal system may be attained,
105
and questionable testimony can be more carefully excluded.
Defenders of the standard recognize that requiring generally accepted
106
scientific evidence excludes testimony that may be valid.
However,
they argue that the cost of excluding worthy testimony from the fringes
is outweighed by the benefit of protecting the court from scientific
107
charlatanism.
However, the confusion precipitated by the Frye standard was
108
remarkable. Depending on the court’s stipulated meaning of “general

1197, 1211 (1980)).
104. Browne et al., supra note 10, at 14; John William Strong, Language and Logic in
Expert Testimony: Limiting Expert Testimony by Restrictions of Function, Reliability, and
Form, 71 OR. L. REV. 349, 366 (1992); Tamarelli, supra note 71, at 1179.
105. Browne et al., supra note 10, at 14. The authors point out that the jurors will be
spared having to wade through “scientific banter” and “unpublished hunches,” both of which
can hinder the fact finder’s quest for truth. Id. (citations omitted).
106. Tamarelli, supra note 71, at 1178–79; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.,
509 U.S. 573, 597 (1993) (acknowledging that some authentic insights will still be excluded
under the new standard).
107. The Frye standard could let in so-called charlatans as well. See Confronting the
New Challenges, supra note 37, at 1511 (citing HUBER, supra note 76, at 14); Osborne, supra
note 59, at 509–11 (recognizing that unreliable evidence could satisfy the Frye standard, and
the scientific community will not always extensively test a novel scientific technique). For
example, the paraffin test, generally accepted in the scientific community as a way to detect
nitrate residues from gunpowder on a person’s hands, was found to create a high number of
false positives (from tobacco or nail polish) after having been used to convict defendants for a
quarter-of-a-century. See Jacobs, supra note 40, at 1088 (citing Edward J. Imwinkelried,
Judge Versus Jury: Who Should Decide Questions of Preiminary Facts Conditioning the
Admissibility of Scientific Evidence?, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 577, 580 (1984)). The problem
of jurors splitting the difference between conflicting experts is related to a concern that jurors
cannot distinguish between “charlatans and Nobel prize winners.” Id. at 1084 n.8; see, e.g.,
Tamarelli, supra note 71, at 1176; Osborne, supra note 59, at 508–09. But see United States v.
Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1975) (preferring the approach of permitting the jury to
hear testimony and assess the credibility through cross-examination and refutation).
108. See Campbell v. People, 814 P.2d 1, 8 (Colo. 1991) (refusing to apply Frye to expert
psychological testimony on eyewitness reliability because eyewitness testimony was not a
scientific device); Hutchinson & Ashby, supra note 36, at 1907 n.157 (“Few decisions have
dominated an area of the law or caused as much confusion as Frye v. United States.” (quoting
Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595, 629 (1988))).
But see Frank R. Emmerich, Jr., Note, The Supreme Court Strengthens the Discretionary
Powers of the District Courts in Admitting Expert Scientific Testimony: Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 1051, 1053–54 (1994) (“[T]he application
of this new rule [the Daubert standard] will only lead to greater confusion and frustration
than that associated with Frye.”).
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109

acceptance,” evidence may be accepted in some courts while rejected
110
in others.
Furthermore, giving such a substantial role to the expert,
111
some argue, deprives the parties of their right to trial by jury and
112
As a
keeps them from presenting evidence that supports their case.
response to this confusion, the Federal Rules of Evidence were created.
D. The Federal Rules of Evidence
113

In 1975, Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence.
The
Rules specifically addressed the admissibility of expert testimony,
114
eliminating some of the barriers to the admission of expert testimony.
Rule 401 defines “relevant evidence” as any evidence that makes the
115
existence of a material fact more or less probable, while Rule 402
116
Rule 104(a) requires
permits admissibility of all relevant evidence.
the judge, rather than the jury, to determine whether an expert can
117
testify.
Rule 702 provides the specific guidelines for the judge’s
decision, stating that a witness qualified as an expert may testify to
scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge, in the form of opinion or

109. Tamarelli identified various judicial definitions of “general acceptance,” such as
“widespread, prevalent, extensive though not universal.” See Tamarelli, supra note 71, at
1186–87.
110. See generally Eileen A. Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, Practical Reasoning, and the
Law of Evidence, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1717 (1995).
111. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
112. See, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v.
United States, a Half Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1230–31 (1980). Stringently
excluding expert testimony may infringe on the defendant’s right to present exculpatory
evidence; however, too much flexibility in admitting evidence may prejudice the jury. Id.
113. Enacting the rules took over thirteen years. S. Rep. No. 93-1277 (1974), reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7051–52.
114. See, e.g., Holbrook v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 80 F.3d 777, 781 (3rd Cir. 1996) (noting
Rule 702’s liberal policy of admission); see Lunney, supra note 38, at 105.
115. FED. R. EVID. 401; see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587
(1993) (“The Rule’s [Rule 401] basic standard of relevance thus is a liberal one.”).
116. FED. R. EVID. 402 (“All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by
other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which
is not relevant is not admissible.”).
117. FED. R. EVID. 104. Rule 104(a) provides:
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a
witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall
be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b).
In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except
those with respect to privileges.
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otherwise, if it “will assist” the trier of fact.
If an expert bases her
opinion on facts and data that are reasonably relied upon by other
experts in their fields, Rule 703 permits the admission of those facts or
120
Finally, according to Rule 706, the judge has the discretion to
data.
121
appoint an expert for assistance.
Rule 706 has particular salience for
118. The Rules eliminated the requirement that counsel use hypotheticals in certain
circumstances, see FED. R. EVID. 705, and abolished the restriction against testifying to the
ultimate issue, see Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 37, at 1486–87. At common
law, an expert could testify that something could have caused a particular result but not that
the expert believed it did cause that outcome in the case at hand. Miller, supra note 92, at
1076.
Despite the allowance of testimony on the ultimate issue in the case, most judges still
keep the expert from taking that final step, preferring to leave the jury to draw its own
conclusions on the implications of the expert’s testimony. See Weinstein, supra note 45, at
717.
Congress retained one exception to the lifting of the ultimate issue ban in Rule 704(b),
which forbids an expert from testifying as to the mental state or condition of a criminal
defendant, specifically as to whether the defendant had the mental state or condition
constituting an element of the crime charged. FED. R. EVID. 702.
119. FED. R. EVID. 702 (“If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier-of-fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”).
Professor Frederic I. Lederer, holding that reliability of testimony is the universal
underlying concern, proposed the insertion of the word “reliable” before “scientific” in Rule
702. See Frederic I. Lederer, Proposals for a Model Rule on Admissibility of Scientific
Evidence: Resolving the Frye Dilemma—A Reliability Approach, 115 F.R.D. 79, 84 (1987).
120. See FED. R. EVID. 703. Some scholars argue this provision incorporates the Frye
standard into the Rules by appealing to the mainstream expert community view. See, e.g.,
Laurel Beeler & William R. Wiebe, Comment, DNA Identification Tests and the Courts, 63
WASH. L. REV. 903, 937 n.176 (1988); Gordon J. Beggs, Novel Expert Evidence in Federal
Civil Rights Litigation, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 34 n.246 (1995).
121. Rule 706(a) provides:
Appointment. The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any
party enter an order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be
appointed, and may request the parties to submit nominations. The court
may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may
appoint witnesses of its own selection. An expert witness shall not be
appointed by the court unless the witness consents to act. A witness so
appointed shall be informed of the witness’ duties by the court in writing,
a copy of which shall be filed with the clerk, or at a conference in which
the parties shall have an opportunity to participate. A witness so
appointed shall advise the parties of the witness’ findings, if any; the
witness’ deposition may be taken by any party; and the witness may be
called to testify by the court or any party. The witness shall be subject to
cross-examination by each party, including a party calling the witness.
See Margaret G. Farrell, Coping with Scientific Evidence: The Use of Special Masters, 43
EMORY L.J. 927 (1994), for a detailed discussion of the use of court-appointed witnesses. For
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this Article because it provides the judge with an opportunity to better
use social science expertise.
122
The Rules are considered more liberal than the Frye test; however,
Frye was not mentioned anywhere within the Rules. Thus, scholars
debated whether the Rules took precedence over the Frye test. Those
who believed that Frye was overruled held that the drafters of the Rules
would have explicitly mentioned Frye had it remained applicable to
123
expert testimony.
Those who held that Frye continued to be valid
argued that the drafters would have explicitly mentioned Frye as being
124
overruled and that the Rules were not a comprehensive statement of
further discussion of court-appointed experts, see, for example, Strier, supra note 68, at 115.
Strier states, “[E]xpert testimony is today almost always confined to those experts hired by
the parties—often to the detriment of the factfinder.” Id. Strier goes on to say, “No question
exists as to the judge’s authority to call expert witnesses.” Id. at 177. He speculates that court
appointed expert witnesses are not used frequently because judges fear they would be too
influential. Id. at 177–78. Strier tries to allay fears of excessive influence by suggesting that
judges could tell jurors not to assume that court appointed experts had their testimony
endorsed by the court. Id. at 178. However, the tendency to treat court appointed experts’
testimony with superior reverence seems likely. See, e.g., AMA REPORT, supra note 76. “If it
is difficult for the judge to evaluate the evidence, the [c]ourts should be encouraged to
exercise a power that they have, but seldom use: the ability to retain their own nonpartisan
expert under Fed. R. of Evid. 706.” Id.; see also Deason, supra note 3, at 61. Deason
recognizes that appointed experts can help juries and judges understand specialized issues.
Id. at 81–94. However, she points out that eliminating payment to expert witnesses does not
eliminate all biases that an individual carries. Id. at 112 (“An expert’s financial interests may
be the most straightforward to identify and even regulate, but they may not be as influential
as intellectual or other personal motivations.”); see also Vigilante, supra note 76, at 588–89
(claiming that court appointed expert witnesses are still biased and have too much power).
Germany similarly uses court-appointed experts in certain cases. See Sven Timmerbeil,
The Role of Expert Witnesses in German and U.S. Civil Litigation, 9 ANN. SURV. INT’L &
COMP. L. 163, 163 (2003). If both parties use experts and the experts disagree about the
evidence, the German judge is required to hire a court expert who must testify. Id. at 178.
Additionally, partisan experts’ testimony is not considered evidence in Germany. Id. at 178.
Timmerbeil argues that this use of court experts may unduly influence judges and juries such
that the court expert becomes the “de facto decision-maker.” Id. at 182. Furthermore,
Timmerbeil argues that German judges may exert greater influence than American judges
because German judges must choose the court expert. Id. at 185.
122. See Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 37, at 1487.
123. See U.S. v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1234 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting Jack Weinstein &
Margaret Berger, 4 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 702[03], at 702–12 n.6); U.S. v.
Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978). The Third Circuit stated that the Frye test was
out. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1237. The Second Circuit, decrying the simplistic head-counting of
Frye, held that courts should consider the potential rate of error of the expert’s scientific
technique, the standard, or lack thereof, controlling the given technique, how the technique
was used, and whether the technique was subject to abuse. Williams, 583 F.2d at 1198.
124. Congressional history, including the Advisory Committee Notes, floor debates,
hearings, and committee reports regarding Rule 702, does not indicate whether Congress’s
intent was to eliminate Frye. Tamarelli, supra note 71, at 1182.
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common law guidelines for evidence.
A majority of circuit courts
126
interpreted the two standards as coexistent, until the 1993 Supreme
Court ruled otherwise in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
127
Inc.
E. Daubert: A New Standard of Admissibility
In Daubert, each party’s case rested on expert testimony, and the
conflict between the two scientific viewpoints hinged upon the court’s
admission of this testimony. Two children brought suit against Merrell
Dow, alleging that its drug, Bendectin, caused their limb reduction birth
128
defects.
Merrell Dow produced a “well-credentialed expert” who
testified that based on his review of more than thirty published studies
regarding Bendectin and human birth defects the causal link was not
129
130
In response, the plaintiffs’ eight experts
supported by any study.
testified that test tube and animal studies demonstrated a link between
131
the drug and defects.
Relying on circuit court decisions, the district court reasoned that
the animal study evidence was inadmissible because it was not generally
132
accepted in its field. Furthermore, the epidemiological analyses by the
plaintiff’s experts of previously published studies were inadmissible
because the results of those analyses had not been published or
133
subjected to peer review.
125. Horne, supra note 103, at 153; see also Tamarelli, supra note 71, at 1185 (stating
that Rule 702 did not contain “a completely integrated standard of admissibility”).
126. See, e.g., Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1991)
(assuming the Frye standard survived the Rules); United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 350–51
(7th Cir. 1989).
127. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
128. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 571 (S.D. Cal. 1989).
Doctors prescribed Bendectin to pregnant women to reduce nausea.
129. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582 (“[There were] more than 30 published studies involving at
least 130,000 patients.”).
130. These experts had the following credentials: Chief of the California Department of
Health and Services Division, Senior Science Advisor to the Environmental Protection
Agency and consultant to the Food and Drug Administration on causation issues, Professor
of Epidemiology at the University of Texas, Associate Professor of Pediatrics, Pharmacology
and Toxicology at the University of Texas Medical Branch, Professor of Pediatrics and
Pharmacology at Wayne State University College of Medicine, Specialist in Pathology and
Pharmacology, and director of the multi-discipline teaching labs and an Assistant Professor of
pharmacology at the University of Arizona College of Medicine. Id. at 583 n.2.
131. The scientists believed that Bendectin ingestion while the fetus’s limbs were
forming could interfere with development. Id. at 583.
132. Id. at 583–84.
133. Daubert, 727 F. Supp. at 575. Various circuit courts refused to admit reanalysis
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision by ruling that
the test tube studies were not sufficient to provide a basis for
134
causation.
The Supreme Court heard the case to determine whether
135
the Frye test had survived the enactment of the Rules.
In Daubert, the plaintiffs argued that the Rules superseded the Frye
rule; specifically, they claimed that Rule 402 admitted all relevant
136
evidence.
In contrast, Merrell Dow, the defendant, suggested that
137
Rule 702 created a general acceptance standard. The Supreme Court
138
They decided that
rejected the traditional test for admissibility.
instead of relying on external groups to determine validity, judges
139
themselves should make the decisions. The Court ruled that evidence
could be admitted under the Rules even if its scientific basis was not
140
generally accepted; thus, the Court settled the controversy that the
141
However, the Court determined that
Rules displaced the Frye test.
judges needed to admit evidence only if it is both relevant and
142
reliable. Some have suggested that this new standard, reliant upon the
studies of Bendectin risks because those studies had not been subjected to peer review.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1130–31 (9th Cir. 1991).
134. Three circuits had determined that animal and chemical studies were insufficient to
demonstrate the link between Benedectin and birth defects. Id. at 1130 (citing Brock v.
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989), modified by 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.
1989); Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Lynch v.
Merrell-National Labs, 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987)).
135. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585. The Court’s example of the conflict among the circuits is
the decisions of United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 59–60 (D.C. Cir. 1987) and DeLuca v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990). Daubert, 593 U.S. at 586. In
Shorter, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals used the Frye test to evaluate an expert’s
testimony regarding an asserted compulsive gambling disorder defense to income tax evasion.
Shorter, 809 F.2d at 59–60. In contrast, the Third Circuit in DeLuca, following a Rules
derived standard, considered the following: “(1) the soundness and reliability of the process
or technique used in generating the evidence, (2) the possibility that admitting the evidence
would overwhelm, confuse, or mislead the jury, and (3) the proffered connection between the
scientific research or test result to be presented, and particular disputed factual issues in the
case.” DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 954–55.
136. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.
137. See Emmerich, supra note 108, at 1061 & n.47 (citing Brief for Respondent at 9,
Daubert (no. 92-102)).
138. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.
139. Id. at 589.
140. Id. at 588; see also Faigman, supra note 83, at 563 (“Daubert’s replacement of Frye
anticipates that there will be many cases in which the research lacks general consensus in its
field, but it is accurate enough to assist the trial process.”).
141. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588. The Court supported this decision by noting that
nowhere in the Rules, or the drafting history, was Frye mentioned. Id.
142. Id. at 591–92. To assist trial judges in determining relevancy and reliability, the
Supreme Court offered four considerations. Id. at 593–94. First, did the expert use the

BROWNE_HARRISON-SPOREL_-_13

2008]

7/5/2008 2:34:02 PM

EXPERT PREDICTIONS OF DANGEROUSNESS

1149

143

judge’s determination,
may exclude as much or more relevant
evidence than did Frye: the judge cannot admit any testimony unless its
scientific validity and connection to the scientific field can be
144
Moreover, the judge must be able to evaluate the
established.
145
scientific principles and methodology of the experts in question.
F. After Daubert
There have been a multitude of cases concerning, involving,
struggling with, or contemplating the Daubert ruling. However, one
theme has emerged: confusion. Since the Daubert decision in 1993, the
Supreme Court has addressed Daubert and Federal Rule of Evidence
146
702 only four times.
The most important of these four decisions was
scientific method defined as forming and testing a hypothesis? Id. at 593. Second, has the
expert’s theory or technique been subjected to peer review and publication? Id. Third, does
the scientific technique have a significant rate of error? Id. at 594. Finally, is the
methodology generally accepted in the relevant community? Id. Another possible question
to aid determination of admissibility might be the following: Did the expert conduct any
research with this litigation in mind? See Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 37, at
1515 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 1317). According to the Court in Daubert, other rules must
bear on this inquiry as well where applicable. 509 U.S. at 595 (citing to Rule 706 allowing for
court experts and Rule 403’s balancing test). Additionally, Rule 703 allows for hearsay if the
opinion is “of a type reasonably relied upon by experts . . . in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject.” FED. R. EVID. 703.
143. The Supreme Court in Daubert first found that the Frye Court’s exclusive reliance
on the general acceptance standard was improper. 509 U.S. at 588. For a case admitting
testimony not “generally accepted” in the community under Daubert, see FDIC v. Suna
Assocs. Inc., 80 F.3d 681 (2d Cir. 1996).
144. See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 38, at 141; Emmerich, supra note 108, at 1106
(describing the Daubert standard as more conservative than Frye).
145. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595; see also Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 37, at
1513. But see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 598–601 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (noting that judges are trained in interpretation of cases and statutory provisions, not
interpretation of scientific knowledge, method, and validity). One scholar has noted the
tension between the role of reliance upon evidence and the evaluation of that same evidence.
See Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 37, at 1510. A possible improvement on the
American role of judge as evaluator would be the British practice where complex matters are
tried under “lay judges” with particular technical expertise. See Warren E. Burger, Agenda
for Change, 54 JUDICATURE 232, 235 (1971).
146. General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141–42 (1997). This case is generally
cited for the Court’s holding as to guidelines for appellate review of Daubert rulings.
According to the Court, decisions concerning admitting expert testimony can only be
reviewed under an “abuse of discretion” standard. Id.
Following the Joiner decision, the Supreme Court was compelled to indirectly address
the Daubert ruling in United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998), regarding the admissibility
of polygraph evidence. Here, the Court described some of the limits to Daubert’s flexibility
and, in very vague terms, attempted to define reliability. Id. at 312.
The third case to reference the Daubert decision is Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526
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The Court concluded that the Daubert ruling

U.S. 137 (1999). The fourth time the Court referred to Daubert was in Weisgram v. Marley
Co., 528 U.S. 440 (2000). Weisgram informed the appellate courts as to what remedies they
could use when reviewing Daubert appeals. Id. at 446. The Court held that appellate courts
may remand a case, direct it for a new trial, direct the district court to decide if a new trial is
warranted, or if the evidence is insufficient to a party’s claim, the court may enter a judgment
as a matter of law. Id. at 457. The Court opined, “We adhere to Neely’s holding and
rationale, and today hold that the authority of courts of appeals to direct the entry of
judgment as a matter of law extends to cases in which, on excision of testimony erroneously
admitted, there remains insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict.” Id. at 457.
Weisgram won a jury verdict. However, during the trial and in the post-trial motions,
Marley repeatedly objected to certain evidence as inadmissible. Id. at 456. “[A]lthough
Weisgram was on notice every step of the way that Marley was challenging his experts, he
made no attempt to add or substitute other evidence.” Id. The Court, citing Lujan v.
National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 897 (1990), notes, “[A] litigant’s failure to buttress
its position because of confidence in the strength of that position is always indulged in at the
litigant’s own risk.” Weisgram, 528 U.S. at 456.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Marley, ruling that the district court
had erred in admitting Weisgram’s expert testimony. Id. at 440–41. Subsequently, the court
entered judgment for Marley as a matter of law. Id. Weisgram appealed, contending that
entering a verdict as a matter of law for a loser in a jury trial was not within the scope of the
appellate court’s authority. Id. at 448–49. Specifically, the Court ruled that Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 501(a) can be applied to Daubert appeals. Id. at 445–46. The appeals court
can direct a judgment as a matter of law for the loser of a jury trial if the court deems that
evidence used by the other party, the winner, was erroneously admitted. The Court stated
specifically,
But if, as in the instant case, the court of appeals concludes that further
proceedings are unwarranted because the loser on appeal has had a full
and fair opportunity to present the case, including arguments for a new
trial, the appellate court may appropriately instruct the district court to
enter judgment against the jury-verdict winner. Appellate authority to
make this determination is no less when the evidence is rendered
insufficient by the removal of erroneously admitted testimony than it is
when the evidence, without any deletion, is insufficient.
Id. at 444.
However, a judgment as a matter of law can only be entered if the remaining evidence
properly admitted does not support a decision for that party. Id. at 457.
Since Daubert, . . . parties relying on expert evidence have had notice
of the exacting standards of reliability such evidence must meet. It is
implausible to suggest, post Daubert, that parties will initially present less
than their best expert evidence in the expectation of a second chance
should their first try fail.
Id. at 455 (citations omitted). Circuit courts are granting summary judgments after the
opposing party’s expert testimony was expelled as inadmissible. Similarly, this case is cited in
numerous circuit court decisions to quiet the objection that the court should not grant
summary judgment but rather remand for a new trial. See, e.g., Alfred v. Caterpillar, Inc., 262
F.3d 1083 (10th Cir. 2001).
147. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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extended to non-scientific expert testimony.
Specifically, trial courts
must judge the admissibility and reliability of all expert testimony in
149
accordance with Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
Thus, Kumho Tire
150
Co. effectively incorporated many of the soft sciences, even those at
one time considered junk science. Despite this guidance, circuit and
district courts have been battling to understand the evidence presented
in order to determine reliability to properly perform their “gate
keeping” function.
The circuit courts have encountered problems interpreting and
applying Daubert. A major obstacle appears to be a general lack of
understanding concerning Daubert and its principles. Certain courts are
taking the principles as rigid standards of admission that have effectively
raised the bar for expert testimony, while others view Daubert as a
flexible set of principles aimed at allowing the novel and respected
minority expert opinions into the courtroom. On occasion the courts
have varied significantly enough that they directly contradict one
another.
Yet another problem that seems to be evident is the court’s ability to
judge the merits of technical testimony. As gatekeepers for the court,
judges are forced to evaluate the merits of testimony that is obviously
151
beyond the purview of any court. Oftentimes the judges listen to the
148. Id. at 138.
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., Milanowicz v. Raymond Corp., 148 F. Supp. 2d 525 (D.N.J. 2001). The
court, discussing the Daubert difficulties regarding Kumho Tire, states, “That guidance
notwithstanding, in the wake of Kumho, courts have nevertheless struggled, with varying
degrees of success, to apply the Daubert factors to seemingly recalcitrant technical subjects
such as engineering.” Id. at 531; see also Kimberly M. Hrabosky, Note, Kumho Tire v.
Carmichael: Stretching Daubert Beyond Recognition, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 203, 222 (1999)
(arguing that “mechanical application of Daubert to nonscientific expert testimony defies
logic and could lead to substantial injustice in the criminal context”); cf. Erica BeecherMonas, The Heuristics of Intellectual Due Process: A Primer for Triers of Science, 75 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 1563, 1566–68 (2000) (arguing that judges gloss over genuine scientific inquiry due to
perplexity over required inquiry).
151. See Nelson v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 243 F.3d 244, 252 (6th Cir. 2001).
If anything, Kumho supports the magistrate judge’s consideration of
factors not mentioned by the Supreme Court, including the fact that
Kilburn’s study was conducted and the experts’ opinions were formed for
purposes of litigation. This factor is consistent with our observation that
close judicial analysis of expert testimony is necessary “because expert
witnesses are not necessarily always unbiased scientists.” Here, the
magistrate did not abuse his discretion by considering this factor as he did,
or by concluding that “the fact that the study was performed in connection
with litigation and funded by plaintiffs’ counsel does not militate in Dr.
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arguments made by each side’s witnesses about the validity of technical
testimony and then are forced to apply vague guidelines enumerated by
the Supreme Court in Daubert that may not be appropriate.
Courts also vary in their perceptions of their role under Daubert.
The Ninth Circuit, for example, cited the district courts’ “gatekeeper”
role as “excluding ‘junk science’ that does not meet the standards of
152
reliability required under Rule 702.”
In Domingo v. T.K., the court
held that if an expert does not test his own hypothesis, there are several
other procedures the expert can employ to demonstrate validity and
153
“[I]f an expert did not conduct his or her own research,
reliability.
independent of the litigation, on the subject of the testimony, the district
court must determine whether there exists any ‘objective, verifiable
evidence that the testimony is based on “scientifically valid
154
This interpretation offers multiple methods other than
principles.”’”
testing to demonstrate reliability and validity, thereby allowing more
expert testimony to be admitted.
The courts also have conflicting interpretations as to the extent to
which an expert’s qualifications can make up for gaps or assumptions in
the reasoning. In Campbell v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty
155
Insurance Co., the court did not require the expert to make scientific
tests of his hypothesis but instead concluded that his assumptions were
156
validated based on the credentials he possessed. Based on his résumé,
Kilburn’s favor.”
Id. (citations omitted).
152. Domingo v. T.K., 289 F.3d 600, 605 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
153. Id. The court states,
On remand from the Supreme Court in Daubert, this court explained that,
if an expert did not conduct his or her own research, independent of the
litigation, on the subject of the testimony, the district court must
determine whether there exists any “objective, verifiable evidence that the
testimony is based on ‘scientifically valid principles.’” Here, because Dr.
Harrington had not conducted his own independent research on FES, the
court correctly looked for objective and verifiable evidence of the validity
of his theory.
Id. at 605 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (Daubert II), 43 F.3d 1311, 1317–18
(1995)).
154. Id. (quoting Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1317–18).
155. 239 F.3d 179 (2nd Cir. 2001). In this case, the expert was asked to testify as to the
time period in which lead poisoning began to affect the Campbell children. Id. at 179. Based
on the impressive credentials of the expert witness the court granted him significant leeway.
Id. at 186.
156. The court noted his credentials in responding to the claim his testimony was not
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the court felt any inconsistencies in his method went to weight rather
157
than admissibility, thus permitting him the benefit of the doubt. Other
courts have ruled that an extensive listing of credentials does not justify
unsupported leaps of logic. The latter opinion can be seen in Coffey v.
158
Dowley Manufacturing, Inc., where the court found that it must look
159
Finding that his methods
beyond the expert’s extensive pedigree.
required taking his word as gospel, the court deemed his testimony
160
inadmissible under Daubert.
In summary, depending on the court, circuit or district, expert
161
testimony may be subject to radically different analyses.
The role of

valid. Id. at 185–86.
He wrote several sections in the air-lead-criteria document published by
the EPA, and he was chairperson of the Centers for Disease Control’s
advisory committee on the reports “published in ‘85 and ‘91 on preventing
lead poisoning in young children, which are used nationally by
departments of health as well as pediatricians for the treatment, diagnosis
and management of childhood lead poisoning.” Thus, the court noted
that Dr. Rosen “seems to be a preeminent expert in the field relied on by
all the relevant government agencies to establish the science for the
policies that the government has adopted.”
Id. at 186. (emphasis omitted).
157. Id. at 186. The court stated,
To the extent that Metropolitan asserts that there were gaps or
inconsistencies in the reasoning leading to Dr. Rosen’s opinion in this
case, or that there were responses from which it could be argued that the
onset of the children’s injuries did not occur prior to the end of the first
policy period, such arguments go to the weight of the evidence, not to its
admissibility.
Id.
158. 187 F. Supp. 2d 958 (M.D. Tenn. 2002).
159. Id. at 975. “Yet, although Dr. Wilson’s pedigree is impressive, the Rule 702 and
Daubert analysis demands that [the] [c]ourt not simply take Dr. Wilson’s bare assertions as
gospel.” Id. “‘[N]othing . . . requires a district court to admit opinion evidence which is
connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.’” (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997)) (omission in original).
160. Id.
161. See Note, Reliable Evaluation of Expert Testimony, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2142, 2142–
43 (2003). The author argues that because Daubert gave judges such little guidance, litigants
will be tried inconsistently across circuits, and these inconsistencies may occur within the
same trial court. Id. at 2147. To remove these inconsistencies, the author proposes that
Congress create a taxonomic system for classifying various kinds of experts. Id. at 2143. With
a classification system, judges could more easily and consistently evaluate the reliability of
expert testimony. Here, the author suggests a two-tier system, composed of more
experimental testimony and testimony that is based more on experience. Id.
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the players in trial proceedings is still an open question: those
advocating liberal admissibility standards tend to give a larger role to
162
163
the jury, while those advocating increased restrictions rely upon the
164
judge to evaluate testimony before it is heard in trial. In the next Part,
we will examine the assumptions about the nature and origins of experts
to see more clearly what it is that experts have to offer for the court’s
consumption.
III. EPISTEMOLOGICAL UNDERPINNINGS AND THE
REAL STORY OF EXPERTISE
As we have seen in examining the various admissibility standards
offered by American common law over the years, different views about
165
the nature of expertise are implied by these standards. Evaluating the
162. The jury may or may not be aware of the disputed nature of this evidence. See
Perrin, supra note 76, at 1399. Perrin says,
Information that once would have been brought out by a lawyer on cross
examination and argued during closing argument is now brought out
through an expert witness who has access to all the testimonial advantages
the Rules provide to experts. The expert can even testify to opinions that
embrace the ultimate issue, thus enhancing the advocate role of the
expert.
Id.; see also Scallen & Wiethoff, supra note 44, at 1151 (“[E]xpert witnesses do not have to
reveal the bases for their opinions.”).
163. One state’s regulations (Washington) provide examples of such restrictions. See
Thornburgh, supra note 76, at 462.
164. See Scallen & Wiethoff, supra note 44, at 1145–46. The authors state,
[T]he problem of expert testimony cannot be resolved adequately simply
be turning judges into “amateur scientists.” Instead, the problem . . . must
be addressed by confronting the problem at bottom: Science and law
speak different languages. A judge, even one trained in the scientific
method, cannot alone translate the testimony of expert witnesses into
meaningful legal discourse.
Id. They explain that now judges, rather than juries, are given primary responsibility for
evaluating an expert’s ethos, “thus obscuring the fact that expert testimony is, at bottom,
‘opinion,’ traditionally evaluated by the trier of fact, often a jury.” Id. at 1144. But see
Abramson, supra note 51. Abramson argues, “[T]he scientific method and the law of
evidence converge to place scientific gatekeeping squarely within the realm of judicial
competence.” Id. at 726.
165. See, e.g., Robert Kargon, Expert Testimony in Historical Perspective, 10 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 15, 15 (1986) (offering a general argument that our reverence for “experts” has
changed significantly throughout history); Haskell, supra note 5, at xii (“[T]he noun form of
the word [expert]—with all it implies about the distinctiveness of the social role, its visibility
across a wide spectrum of activities and occupations, and the prospects of earning an income
from it—did not come into use until the middle decades of the nineteenth century.”). For
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standards that have been presented, as well as the often-conflicting
judicial application of these standards, leads to important questions
about the epistemological assumptions inherent to these different
166
How do experts arrive at the knowledge they present for our
views.
167
edification? Are scientific “facts” as we receive them the products of
168
an impersonal and objective scientific force, or the results of human

further discussion of the development of our current reliance upon expertise in the twentyfirst century, see BRINT, supra note 4, at 40 (“[T]he prominence of expert professionalism
grew naturally out of the sense of progress and power long associated with new technology
and new intellectual tools of control.”). See also Haskell, supra note 5, at xii (“[A]scending
levels of population density and per capita income made it possible for substantial numbers of
people to make a living by selling advice and specialized services, rather than producing food
or other tangible goods.”). But see Larson, supra note 5, at 37 (“[P]owerful as they were, the
legitimizing factors that we have discussed so far—faith in science, confirmed by technological
progress; the submission of all to the impersonal laws of the market, rigged though it was—
were not enough to confer upon experts the full scope and character of the power they appear
to exercise today.”). Instead, Larson argues that the rise of expert power should largely be
contributed to the “emergence of a formally free system of mass education.” Id. To Larson,
it was the “pedagogies based on an ‘ideal of simple calculability’” that reinforced the notion
that “experts, who study longer, master uncertainty better because they know more facts.” Id.
at 55. “Expertise . . . increasingly provides a base for attaining and exercising power by the
people who can claim special knowledge in matters that their society considers important.”
Id. at 28.
See also Bayles, supra note 5, at 29, arguing that much of the reason experts have power
over non-experts is that in a majority of the situations in which an expert opinion is needed,
non-experts are experiencing some type of a crisis. “The professional has the specialized
knowledge or means to diagnose the problem, determine the alternative approaches to
resolving it, and then take the necessary steps. This knowledge gives a professional power
over an individual.” Id.
166. See Gary Edmond, Science, Law and Narrative: Helping the ‘Facts’ to Speak for
Themselves, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 555, 559 (1999). Edmond critiques the underpinnings of the
expert witness system itself by revealing that science’s status as objective and impartial is
increasingly being questioned. Id.; see also David S. Caudill & Richard E. Redding, Junk
Philosophy of Science?: The Paradox of Expertise and Interdisciplinarity in Federal Courts, 57
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 685, 690 (2000) (arguing that only a weak social constructivist
approach has found its way into the legal system).
167. See, e.g., BRUNO LATOUR, SCIENCE IN ACTION: HOW TO FOLLOW SCIENTISTS
AND ENGINEERS THROUGH SOCIETY 104 (1987). Latour suggests that facts arise when
readers are sufficiently convinced about something that there is no debate about it, and the
processes that led to the successful persuasion of those readers has dropped out of sight. Id.
168. See Easton, supra note 65, at 471 n.15. Easton reveals, “It is axiomatic to state that
a trial is a search for the truth.” Id.; see, e.g., Oneida, Ltd. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 611,
619 (Fed. Cl. 1999) (stating that ”the integrity and reliability of the truth finding process in a
case should be paramount”); Mark R. Patterson, Conflicts of Interest in Scientific Expert
Testimony, 40 WM & MARY L. REV. 1313 (1999). Patterson is skeptical of experts and
concerned with the relationship between science and the law, but he ignores the clashes in the
courtroom when experts promulgate different versions of truth. Patterson, supra, at 1394.
Strier argues for a less adversarial and more inquisitorial judicial system. See generally Strier,
supra note 68. He justifies his modifications, including the use of court appointed experts, by
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169

interactions within certain social structures,
influenced by the
particular needs and values of the scientists that inhabit those
170
structures?
The conflicting guidance offered to courts by Daubert follows from
the conflicting epistemological assumptions on which the Daubert
decision rests. On the one hand, Daubert promotes the court’s reliance
on expertise by creating a more liberal standard in admissibility. The
171
courts’ continued emphasis on turning to experts for the “truth”
172
However, because the
demonstrates an allegiance to positivism.
Court in Daubert urges judges to act as a “gatekeeper” by evaluating the
relevancy and reliability of testimony, the Court is recognizing a
173
174
constructivist notion: the idea that truth is socially constructed.

appealing to their usefulness in reaching the truth. Id. at 169–70. Strier’s unidimensional
understanding of truth is omnipresent throughout the article. For example, “The attorney’s
overriding allegiance is to the client, not the truth.” Id. at 117. And, “As opposed to the
adversary system, the inquisitorial system trial is remarkably unencumbered in its search for
truth.” Id. at 144.
169. See DANIEL LITTLE, VARIETIES OF SOCIAL EXPLANATION: AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 68–87 (1991). Little explains the approach to
social science truth determination as the fruit of interpretative schemas derived from
recognition that truth is established in relational networks.
170. See BRINT, supra note 4, at 145–46 (arguing that experts, while claiming to be value
neutral, are actually imposing a specific set of values upon society). “[T]he social values of
experts, in keeping with the main thrust of the rationalizing process, tend to favor centralized
control and hierarchy, since these are associated with the virtues of predictability.” Id. But
see William Gardner et al., Asserting Scientific Authority: Cognitive Development and
Adolescent Legal Rights, 44 AM. PSYCHOL. 895, 899 (1989) to find an example of a scientist
who contends that expert scientific testimony is, in fact, value neutral. “When we claim to
speak with scientific authority, it is implicit that our discourse is motivated by the epistemic
values of science, rather than extra scientific values. If our scientific evaluations are filtered
through our political values, why should anyone who disputes our politics accept our
science?” Id.
171. But see Caudill & Redding, supra note 166, at 690. Caudill and Redding argue that
courts follow a “pragmatic legal constructivis[t]” approach that ignores philosophical
problems with defining science. Id. The authors conclude that their approach renders science
in the law “almost wholly independent from the scientific enterprise.” Id. Caudill & Redding
argue against what they see as the false dichotomy of positivist approaches to science versus
social constructionist approaches to science. Id.
172. See Margaret G. Farrell, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.:
Epistemology and the Legal Process, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2183, 2189–93 (1994) (stating that
the Frye test’s reliance on the external scientific community for determining truth is another
illustration of positivism).
173. But see Caudill & Redding, supra note 166, at 749. In response to Browne et al.’s
suggestion for court appointed experts, Caudill and Redding explain, “That is not the
conclusion we would have expected from social constructivists—we were thinking something
like ‘court appointed experts will likely be leaders in the field who will further the hegemony
of mainstream science.’” Id. However, whether elites would be appointed to courts as
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Instead of looking to the expert for truth, the Court seems to recognize
175
that experts offer a perspective of truth. This Part will more carefully
consider these two conflicting epistemologies.
176
177
Positivism, the epistemology of modernism, suggests that there is
178
an observable reality.
Defenders of an objective science typically
experts is difficult to ascertain. The same certainly does not occur with court-appointed
lawyers. Caudill and Redding have a more serious social constructivist critique of court
appointed experts: “The use of court-appointed expert panels or science courts, proposed by
a variety of scholars, does generally represent the view that there is a majoritarian ‘correct’
science. Thus, it is strongly positivist in orientation.” Id. (citation omitted).
174. See, e.g., Michel Foucault, Strategies of Power, in THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TRUTH:
DECONFUSING AND RE-CONSTRUCTING THE POSTMODERN WORLD 40, 40–45 (Walter
Truett Anderson ed., 1995). Foucault wants us to focus more on identifying how what we call
truth came to be known and be less concerned about what the truth is. Id.
175. See Anthony G. Greenwald, The Totalitarian Ego: Fabrication and Revision of
Personal History, 35 AM. PSYCHOL. 603 (1980) (suggesting that humans—and thus experts—
permit the external world to determine their perceptions). Specifically, Greenwald
discovered humans see what is consistent with positive stories about themselves. Id.
176. By epistemology, we mean “How do we know what we think we know?” rather
than “How do we know the truth?” The latter question is from a realist perspective we do not
share, as will become plain.
177. Postmodernists, on the other hand, believe that there are no “truths” in the world;
instead, they argue that knowledge is constructed. Consequently, an expert cannot simply
report the events that occurred during an experiment. Because the expert interprets the
results, she is constructing the knowledge. Consequently, postmodernists stress the
importance of many voices, as opposed to a single “canonical” voice. See PAULINE MARIE
ROSENAU, POST-MODERNISM AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: INSIGHTS, INROADS, AND
INTRUSIONS 77–91 (1992); see also Vivienne Brown, Decanonizing Discourses: Textual
Analysis and the History of Economic Thought, in ECONOMICS AND LANGUAGE 64 (Willie
Henderson ed., 1993) (applying Bakhtin’s process of canonization to the treatment of
economic ideas and suggests that the unilogical system of the epic poem be replaced by the
heteroglossia of the novel).
178. During the Enlightenment, notable philosophers including Descartes and Locke
celebrated rationality and emphasized the powers of individual observation as a means of
acquiring truth. See ROGER SMITH, THE NORTON HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 157,
160–83 (1997). Logical empiricists nurtured this perception and gradually the notions of
“science,” “rationality,” and “truth” became intertwined. See Rorty, supra note 14, at 38–39
(discussing the impact of equating rationality with science and describing the modernist
assumption that truth corresponds with reality).
In the field of psychology, behaviorism became the dominant method. Behaviorists
asserted the position that through carefully controlled experiments, universal laws of human
behavior like those discovered in the physical sciences would soon follow. The empiricist
position that experience of the senses is the only source of knowledge, along with the
principles of “physicalism” and “operationalism,” legitimized behaviorists’ limitations on
acceptable questions, method and data, and soon the behaviorist method was considered
synonymous with the scientific method. See POLKINGHORNE, supra note 14, at 21; see also
Stephen Toulmin & David E. Leary, The Cult of Empiricism, and Beyond, in A CENTURY OF
PSYCHOLOGY AS SCIENCE 594 (Sigmund Koch & David E. Leary eds., 1985).
The publication manual of the American Psychological Association provides some
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“honest,”

important examples of the implicit positivistic assumptions that have been incorporated into
the field.
See AM. PSYCHOL. ASSOC., PUBLICATION MANUAL 11 (4th ed. 1994)
(demonstrating the discipline’s commitment to the view of science as a cumulative,
collaborative endeavor); G. Scott Budge & Bernard Katz, Constructing Psychological
Knowledge: Reflections on Science, Scientists and Epistemology in the APA Publication
Manual, 5 THEORY & PSYCHOL. 217, 219 (1995).
This shift is more than cosmetic, for it reflects a shift from a more
macroscopic to a more microscopic perspective in both form and content,
as well as an implicit statement about the nature of language, science, and
epistemology world-view (Weltanschauung) of psychology. These are
that language is a tool, science is the accumulation of information based
on single experiments that achieve positive results, knowledge is gained
through the discrete and abstract measure of external behavior and
recorded through the neutral and objective pen of a scientific observer,
and the world is a place to be bracketed and controlled.
Budge & Katz, supra, at 219–20. For further discussion of modernism, see Donald N.
McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Economics, 21 J. ECON. LIT. 481 (1983). According to
McCloskey, the precepts of modernism are the following:
(1) Prediction (and control) is the goal of science.
(2) Only the observable implications (or predictions) of a theory matter
to its truth.
(3) Observability entails objective, reproducible experiments.
(4) If (and only if) an experimental implication of a theory proves false is
the theory proved false.
(5) Objectivity is to be treasured; subjective “observation”
(introspection) is not scientific knowledge.
(6) Kelvin’s Dictum: “When you cannot express it in numbers, your
knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind.”
(7) Introspection, metaphysical belief, aesthetic, and the like may well
figure in the discovery of an hypothesis but cannot figure in its
justification.
(8) It is the business of methodology to demarcate scientific reasoning
from non-scientific, positive from normative.
(9) A scientific explanation of an event brings the event under a covering
law.
(10) Scientists, for instance economic scientists, have nothing to say as
scientists about values, whether of morality or art.
Id. at 484.
179. See Charles Taylor, Neutrality in Political Science, in READINGS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 547–48 (Michael Martin & Lee McIntyre eds., 1994).
Taylor explains the influence of positivism as a retraint on consideration of the value
dimensions of research conclusions in the social sciences. The resulting effort to see research
conclusions as outside the domain of values is an effort to align social science conclusions with
the well-respected findings of the natural sciences.
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180

and “free of irrational prejudice.”
They claim that science is the
“ultimate market economy of knowledge, where only valid observations
181
and plausible theories survive.” The Frye decision, with its reliance on
“general acceptance,” is a strong example of positivism.
Social constructionism, on the other hand, offers a view of scientists
as participants in a particular societal milieu, where “truth” is shaped by
182
the various influences affecting the humans engaged in scientific
pursuits. Constructivists argue that because social forces influence
scientists, we should pay more attention to the social dimension of truth
183
formation. Thus, the Federal Rules of Evidence encourage judges and
juries to consider the epistemological origins of the evidence offered by
the experts, rather than simply deferring to the scientists to declare
some univocal truths.
Defenders of positivism try to argue that scientists are disinterested
184
agents who are simply recorders of reality. In other words, they clean
off the “mirror” of reality so that the rest of us can accurately see the
185
The positivist’s reaction to social constructionism frequently
truth.
180. See Peter Atkins, Science as Truth, 8 HIST. HUM. SCI. 97, 97 (1995). Atkins treats
science as an impersonal force, claiming that science is honest and science is free from
irrational prejudice. Id. However, Atkins ignores the human element that influences science.
See, e.g., FRED BLOCK, POSTINDUSTRIAL POSSIBILITIES: A CRITIQUE OF ECONOMIC
DISCOURSE 1–32 (1990) (offering an argument against the idea of the market as an
impersonal force); see also Herzberger, supra note 8, at 1069–72 (claiming that methodology
ensures that personal viewpoints do not interfere with the unbiased collection and analysis of
data; faith in “methodological procedures [is] necessary to conduct valid and reliable
research”).
181. One way that the truth is uncovered is through quantification. Quantification gave
credence to psychology’s claim as an exact science. See KURT DANZIGER, CONSTRUCTING
THE SUBJECT: HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH 147 (1990)
(“Quantification seemed to mark psychology as one of the exact sciences and to distinguish it
sharply from such questionable pursuits as philosophy and spiritualism, with which it had
been popularly associated.”).
182. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE (Colin Gordon et al.
trans., 1980) (arguing that when we speak we have less autonomy than we often claim because
we always use the categories, argumentative strategies, metaphors, modes of composition,
and rules of evidence that precede us and that have no single, identifiable author).
183. WAYNE C. BOOTH, MODERN DOGMA AND THE RHETORIC OF ASSENT xiii (1974).
Booth presents the argument that truth can be found through the art of rhetoric; rhetoric
being the art of discovering warrantable beliefs and improving those beliefs in shared
discourse. Id. at 112 & n.19 (“[T]he rhetorical philosophy of Cicero” is “the fullest
development of . . . consensus as a source of reliable knowledge.”).
184. See, e.g., Stephen Fuchs, Positivism Is the Organizational Myth of Science, 1 PERSP.
ON SCI. 1, 11 (1993) (arguing that by worshipping the twin gods of scientific method and
scientific community, positivism merges truth and power and presents a professional claim to
cognitive monopoly as an innocent claim to truth).
185. RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 12 (1979). Rorty
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casts it in the opprobrious terms of “relativism” and “nihilism”: if one
believes scientific knowledge is essentially untouched by power struggles
and groupthink within disciplines, then “science must be viewed as a
186
chaotic heap of unconnected and contradictory assertions.”
However, we would argue that this overly simplistic dichotomy
between absolute certitude and utter relativism is unhelpful for
understanding the processes shaping expertise. Science does not
187
operate in a vacuum; it is subject to social forces, both within and
without the scientific world. In other words, the scientists play a role in
argues against “polishing the mirror” as an educational guide. Id. “It is pictures rather than
propositions, metaphors rather than statements, which determine most of our philosophical
convictions.” Id.
186. Peter Huber, Junk Science in the Courtroom, FORBES, July 8, 1991, at 68, 72; see
PAUL R. GROSS & NORMAN LEVITT, HIGHER SUPERSTITION: THE ACADEMIC LEFT AND
ITS QUARRELS WITH SCIENCE 1–4 (1994) (arguing that leftist criticisms of science are
relativistic). In reviewing this work, Fuller points out that it is the first book entirely
considering threats posed by academic critics of science, but other books, namely LEWIS
WOLPERT, THE UNNATURAL NATURE OF SCIENCE (1992), and STEVEN WEINBERG,
DREAMS OF A FINAL THEORY (1992), addressed these criticisms in single chapters. See Steve
Fuller, A Tale of Two Cultures and Other Higher Superstitions, 8 HIST. HUM. SCI. 115, 117
(1995).
Thomas Kuhn calls the sociology of scientific knowledge “deconstruction gone mad,”
protesting that sociological interpretations of scientific processes cast unjust aspersions on the
purity of scientific inquiry. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE TROUBLE WITH THE HISTORICAL
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 8–9 (1992); see also LATOUR, supra note 167, at 104. An answer to
Kuhn’s characterization of the sociology of scientific knowledge as an example of
“deconstruction gone mad” is provided by Steven C. Ward, In the Shadow of Deconstructed
Metanarratives: Baudrillard, Latour and the End of Realist Epistemology, 7 HIST. HUM. SCI.
73 (1994). Ward demonstrates the difference between Latour’s epistemology, based on
Durkheim’s view of truth as inseparable from social organization (“truth as collective
representation,” as Ward terms it), and Baudrillard’s epistemological nihilism, based on
Nietzsche’s proclamation that “God [i.e. truth] is dead.” Id. at 75–82. “From this position,
what distinguishes irrationality from rationality, belief from science, text from reality, is not
the cognitive level or type of the participating actants, but the associational enhanced power
of some individuals and groups to establish resistant coalitions.” Id. at 87.
187. See Edward Phillips, Testing the Truth: The Alliance of Science and Law, in
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS 229, 239–40 (Mike McConville & Lee Bridges eds., 1994).
Phillips writes,
[I]t is tempting to assume that the expert’s conclusion is objective. This is
an illusion. The expert may well be operating from a theoretical or
intellectual base which involves predetermined conclusions; scientific
knowledge, like other forms of knowledge, does not exist in a political or
institutional vacuum. This may involve methodology as well as ideology.
Moreover, the conclusions drawn may involve interpretative value
judgments.
Id.; see also Margaret C. Jacob, Science and Politics in the Late Twentieth Century, 59 SOC.
RES. 487, 487–88 (1992).

BROWNE_HARRISON-SPOREL_-_13

2008]

7/5/2008 2:34:02 PM

EXPERT PREDICTIONS OF DANGEROUSNESS
188

1161

189

creating the image of reality they show us.
Knowledge can be legitimized; yet, we recognize that the knowledge
190
The relationships both within and beyond the scientific
is contested.
community exert influence on the creation of scientific knowledge. The
next section will examine the various forces that impact science.
A. The Birth of Scientific Fact
When factfinders encounter science in the form of expert testimony,
the expert typically testifies with phrases like, “It is firmly established.”
Because this testimony is heard so often, it is important for the courts to
know how such science becomes “firmly established.”
Science may be categorized as journal science or vandemecum
science. Journal science is frequently contradictory and consists of a
diverse body of published journal articles; in contrast, vandemecum
191
science is the institutionalized knowledge of the discipline. Instead of
hypothetical humility, the author uses the rhetorical language of
188. Jeremy Campbell, Observer and Object, Reader and Text: Some Parallel Themes in
Modern Science and Literature, in BEYOND THE TWO CULTURES: ESSAYS ON SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY, AND LITERATURE 23 (Joseph W. Slade & Judith Yaross Lee eds., 1990)
(documenting the commonality between physics and reading in that both create
understanding via observation, with special emphasis on the idea of “create”).
189. See, e.g., Daniel Bell, The Turn to Interpretation, 51 PARTISAN REV. 215, 215–19
(1984). One role scientists play in creating an image of reality is in the interpretation of their
observations and “facts.” Bell argues that facts do not speak for themselves and require
interpretation: “In its broadest sense, the turn to interpretation is a move away from
positivism with its emphasis on naïve observation.” Id. at 218.
190. Joseph Rouse, Foucault and the Natural Sciences, in FOUCAULT AND THE
CRITIQUE OF INSTITUTIONS 137, 158 (John Caputo & Mark Yount eds., 1993). Rouse states:
The crucial point is not that there is no legitimacy . . . . In the circulation
of contested, heterogeneous knowledges, disputes about legitimacy and
the criteria for legitimacy are part and parcel of the dynamics of that
circulation. Understanding knowledge as “a strategical situation” rather
than as a definitive outcome places epistemological reflection in the midst
of ongoing struggles to legitimate (and delegitimate) various skills,
practices, and assertions. Recognizing that the boundaries of science (or
of knowledge) are what is being contested, epistemology is within those
contested boundaries.
Id. at 158.
191. See LUDWICK FLECK, GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENTIFIC FACT 118
(English Language ed. 1979). Fleck also refers to vandemecum science as “handbook
science,” a science that offers a greater degree of certainty than its counterpart. Browne
et al., supra note 10, at 52. While journal science is contested, vandemecum science is
considered accepted fact; consequently, vandemecum science acts as a constraint on thinking.
See FLECK, supra, at 118–19.
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reliability.
To the outsider, including judge and jury, the shift from
vandemecum to journal science is an unknown process, subject to
192
193
metaphors
such as “ship in a bottle” or “black box” —the
complexities of the production facilities converting heterogeneous
perspectives to homogenous scientific facts are unknown. However,
Fleck argues that it is important that the court is informed of these
194
Understanding the “genesis of a scientific fact” has
processes.
important implications for the role of the expert witness.
B. The Social Construction of Scientific Knowledge
195

Robert Merton proffers four norms of science: universalism,
196
197
communism, disinterestedness, and organized skepticism.
If these
norms were a reflection of the practice of science, we could be confident
about the results of scientific investigations. However, these norms are
not always accurately followed; instead, science is often quite
198
The acceptance of a proposed scientific claim depends
arbitrary.
192. See, e.g., GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980).
The use of metaphor in scientific writing has a long and diverse history. Psychological
literature is replete with metaphors describing virtually every aspect of psychological
functioning. See Donal E. Carlston, Turning Psychology on Itself: The Rhetoric of Psychology
and the Psychology of Rhetoric, in THE RHETORIC OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES, supra note 14,
at 145, 146 (“[T]he theorizing of social scientists is metaphorical storytelling.”); see also James
R. Averill, Inner Feelings, Works of the Flesh, The Beast Within, Diseases of the Mind, Driving
Force, and Putting on a Show: Six Metaphors of Emotion and Their Theoretical Extensions, in
METAPHORS IN THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY 104, 113 (David E. Leary ed., 1990)
(describing metaphors of emotion including: inner feelings or experience—“He felt his anger
rising,” “He ached for her”—or emotions as disease of the mind—“He was insane with rage,”
“She fell madly in love”). The computer metaphor may arguably be the most familiar of
cognitive metaphors. See Robert R. Hoffman et al., Cognitive Metaphors in Experimental
Psychology, in METAPHORS IN THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY, supra, at 173, 177–89.
193. See LATOUR, supra note 167, at 2–3. Some scientists use a “black box” in place of a
piece of machinery or a set of commands that is extremely complex. Id.
194. FLECK, supra note 191, at 121.
195. ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE 270–73 (1973) (according to
the norm of universalism, claims would not be evaluated in a framework that considers race,
gender, and status).
196. Id. at 275–77 (according to the norm of communism, scientists would enjoy equal
accessibility to evaluative resources).
197. Id. at 273–75 (according to the norms of disinterestedness and organized skepticism,
claims would be evaluated for their logic and validity). Furthermore, all claims receive at
least the same level of scrutiny. Id.
198. See LATOUR, supra note 167, at 104. Latour states,
[T]he fate of a statement depends on others’ behaviour. You may have
written the definitive paper proving that the earth is hollow or that the
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199

largely upon those scientists who come into contact with the proposed
200
claim.
However, the scientist is not without his own methods for gaining
recognition. Scientists engage in network building in the effort to turn
their claims into accepted fact. The actor-network theory of scientific
development describes how they make “allies” in support of their
proposed claim out of facts, people, money, theories, and
201
organizations.
These actions lead to the construction of facts, as
202
Scientists compile huge
opposed to the objective discovery of facts.
reference lists creating a network of support for their position, citing
even the indirect agreement obtained by referring to historical and
contemporary authority, various interest groups, and informal
203
conversations with others in their area of science.
Those who would
point to the successful scientist as being the one who develops strong
networks realize that this contradicts science’s claim of pure

moon is made of green cheese but this paper will not become definitive if
others do not take it up and use it as a matter of fact later on. You need
them to make your paper a decisive one. If they laugh at you, if they are
indifferent, if they shrug it off, that is the end of your paper.
Id. Latour restates this paragraph as a metaphor: the proposed scientific claim is a ball in a
rugby game. The scientist who originally kicks the ball at one end of the field does not
determine whether the ball is scored. Instead, others impact the speed and direction of the
ball when they come into contact with it on the field. Id.
199. BENT FLYVBJERG, MAKING SOCIAL SCIENCE MATTER 32–33 (2001). Flyvbjerg
argues why the social sciences are limited by what Anthony Giddens calls the “double
hermeneutic.” Id. The people being studied are themselves making interpretations, and we
must be aware of how those interpretations are formed. Then the researcher also makes
interpretations. Context both determines and is determined by the researchers’ selfunderstanding.
200. See STEPHEN COLE, MAKING SCIENCE: BETWEEN NATURE AND SOCIETY 176
(1992) (stating that interpersonal social relations play an important role in shaping the science
process).
201. See Yuval P. Yonay, When Black Boxes Clash: Competing Ideas of What Science Is
in Economics, 1924–1939, 24 SOC. STUD. SCI. 39, 39–46 (1994) (analyzing this process at work
in the struggle between neoclassical and institutionalist economists for control of the
discipline and suggesting that the battle and eventual victory of the neoclassicals can be
described in terms of a network-building duel, rather than rational consideration amidst
Mertonian norms).
202. See generally BRUNO LATOUR & STEVE WOOLGAR, LABORATORY LIFE: THE
CONSTRUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC FACTS (1986). Relying on participant observation in scientific
laboratories, Latour and Woolgar argue that much lab activity attempts to create order from
the disorderliness of both the world and the data collected from it. Id. at 246. Thus, “order,”
or a claim accepted as truth, is constructed through creative processes. Id. at 21–23, 246.
203. Yonay, supra note 201, at 49–64.
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204

objectivity. Moreover, the network-building contest is not carried out
in conditions of perfect equality. The position held by an actor
determines the resources and ability he has to construct networks. The
205
community of science, like other human organizations, is stratified.
C. Elites and Their Influences
One of the factors determining the status and deference awarded to
206
individuals within the scientific community is doubtless the intellectual
abilities and accomplishments of those individuals. However, this is not
the only factor: the social characteristics and the operation of social
processes in science also play a role in ensuring that the scientific claims
of some individuals, the elites, are given attention, while other equally
207
worthy claims may be overlooked.
One way in which the elites gain an advantage is through
accumulated research credit. “Once a scientist has been rewarded, his or
her chance of receiving further rewards in the future are greater,
208
independent of indicators of role performance,” explains Cole. Those
204. Fuchs, supra note 184, at 4 (“[Scientists] frequently appear to support an idea not
because of its sheer intellectual merit but because they have considerable investments in it.”).
205. Id. at 12.
Sharply stratified specialties have a monopoly within a monopoly. The
more one is known, the more one is heard, and so lesser known scientists
working at the semi-peripheral or even marginal areas of the profession
have fewer chances to attract attention to their work. Together, these
processes of professional recruitment, self-referential certification, and
self-reinforcing reputational inequality exclude most outsiders.
Id.
206. See WALTON, supra note 5, at 17, where he argues,
The main problem with the authority of science relates not so much to
internal matters of how scientific reasoning is used in scientific research
within the discipline to arrive at conclusions . . . as to the more subtle but
more crucial problem: how the results of this research are communicated
to a wider community of users who are not experts in that discipline.
See BRINT, supra note 4, at 203 for an interesting example of how this deification of scientific
expertise within society can cause harm. “[T]he new, more exclusive emphasis on expertise
. . . has primarily helped further to reduce the status of several occupations that are of great
value from the perspective of their social contribution [teachers, nurses, social workers, city
planners, and others].” Id.
207. The rhetorical force of intellectual authority has a profound impact upon the
scientific audience. See generally JONATHAN R. COLE & STEPHEN COLE, SOCIAL
STRATIFICATION IN SCIENCE (1973).
208. See COLE, supra note 200, at 165. Cole refers to this process as the “accumulative
advantage principle,” like wealth accumulation with compound interest. Id. Scientific
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on the top of the stack tend to become more firmly established there;
those on the bottom tend to be ignored.
Intellectual suppression and hegemony also influence the science
209
that creates expert testimony.
The rigidity of disciplinary boundaries
limits the scientific claims that can be proffered. Disciplines will often
210
attempt to tout their “unity”; however, this highlighting often covers
the diversity within the discipline and marginalizes potentially valid
claims. The unity (i.e., the paradigm of the discipline) is perpetuated,
not necessarily because it is valid, but because the costs of altering the
paradigm are too high. Gieryn refers to a “struggle for authority,
211
power, and resources”
influencing scientific decision making
specifically leading to the development of strongly marked boundaries
212
between scientific and non-scientific endeavors.
Gieryn argues that
creating an ideology of boundary work helped establish the
independence and recognition awarded to science today. Fuller
corroborates this view by pointing out that disciplinary boundaries will
be more clearly outlined in later accounts of the discipline’s history than
213
Klein refers to such histories as a means of
in earlier ones.

research is certainly a worthy contribution, but this advantage means the scientist’s
subsequent research is recognized over research of the non-elites, regardless of the actual
worth of the research.
209. While by hegemony we refer to a Gramscian situation in which the less powerful
(to their own disadvantage) accept the view of things presented by those in control of
resources; intellectual suppression is the actual silencing of discordant voices. For an example
of hegemony, see Jack Amariglio et al., Division and Difference in the ‘Discipline’ of
Economics, in KNOWLEDGES: HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL STUDIES IN DISCIPLINARITY 160
(Ellen Messer-Davidow et al. eds., 1993). “[T]he portrayal of economics as a discipline with
distinct boundaries is often a discursive strategy by one school or another to hegemonize the
field of economic discourse.” Id. at 150.
210. See BROWN, supra note 177, at 67–68 (“Bakhtin’s notion of canonization captures a
discursive process by which a range of voices loses its heterogenity or heteroglossia and
becomes assimilated as a single-voiced and unified discourse.”).
211. See Thomas F. Gieryn, Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science from NonScience: Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 781,
792 (1983); see also Julie Thompson Klein, Blurring, Cracking, and Crossing: Permeation and
the Fracturing of Discipline, in KNOWLEDGES: HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL STUDIES IN
DISCIPLINARITY, supra note 209, at 185, 190 (arguing that the diversity of theories,
assumptions, and methodologies within a single field is hidden by efforts to increase
disciplinary recognition).
212. Gieryn, supra note 211, at 781–82. For example, members of the field of
psychology recognized that quantitative data could be transformed into a potent source of
social power for those who directed their production and interpreted their meaning to the
public. See DANZIGER supra note 181, at 147 (“Quantitative psychological knowledge was a
species of esoteric knowledge that was held to have profound social implications.”).
213. See STEVE FULLER, SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY 197–203 (1988).

BROWNE_HARRISON-SPOREL_-_13

1166

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

7/5/2008 2:34:02 PM

[91:1119

“indoctrinating new entrants into a field, legitimating the field to
214
outsiders, and controlling, promoting, or opposing change.”
If consolidation of resources and the formation of consensus are the
dual pathways to success, what becomes of the intellectually deviant?
Huber has suggested that modern scientific enlightenment makes any
215
The
recurrence of the treatment accorded Galileo impossible.
paradigm established by a discipline is difficult to challenge: “paradigm
216
217
stickiness” and “cognitive cronyism” are powerful factors to be
faced by the unorthodox.
Thus, we see that while the positivist relies on scientific clearheadedness, the focus on objective verification, and the ability of all
scientists to have their claims fairly evaluated, there are compelling
218
forces within science as a human endeavor that expose it to the flaws
219
Expertise emerges
of which human interaction typically partakes.
from a process of particularism, solitariness, interestedness, and
220
organized dogmatism in which the less powerful or intellectually
221
deviant tend to be ignored.
214. See Klein, supra note 211, at 196.
215. See generally Peter Huber, Medical Experts and the Ghost of Galileo, 54 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 119. He assures us that the Galileo problem, still a
concern for modern observers of science, belonged only to the unenlightened past of
“scientific prehistory.” Id. at 168. Nowadays, the true “cranks” are obvious. Id. at 169.
216. See Mark A. Zupan, Paradigms and Cultures: Some Economic Reasons for Their
Stickiness, 50 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 99 (1991). The reasons for this “stickiness” include the
fear of the established scientist that alterations in the reigning paradigm would lessen the
worth of their own work, the start-up costs of a new paradigm and the costs already sunk in
building the old one, the scarcity of scientists willing to risk their positions in the current
paradigm by standing up for a new idea, and the poor quality of communication between
paradigms. Id. at 99–103.
217. See G.D.L. Travis & H.M. Collins, New Light on Old Boys: Cognitive and
Institutional Particularism in the Peer Review System, 16 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 322
(1991). Travis and Collins, who had access to ten United Kingdom Science and Engineering
Research Council meetings, noted “that committee members sometimes make decisions [to
award grants] based on their membership in scientific schools of thought.” Id. at 323. This
expression of solidarity is termed by them “cognitive cronyism”: the evaluator favors the
evaluatee who is similar to himself. Id. at 327.
218. See Henry David Thoreau, Civil Disobedience, in HENRY DAVID THOREAU,
WALDEN: OR LIFE IN THE WOODS; ON THE DUTY OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 281, 291 (Holt,
Rinehart & Winston 16th ed., 1964) (“For it is, after all, with men and not with parchment
that I quarrel.”).
219. See Lawrence J. Prelli, The Rhetorical Construction of Scientific Ethos, in
RHETORIC IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES, supra note 16, at 48, 48–68.
220. These concepts are counter-norms of Merton’s four: universalism, communism,
disinterestedness, and organized skepticism. See supra notes 195–197.
221. R.G.A. Dolby, Reflections on Deviant Science, in ON THE MARGINS OF SCIENCE:
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REJECTED KNOWLEDGE 9 (Ron Wallis ed., 1979). The
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Perhaps the best way to show the situated nature of expert testimony
is to examine one particular form of expert advice under a microscope.
Courts have various reasons to know when a particular party is or is not
dangerous. Not too surprisingly, they often wish for experts to come
forward to assure the factfinder that the truly dangerous have been
identified, while those who only appear dangerous are liberated from
that often damaging designation. But if what we have suggested in the
first half of this Article is true, we can expect that courts relying on such
expertise, unless guided by expertise from multiple legitimate
perspectives on this matter, will risk significant error.
IV. INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF DANGEROUSNESS
222

In Kansas v. Hendricks, the Supreme Court affirmed the right of
states to legislate procedures for the civil commitment of persons who,
due to a “mental abnormality” or “personality disorder,” are likely to
223
engage in “predatory acts of sexual violence.”
This decision
reaffirmed the Court’s acceptance of dangerousness as an appropriate
224
legal criterion, and in doing so, revived the controversy surrounding
225
expertise and predictions of violence.
In contrast to the Court’s
elites in science tend to agree with each other, thus making it difficult and discouraging for a
deviant voice from a lower level to be heard. Deviants are often “ignored or rejected after
brief criticism. A scientist who doubts whether he can make an impressive case on behalf of
his deviant belief may not make the effort, and turn to other scientific matters, or even leave
scientific research.” Id. at 17. Those who remain ambitious for change devise strategies to
circumvent this conservatism. See Julia M. Allen & Lester Faigley, Discursive Strategies for
Social Change: An Alternative Rhetoric of Argument, 14 RHETORIC REV. 142 (1995).
222. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
223. Id. at 350.
224. See Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 97,
103–08 (1984), for a discussion of the challenges to the legitimacy of dangerousness as a legal
issue. Professor Slobogin concludes that as long as statutes specify the type of harm, the time
frame, and the degree of probability that it will occur they are likely to withstand
constitutional challenge. Id.
Dangerousness is a necessary, but not sufficient, criterion for a statute to pass
constitutional review. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358. In general, the Court requires a statute
to couple proof of dangerousness with proof of some additional factor, such as mental illness
or abnormality. The additional requirements “serve to limit involuntary civil confinement to
those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their
control.” Id.; see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312
(1993).
225. See, e.g., John Kip Cornwell, Protection and Treatment: The Permissible Civil
Detention of Sexual Predators, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1293 (1996); Sarah H. Francis, Note,
Sexually Dangerous Person Statutes: Constitutional Protections of Society and the Mentally Ill
or Emotionally-Driven Punishment?, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 125 (1995); Andrew Horwitz,
Sexual Psychopath Legislation: Is There Anywhere to Go but Backwards?, 57 U. PITT. L. REV.
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affirmative stance regarding mental health professionals’ ability to
226
predict violence, critics have vehemently opposed the introduction of
227
dangerousness testimony.
Recent cases challenging preventive detention commitments of
sexual offenders provide just one example of the debate over experts’
228
ability to predict dangerousness.
In this portion of the Article, we

35 (1995).
226. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274 (1976) (addressing the constitutionality of a
portion of the Texas Penal Code that made probability of future violence a consideration in
capital punishment). The petitioner argued that “it is impossible to predict future behavior
and that the question is so vague as to be meaningless.” Id. The Court rejected this argument
acknowledging, “It is, of course, not easy to predict future behavior. The fact that such a
determination is difficult, however, does not mean that it cannot be made. Indeed, prediction
of future criminal conduct is an essential element in many of the decisions rendered
throughout our criminal justice system.” Id. at 274–75. The Court again addressed the
prediction of dangerousness in Barefoot v. Estelle, in which the majority compared the
suggestion that psychiatric testimony concerning dangerousness should be abandoned to
“asking us to disinvent the wheel,” asserting that “we are not persuaded that such testimony
is almost entirely unreliable.” 463 U.S. 880, 896, 899 (1983). Justice White stated, “We are
unconvinced, however, at least as of now, that the adversary process cannot be trusted to sort
out the reliable from the unreliable evidence and opinion about future dangerousness,
particularly when the convicted felon has the opportunity to present his own side of the case.”
Id. at 901; see also Shall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278 (1984) (“[F]rom a legal point of view
there is nothing inherently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal conduct.”); In re
Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1017 (Wash. 1993) (acknowledging that “prediction of dangerousness
has its attendant problems” but finding violence prediction testimony “sufficiently accurate
and reliable” to be admitted); State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 126 (Wis. 1995) (“[P]redictions
of future dangerousness may be difficult, [but] they are still an attainable, in fact essential,
part of our judicial process.”).
227. See, e.g., People v. Murtishaw, 29 Cal. 3d 733, 767 (1981) (holding that psychiatric
predictions of dangerousness are exceptionally unreliable and highly prejudicial to the
defendant); Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 921 (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (“[T]he unanimous conclusion
of professionals in this field [is] that psychiatric predictions of long-term future violence are
wrong more often than they are right. . . . It is difficult to understand how the admission of
such predictions can be justified as advancing the search for truth.”); Brief for American
Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae, Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981); JAY ZISKIN
ET AL., COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 12 (3rd ed., 1981);
Joseph J. Cocozza & Henry J. Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of
Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084 (1976)
[hereinafter Rutgers Study]; Alan Dershowitz, The Role of Psychiatry in the Sentencing
Process, 1 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 63 (1978).
228. The revival of sexual psychopath statutes was inspired by a number of highly
publicized child murder cases in which previously convicted sexual offenders were released
into the community and subsequently committed another sexual offense. See, e.g., Sam Howe
Verhovek, Texas Frees Child Molester Who Warns of New Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1996,
at B7 (quoting Larry Don McQuay, who warned that he was “doomed to eventually rape,
then murder my poor little victims to keep them from telling on me”); Barry Siegel, Locking
up “Sexual Predators,” L.A. TIMES, May 10, 1990, at A1 (describing the case of Earl Shriner,
a sexual offender with a long history of violent offenses who was released from prison
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propose that marked variation in the methods and reliability of expert
predictions of dangerousness mandate that the judiciary take an active
role in determining admissibility. Specifically, we argue that the nature
of violence predictions requires judicial inquiry on a case-by-case basis
to address whether proffered dangerousness testimony meets
admissibility standards. We support this position on two separate
grounds; the first is based on an analysis of the rules of evidence, while
the second stems from an examination of variations in standards of
proof.
229
While psychological and psychiatric dangerousness testimony has
been introduced in a variety of contexts in both civil and criminal
230
litigation, we will restrict our focus to those contexts using long-term
following the state’s inability to secure civil commitment in spite of psychiatric opinion that
he experienced unusually sadistic sexual fantasies because Shriner had failed to commit a
“recent overt act” that indicated dangerousness under Washington’s commitment statute;
Shriner subsequently raped and mutilated a seven-year-old boy, abandoning him for dead).
Legislators have enacted statutes that provide for a special kind of civil commitment
procedure to detain “dangerous” offenders who are unable to control their sexual behavior
and thus threaten public safety. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (2005); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 71.09.010–.120 (West 2002 & Supp. 2008). A second response to sexual
violence has focused on reducing risk to the community by enacting legislation that permits
law enforcement agencies to notify residents when a sexual offender has moved into the
community. As a term of conditional release, these offenders are evaluated and assigned to a
risk classification that determines the comprehensiveness of the notification.
This
classification is based, in part, on dangerousness. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. ch. 2950
(LexisNexis 1996).
This legislation relies on psychological or psychiatric [hereinafter “psychological”] expert
testimony to prove future dangerousness.
229. See Slobogin, supra note 224, at 108 (acknowledging that while courts have
occasionally relied on lay testimony to determine dangerousness, “in modern times the
question of dangerousness has most often been the province of expert opinion by mental
health professionals”); cf. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 473 (1981) (reviewing a Texas capital
sentencing statute and asserting that dangerousness “does not require resort to medical
experts”; however, mental health professionals provide the vast majority of predictions of
dangerousness and this portion of the Article will address this type of testimony). See, e.g.,
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346; Barefoot, 463 U.S. 880; Chambers v. State, 568 S.W.2d 313 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1978).
230. See Saleem A. Shah, Dangerousness: A Paradigm for Exploring Some Issues in Law
and Psychology, 33 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 224, 225 (1978) (identifying fifteen stages of the legal
process in which assessments of dangerousness are made including pretrial release hearings,
juvenile transfer decisions, and civil commitment hearings). For a discussion of the
evaluation of dangerousness in juveniles, see Randall T. Salekin et al., Juvenile Waiver to
Adult Criminal Courts: Prototypes for Dangerousness, Sophistication-Maturity, and
Amenability to Treatment, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 381 (2001). “Psychological
assessment of juveniles for waiver to adult criminal courts requires systematic evaluation of
dangerousness, sophistication-maturity, and amenability to treatment.” Id. at 381. Even
though these three components are required for transfers, there is still much confusion about
the criteria; there are “wide differences of opinion in the understanding of the constructs held
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232

predictions of dangerousness to others.
We will focus on violence
prediction testimony in three types of proceedings: capital sentencing
by lawyers, judges, and psychologists.” Id. at 403. To determine dangerousness, Salekin et
al., report four factors: “(a) extreme unprovoked violence; (b) severe, aggressive, antisocial
personality; (c) lack of remorse/guilt and empathy; and (d) leadership role in the crime.” Id.
at 397. If these four factors are present, there is a strong case for waiver to adult court. Id.
Salekin et al. argue that case-by-case assessment of juveniles is essential. Id. The Supreme
Court, in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), defined eight criteria for determining
whether a juvenile should be transferred and tried in adult court. These criteria include the
following:
(1) The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether
the protection of the community requires waiver.
(2) Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent,
premeditated or willful manner.
(3) Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property,
greater weight being given to offenses against persons especially if
personal injury resulted.
(4) The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether there is
evidence upon which a Grand Jury may be expected to return an
indictment (to be determined by consultation with the United States
Attorney).
(5) The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one
court when the juvenile’s associates in the alleged offense are adults
who will be charged with a crime in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia.
(6) The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by
consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional
attitude and pattern of living.
(7) The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous
contacts with the Youth Aid Division, other law enforcement
agencies, juvenile courts and other jurisdictions, prior periods of
probation to this Court, or prior commitments to juvenile
institutions.
(8) The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the
likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found
to have committed the alleged offense) by the use of procedures,
services and facilities currently available to the Juvenile Court.
Id. at 566–67.
231. That is, those predictions that purport to make predictions of violence for one year
or longer after the assessment period. We have chosen long-term prediction tasks because
they are the most frequently used and most often criticized by opponents of violence
prediction.
232. All fifty states provide for the civil commitment of individuals found to be
“mentally disordered” or found to suffer from a “mental abnormality” and are either
“dangerous to others” or present a “substantial threat to the welfare of society.” See Edward
Beis, State Involuntary Commitment Statutes, 7 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 358 (1983);
Edward P. Mulvey & Charles W. Lidz, Back to Basics: A Critical Analysis of Dangerousness
Research in a New Legal Environment, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 209 (1985).
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234

hearings, “criminal” commitment hearings, and civil commitment of
235
sexual predator hearings.
We have selected these prediction tasks
because they are representative of the range of cases in which expert
236
testimony may be solicited.

233. Dangerousness has been identified as a mitigating factor in a number of capital
sentencing statutes. See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The
Paradox of Today’s Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 345, 363 (1998) (describing the role of a defendant’s “future danger” in the
capital punishment scheme of the various statutes).
234. Commitment and release hearings for individuals adjudicated “not guilty by reason
of insanity” (“NGRI”). In a majority of states, the standards for release are identical to those
of the states’ civil commitment statutes with dangerousness being an explicit criterion for
commitment. See June Resnick German & Anne C. Singer, Punishing the Not Guilty:
Hospitalization of Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1011, app.
(1976).
235. The sexual psychopath statutes provide for a special class of civil commitment
hearings for “dangerous” offenders unable to control their sexual behavior and thus, present
a threat to the public. The evaluation of future dangerousness is a necessary component for
preventive detention with mental health professionals providing this opinion evidence for the
courts.
236. In each of these tasks, the standards of proof, infringement on liberty, and even
definitions of dangerousness are widely variable. See Grant Morris, Defining Dangerousness:
Risking a Dangerous Definition, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 61 (1999). Morris argues that
individual autonomy is “sacrificed on the altar of collective security” without consistency or
discussion about the criteria for determining future dangerousness. Id. at 62–63.
The Supreme Court has not informed us what magnitude of harm, or how
probable its occurrence, justifies civil commitment of a mentally
disordered person as “dangerous.” Rarely have other courts considered
whether the statutory definition of dangerousness assures that the civil
commitment criteria reflect an appropriate balance between the
individual’s liberty and society’s safety.
Id. at 65. Examining the ability of violence prediction testimony to meet the diverse
requirements will encourage a more thorough analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the
body of research, while also modeling the type of analysis Morris proposes that members of
the judiciary should undertake.
Notably absent from our discussion, however, are civil commitment hearings; although
imminent prediction of dangerousness is frequent and important in emergency commitments,
there are fundamental differences in the procedures and outcome of these determinations.
One of the most important of these differences involves the treatment and short-term
incapacitation goal of the civil commitment process that differs markedly from the criminal
commitment procedures. See Slobogin, supra note 224, at 170–74 (discussing the differences
between emergency commitment and long-term prediction contexts). Thus, we are treating
such predictions as beyond the scope of the Article. Limiting analysis to this subset of
prediction contexts keeps the argument within manageable boundaries while facilitating a
careful examination of situations in which predictions are frequently provided and have been
most frequently criticized. For a review of the civil commitment process, see, e.g., Daniel W.
Shuman, The Road to Bedlam: Evidentiary Guideposts in Civil Commitment Proceedings, 55
NOTRE DAME LAW. 53, 54 (1979).
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We begin by examining the empirical literature on the prediction of
dangerousness and challenge some of the misconceptions about mental
health professionals’ ability to predict future violence. We provide a
brief history of the “first-generation” dangerousness prediction
literature and the legal community’s response to this research.
V. EMPIRICAL PREDICTION STUDIES
237

238

“Junk Science,” “quackery,” and “wrong about 95% of the
239
time” are just a few of the allegations that critics have leveled at
240
experts’ predictions of dangerousness.
In this Part, we evaluate the
credibility of these claims by exploring the research on violence
prediction.
A. “First-Generation Research”
The 1970s marked the birth of the first empirical studies examining
the accuracy of mental health professionals’ predictions of violence in
241
patients released from psychiatric facilities by the courts. In Baxstrom

237. See HUBER, supra note 76, at 220 (coining the phrase “junk science” to describe
judicial acceptance of unreliable expert testimony). With regards to predictions of
dangerousness, “one could favor the death penalty and ‘yet still recoil at the thought that a
junk science fringe of psychiatry . . . could decide who will be sent to the gallows.’” Giannelli,
supra note 102, at 114 (quoting HUBER, supra note 76, at 220) (omission in original).
238. See George E. Dix, The Death Penalty, “Dangerousness,” Psychiatric Testimony,
and Professional Ethics, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 151, 172 (1977) (commenting on Dr. Grigson’s
willingness to operate at the brink of quackery).
239. See BRUCE J. ENNIS & RICHARD D. EMERY, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS
20 (1978).
240. Clinicians do not appear to share these concerns. In 1974, a California court
imposed tort liability on mental health professionals who failed to predict the violent actions
of their patients. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 529 P.2d 553 (Cal. 1974) (“Tarasoff
I”), reargued, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (“Tarasoff II”). Tarasoff I found that mental health
professionals have a duty to warn potential victims of their patients, while Tarasoff II revised
that duty into a duty to protect. A survey of 2,875 psychiatrists, psychologists, and social
workers was conducted to answer questions related to this ruling. See Daniel J. Givelber et
al., Tarasoff, Myth and Reality: An Empirical Study of Private Law in Action, 1984 WIS. L.
REV. 443, 454. The authors were particularly concerned with whether the clinicians believed
that the ruling was unworkable due to the “allegedly non-existent professional standards
regarding the prediction of violence.” Id. at 453. The responding clinicians reported
confidence in their ability to predict future violent acts committed by their patients, with 75%
indicating they could make a prediction ranging from “probable” to “certain.” Id. at 462.
241. A number of societal forces converged to create the opportunity to examine the
predictive accuracy of predictions of violence. The civil rights movement had gained
significant momentum during the early-to-mid 1960s, and these successes led civil libertarians
to extend the attention beyond racial minorities to other traditionally marginalized groups
including juveniles, criminal defendants, and the mentally ill. The courts followed and
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242

v. Herold, the Court rejected the State of New York’s administrative
procedure by which time expired, mentally ill inmates were confined
following the expiration of their sentences. The Court concluded that
243
The significance
the practice denied equal protection under the law.
of this case is its initiation of greater concern for the basis on which
people could be determined dangerous and thus in need of mandatory
244
commitment.
Five seminal studies published between 1972 and 1980 examined the
incidence of violence and criminal recidivism in patients classified as
245
dangerous by psychiatrists but released by the courts. Taken together,
the results were disappointing.
The most comprehensive and methodologically sound of the studies
was performed by Harry Kozol and four other clinicians who evaluated
435 male offenders and classified them as dangerous or nondangerous
246
prior to their community release.
Clinical interviews, psychological
testing, and life history information was provided from a variety of
247
Clinicians classified forty-nine individuals as
collateral sources.
dangerous, seventeen of whom committed a serious assaultive act that
248
resulted in arrest during the five-year follow-up period.
Thus,
clinicians’ accuracy rate was 35%; almost two-thirds of individuals
predicted to be dangerous were not found to have committed a violent

recognized the need to extend procedural protections to these classes of individuals. See, e.g.,
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (providing juvenile offenders with constitutional privileges
including the right to counsel, notice, cross-examination of witnesses, and self-incrimination);
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972) (extending procedural protection to mentally ill
offenders).
242. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
243. Id. at 110. Chief Justice Earl Warren, writing for the majority, concluded that
Baxstrom was denied equal protection under the laws by the failure of the state to provide
him opportunity for jury review of his civil commitment status. Id.
244. The effects of this decision were to provide many more safeguards for those
committed for compulsory psychiatric treatment. See, e.g., Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal
Court, 407 U.S. 355 (1972).
245. The five studies are: (1) HENRY J. STEADMAN & JOSEPH J. COCOZZA, CAREERS
OF THE CRIMINALLY INSANE (1974) [hereinafter BAXSTROM STUDY]; (2) Henry J.
Steadman, A New Look at Recidivism Among Patuxent Inmates, 5 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 200 (1977) [hereinafter Patuxent Study]; (3) Harry L. Kozol et al., The
Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness, 18 CRIME & DELINQ. 371 (1972) [hereinafter
Kozol study]; (4) Rutgers Study, supra note 227; and (5) TERENCE P. THORNBERRY &
JOSEPH E. JACOBY, THE CRIMINALLY INSANE: A COMMUNITY FOLLOW-UP OF MENTALLY
ILL OFFENDERS (1979) [hereinafter THORNBERRY STUDY].
246. See Kozol Study, supra note 245, at 388–89.
247. Id. at 383.
248. Id. at 390.
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249

act during the follow-up.
The accuracy rates of the remaining studies support the conclusion
that clinicians vastly overestimated the incidence of violence in released
250
patients.
Thus, while across studies clinicians estimated that 50% to
80% of these offenders would engage in a serious aggressive act, the
actual base rate for violence in this population of individuals was found
251
to range from 12% to 15%.
252
Response to these reports was swift and nearly universal. Mental
health and legal commentators alike rejected the contention that mental
253
health professionals could accurately predict future acts of violence.
249. Id. (reporting a false-positive rate for the study of 65%, a true-positive rate of 35%,
a false negative rate of 8%, and a true negative rate of 92%).
The method of equating accuracy with false-positive rates—the group of individuals
predicted to be dangerous who did not act violently—is only one of the indices appropriate
for measuring the utility of a decision-making strategy. If one considers the false-negative
rate—the group of individuals classified as nondangerous who went on to commit a violent
act—the conclusions would likely be more optimistic. In the case of the Kozol study, falsenegatives were a low 8%, indicating that clinicians were accurate in 92% of the cases in which
they classified an individual as nondangerous. Id.; see Randy K. Otto, On the Ability of
Mental Health Professionals to “Predict Dangerousness”: A Commentary on Interpretation of
the “Dangerousness” Literature, 18 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 43, 55–58 (1994) (describing a
number of formulas for determining predictive validity). The author recommends comparing
the overall rate of correct classification divided by the total number of persons classified to
the overall rate of correct classification expected if subjects were predicted as a function of
base rates. Id. See Janus & Meehl, supra note 11, at 47–49, for an excellent discussion of the
implication of base rate on prediction problems.
250. See, e.g., BAXSTROM STUDY, supra note 245, at 139 (reporting a false-positive rate
of 80%); JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 44–49
(1981) (describing the accuracy of the first-generation research). In general, the false positive
rates were unacceptably high, ranging from 58.7% to 86%. See id. at 48.
251. The incidence rate or “base rate” of violence is of great concern to clinicians and
researchers alike. The ability to detect an incident is directly related to the frequency with
which it occurs within the population. The optimal base rate is 50%, and as the proportion of
incidents decrease, the number of false positives increase. In instances where the base rate
exceeds 50%, the number of false negatives increase. See, e.g., TERRENCE W. CAMPBELL,
ASSESSING SEX OFFENDERS 48 (2007).
252. See Monahan, supra note 21, at 10. “Rarely has research been so uncritically
accepted and so facilely generalized by both mental health professionals and lawyers as was
this first-generation research on the prediction of violence.” Id.
253. See, e.g., MONAHAN, supra note 250, at 47, 49 (declaring “psychiatrists and
psychologists are accurate in no more than one out of three predictions of violent behavior
over a several-year period among institutionalized populations that had both committed
violence in the past (and thus had high base rates for it) and who were diagnosed as mentally
ill” (emphasis omitted); Bruce J. Ennis & Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the
Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REV. 693, 737 (1974)
(emphasizing that psychiatric predictions of dangerousness are more often wrong than right);
Rutgers Study, supra note 227, at 1099 (asserting that the high false positive rates provided
“clear and convincing proof” of clinicians’ inability to predict dangerousness).
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The courts, however, expressly rejected the conclusion that mental
health professionals are incapable of predicting future dangerousness
254
with an acceptable degree of accuracy.
The apparent mandate to
provide risk assessment and violence prediction led many critics to re255
examine their abolitionist positions.
Ultimately, pragmatists,
researchers, and clinicians recognized that the courts were unwilling to
exclude violence prediction testimony. Members of the discipline
concluded that the best way to serve their clients was to shift the focus
to improving prediction accuracy by critically analyzing the
methodology of the early work.
B. Criticisms of First-Generation Literature
Methodological problems significantly affect the credibility of first
generation empirical evidence. One of the most significant criticisms of
these problems concerns the ways in which researchers evaluated the
256
Researchers reported false positive rates
accuracy of outcomes.
257
ranging from 54% to 80%, leading critics to suggest that predictions of
258
The fatal
dangerousness are no less accurate than “flipping a coin.”
error in the coin toss analogy involves the failure to consider the
259
implications of base rates on prediction. Incorporating base rates into
the analysis indicates that in two of the studies, clinicians’ judgments
260
did, in fact, improve on chance.
254. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 901 (1983) (implying that the legal system’s
reliance on prediction of dangerousness in a variety of contexts precluded exclusion in this
particular prediction task).
255. See Charles W. Lidz & Edward P. Mulvey, Dangerousness: From Legal Definition
to Theoretical Research, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 41, 42–44 (1995) (describing Saleem Shah’s
progression from abolitionist to advocate as a means of serving his forensic clients).
256. See Slobogin, supra note 224, at 111–14.
257. See MONAHAN, supra note 250, at 44–46. The Baxstrom Study acknowledged an
80% false positive rate. BAXSTROM STUDY, supra note 245, at 139.
258. See Ennis & Litwack, supra note 253, at 737 (“It is inconceivable that a judgment
could be considered an ‘expert’ judgment when it is less accurate than the flip of a coin.”).
259. See Slobogin, supra note 224, at 111 (“In fact, knowledgeable clinicians are much
better at predicting dangerousness than the random selection process suggested by the coinflipping analogy.”); see also Albert W. Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure
of Interest-Balancing Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510, 539–46 (1986).
260. Using Ennis & Litwack’s coin toss method, five individuals would be predicted
dangerous and five non-dangerous. See Ennis & Litwack, supra note 253. In the Baxstrom
Study, for example, the base rate of violence was approximately two in every ten patients.
BAXSTROM STUDY, supra note 245. If both of the truly dangerous offenders were included in
the predicted dangerous group, the remaining three of five, or 60%, would be false-positives.
If one of the truly dangerous fell into the predicted non-dangerous group, the false-positive
rate would rise to 80% while the false-negative rate would increase to 20%. In the worst case,
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Additional methodological concerns arise from definitional
problems with the criterion variable. Early research studies defined
261
262
dangerousness as an arrest for serious violence.
Use of such a
narrow, restrictive definition necessarily results in inflated false positive
263
rates.
The reliance upon arrest records to identify violent patients
also raises methodological concerns because of the significant number of
264
False positive rates
violent individuals who evade police detection.
were likely inflated by the failure of the criterion variable to detect
those violent acts.
265
Characteristics of the sample studied,
reliance on restricted
if both truly dangerous offenders fell in the non-dangerous group, the false-positive rate
would equal 100%, while the false-negatives would increase to 40%. Clinicians’ accuracy in
the Kozol and Patuxent studies both exceeded chance levels. Kozol Study, supra note 245
(reporting an accuracy rate three times better than chance); Patuxent Study, supra note 245
(reporting an accuracy rate 1.2 times better than chance).
261. Many commentators have criticized the use of the word “dangerousness” as
problematic. See Megargee, supra note 13, at 5 (“‘Dangerousness’ is an unfortunate term, for
it implies there is a trait of ‘dangerousness’ which, like intelligence, is a relatively constant
characteristic of the person being assessed. However, the degree of danger an individual
represents to himself or others varies markedly as a function of a number of variables.”);
MONAHAN, supra note 250, at 4–5 (“‘Dangerousness” confuses issues regarding what one is
predicting with the probability one is assigning to its prediction.”); see also Grisso &
Appelbaum, supra note 13, at 623 n.3 (“Future discourse in this area might be facilitated by
ridding ourselves of the phrase predictions of dangerousness. It has no logical meaning in the
context of the behavioral and social sciences. To ‘predict’ is to make a statement about the
likelihood of a future event or behavior. Dangerousness seems to refer not to an event or
behavior, but to a condition that exists as a function of the presence of someone or something
perceived as ‘dangerous.’”).
262. The definition of dangerousness in legal contexts has varied considerably, with
courts generally adopting a broader definition of “dangerous behavior” in civil commitment
contexts. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 364–65 (1983) (“We do not agree with
petitioner’s suggestion that the requisite dangerousness is not established by proof that a
person committed a non-violent crime against property.”). Capital sentencing statutes have
articulated a more stringent definition referencing the potential to cause serious bodily injury
to another person. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (2004) (requiring “a probability that
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious
threat to society”); see also Slobogin, supra note 224, at 101–02.
263. See Otto, supra note 249, at 52.
264. Every year the crime rate exceeds the arrest and conviction rate, indicating that a
significant number of offenders are not apprehended for their crimes. In violence prediction
research, this could lead to a significant elevation in the number of “false-positives,” when in
reality prediction was more accurate than follow-up measures demonstrated.
265. The research was limited to examining patients who had been charged, convicted
and had served prison terms for a prior violent offense. Additionally, the patients had been
hospitalized in a secure, forensic mental facility for long periods of time. See, e.g., Patuxent
Study, supra note 245 (describing the mean hospitalization period at twelve years). The
degree to which patients who have not experienced long-term custodial care nor engaged in
prior violent acts are different from subjects studied limits the appropriateness of generalizing
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samples, the frequent use of proxy measures of future violence, the
268
failure to consider adequate predictor variables, and the use of cross269
have all been identified as
contextual predictions of violence
methodological deficiencies.
Collectively, these methodological
problems restrict both the weight and the breadth of conclusions that
can be reasonably drawn from this body of research. Scholars concede
that the accuracy of most kinds of violence predictions remained
untested, and gradually new research programs emerged to address
270
deficits in the early work.

results to dissimilar groups.
266. The inability to include the groups of individuals predicted by psychiatrists to be
violent and with whom the courts agreed was significant. By virtue of this categorization, this
group remained in a secure environment where opportunity to engage in violent acts is
necessarily restricted. It is likely that, had these individuals been released, some unknown
proportion would have engaged in violence, thereby increasing clinicians’ predictive accuracy.
267. See, e.g., THORNBERRY STUDY, supra note 245; Patuxent Study, supra note 245.
Both of these studies relied on administrative classification to infer predictions of future
violence. THORNBERRY STUDY, supra note 245; Patuxent Study, supra note 245. One
criticism of this method is that those administrative classifications were often stale (occurring
months or years prior to transfer) and thus, did not accurately represent psychiatric opinion at
transfer. Additionally, it is possible that extraneous factors such as maturation or the
treatment the individuals received impacted the propensity to commit violence upon release.
A methodologically sound study would have used clinician ratings immediately prior to
release. But see Kozol Study, supra note 245 (incorporating this method but failing to
demonstrate predictive accuracy). Others have argued that psychiatrists did not, in fact,
believe that the majority of patients would engage in future violence, but used
characterizations of “dangerousness” to exert social control. See MONAHAN, supra note 250,
at 50–54.
268. Although clinicians had access to a variety of information sources, analysis of
decision-making strategies revealed that they relied upon only a few variables, primarily age
(virtually all offenders under age fifty were classified as dangerous) and severity of index
offense, in making classifications. See, e.g., Patuxent Study, supra note 245. The identification
of factors or variables that are predictive of violence is an important goal of secondgeneration research. See, e.g., Randy K. Otto, Prediction of Dangerous Behavior: A Review
and Analysis of “Second-Generation” Research, 5 FORENSIC REP. 103 (1992).
269. See MONAHAN, supra note 250, at 57–58 (discussing the inefficacy of predictions
made in one context (such as a hospital) that an individual will be violent in another very
different context (e.g. the community) and concluding that “cross-situational consistency of
any type of behavior rarely exceeds the ‘sound barrier’ of a .40 correlation coefficient”).
270. Professor Monahan led the field in articulating the need for improvement in
violence prediction in his 1984 article calling for a second generation of scholarship and
outlining a number of areas that should be emphasized when designing new research. See
Monahan, supra note 21, at 13 (suggesting researchers consider the effect of situational
variables, vary the populations under investigation, and include more short-term predictions
in community settings); see also Lidz & Mulvey, supra note 255, at 45 (“[A] field that had seen
little research activity for several years was revitalized. The issues no longer seemed settled.
Instead they appeared as formidable challenges.”).
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C. Second-Generation Research
Initial second-generation research efforts focused on examining the
271
base rates of violence, exploring the relationship between predictor
272
variables and violence, and assessing violence across multiple contexts
273
Virtually abandoning long-term prediction as
and domains.
274
impossible,
research focused on examining mental health
275
professionals’ ability to make short-term predictions of violence.
The groups of individuals studied were also expanded to include
276
both mentally disordered and non-mentally disordered individuals,
271. The overestimation of violence was the single most important error in firstgeneration research. Thus, information regarding the occurrence of violence was a critical
issue in improving the accuracy of violence predictions. See, e.g., Otto, supra note 268, at 104
(describing base-rate research as providing “data necessary to evaluate the predictive
accuracy of professionals and information regarding the overall accuracy of dangerousness
predictions”).
272. Researchers expanded the variables under consideration to include static and
dynamic variables that had not been attended to in first-generation research. See infra notes
284–90 and accompanying text.
273. Incorporating more than one type of predictor variable, as well as limiting
predictions to situationally similar contexts, have been posited to reduce error and increase
predictive validity. See, e.g., MONAHAN, supra note 250, at 57–59 (suggesting that research
indicates that the correlation of behavior predicted in one situation and observed in another
would be low).
274. See Monahan, supra note 21, at 13 (referring to long-term predictions of violence,
“There are so many nails now in that coffin that I propose we declare the issue officially
dead.”); Otto, supra note 268, at 104 n.2 (“[I]t seems well established that mental health
professionals are not able to make these types of predictions with any degree of accuracy.”).
But see Douglas Mossman, Assessing Predictions of Violence: Being Accurate About
Accuracy, 62 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 783, 789 (1994) (describing “an average
accuracy for short-term clinical predictions . . . that is not different from the accuracy of the
long-term predictions”).
275. The impetus for this shift came from Monahan, supra note 21, at 56 (Discussing the
limits of the one in three accuracy reported in first-generation research, he stated, “I believe
that one situation may prove to be such an exception: prediction in short-term community
contexts, such as emergency civil commitment and perhaps release on bail.”).
276. See, e.g., Deidre Klassen & William A. O’Connor, Crime, Inpatient Admissions, and
Violence Among Male Mental Patients, 11 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 305, 306–10 (1988). In
this study, researchers attempted to answer questions about the relationship between
hospitalization, arrest, and violence. Id. at 306. They concluded that the number of prior
arrests, the diagnosis of substance abuse, and the number of prior admissions were all
significant predictors of arrest following discharge of male mental patients (Multiple r = .49).
Id. at 309. Similarly, the number of prior arrests, young age, and the number of previous
admissions predicted post-release violence (Multiple r = .26). Id. This study provides some
evidence that the more frequently individuals are defined as disordered, the greater the
likelihood that they will also be identified as criminal (arrested), and thus, demonstrates the
importance of measures to address the needs of the patient both in the mental health care
system and the criminal justice system. Id. at 310; see also Jeffrey S. Janofsky et al.,
Psychiatrists’ Accuracy in Predicting Violent Behavior on an Inpatient Unit, 39 HOSP. &
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278

inmates, inpatients in psychiatric hospitals, and individuals living in
279
the community.
Criterion variables were strengthened by including re-hospitalization
280
for violent behavior, developing methods to track patients in the
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1090 (1988); cf. Harold Hall et al., Dangerous Myths About
Predicting Dangerousness?, 2 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 173, 181–84 (1984) (describing the
base rates of violence in U.S. servicemen).
277. See, e.g., Rueben E. Lang et al., Personality and Criminality in Violent Offenders, 2
J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 179, 182–83 (1987); Jeremy F. Mills et al., Novaco Anger Scale:
Reliability and Validity Within an Adult Criminal Sample, 5 ASSESSMENT 237, 239 (1998);
Frank H. Walkey & D. Ross Gilmour, The Relationship Between Interpersonal Distance and
Violence in Imprisoned Offenders, 11 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 331, 334 (1984). The unique
circumstances of the correctional environment have led social scientists to hypothesize about
the relationship between environmental factors and violent behavior. A body of literature
suggests that overcrowded conditions are associated with increased frequency of violence in
inmates who prefer greater interpersonal distance. See, e.g., Claire Lawrence & Kathryn
Andrews, The Influence of Perceived Prison Crowding on Male Inmates’ Perception of
Aggressive Events, 30 AGGRESSIVE BEHAV. 273. Results from the Walkey and Glimour
study support this hypothesis; however, the study design prevented researchers from ruling
out alternative causes. Walkey & Gilmour, supra, at 337. When viewed together, the
evidence suggests that environmental factors, such as overcrowding, are related to an increase
in violent acts. Id. at 338.
278. See, e.g., Cathy Owen et al., Repetitively Violent Patients in Psychiatric Units, 49
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1458 (1998) [hereinafter Owen et al, Repetitively Violent Patients]
(reporting that the risk of inpatient violence can be significant). In this study, researchers
found that a small number (12%) of patients accounted for 69% of 752 serious violent
incidents. Id. The frequency with which inpatients engage in violent acts demonstrates the
importance of including these behaviors in any outcome measure of violent acts. See Dale E.
McNiel & Renée L. Binder, Clinical Assessment of the Risk of Violence Among Psychiatric
Inpatients, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1317 (1991); Cathy Owen et al., Violence and Aggression
in Psychiatric Units, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1452 (1998) [hereinafter Owen et al.,
Violence and Agression].
279. See Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Violence and Psychiatric Disorder in the Community:
Evidence from the Epidemiologic Catchment Area Surveys, 41 HOSP. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 761 (1990). This well-funded, methodologically sound study addressed the
association between psychiatric disorder and assaultive behavior among patients in the
community. Id. In this analysis, 10,000 respondents completed a structured interview
designed to generate a DSM-III diagnosis. Id. at 761–62. This interview also addressed
subject violence. Id. at 761. Results indicated an increased risk of violence for various
psychiatric illnesses. Id. The highest risk was associated with those respondents with alcohol
or substance abuse or dependence disorders (24.57% to 34.74%). Id. Although a single
study rarely settles a research question, this study, with a large sample size and careful
methodology, provides convincing evidence that psychiatric disorders increase the risk of
violence. See also Deidre Klassen & William A. O’Connor, Assessing the Risk of Violence in
Released Mental Patients: A Cross-Validation Study, 1 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 75 (1989).
280. See Edward P. Mulvey & Charles W. Lidz, Measuring Patient Violence in
Dangerousness Research, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 277, 278 (1993) (describing the advantages
and disadvantages of using re-hospitalization as a criterion variable and concluding that it is
best used as an ancillary data source); see also Owen et al., Violence and Aggression, supra
note 278, at 1454.
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community, and using self-report measures of violence.
Using these methodological innovations, researchers explored the
relationship between future violent behavior and a number of predictor
variables, which can be loosely grouped into five general categories:
criminal history, dispositional, demographic and case history, clinical,
283
In the sections that follow, we
and situational/contextual factors.
review and synthesize the research literature addressing each of these
categories of variables.
1. Criminal History Variables
One relatively consistent result of the second-generation literature is
that the likelihood for future violence increases with past incidents of
284
violence.
Research using both mentally disordered and non285
disordered populations reports significant correlations of varying size
281. See Henry J. Steadman et al., Designing a New Generation of Risk Assessment
Research, in VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DISORDER: DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT
247, 298–305 (John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman eds., 1994) (describing the MacArthur
risk assessment project and its community follow-up procedures).
282. See, e.g., Mark R. Weinrott & Maureen Saylor, Self-Report of Crimes Committed by
Sex Offenders, 6 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 286, 291 (1991) (describing the discrepancy
between official reports of offense history and anonymously provided self-report
information). This discrepancy was marked. For the rapists in the study, official records
revealed a mean of 1.8 rapes per offender and a total of 66 arrests for sexual offenses for the
participants, while self-report information indicated a mean of 11.7 rapes per offender and a
total of 433 actual rapes. Id. Those identified as child molesters showed a similar pattern of
responding. Id. Participants in the study were individuals who had been identified as sexual
predators and committed under the Washington Sexual Predator Statute, and who thus can
likely be considered some of the most serious and frequent offenders whose offense patterns
may not be representative of others. Id. This study does, however, support the contention
that for the most serious offenders, use of official records may result in serious
underestimation of offense history. See Gene G. Abel et al., Behavioral Approaches to
Treatment of the Violent Sex Offender, in CLINICAL TREATMENT OF THE VIOLENT PERSON
95, 96 (Loren H. Roth ed., 1987); see also Robert Plutchik & Herman M. van Pragg, A SelfReport Measure of Violence Risk, II, 31 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 450, 451 (1990)
(providing a general discussion of the benefits of self-report measures of violence).
283. Many commentators and researchers have found this taxonomy useful in classifying
variables. See Steadman et al., supra note 281, at 297 (elaborating on the distinctions of these
classifications); see also Deidre Klassen & William A. O’Connor, A Prospective Study of
Predictors of Violence in Adult Male Mental Health Admissions, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
143, 145–56 (1988).
284. The adage “the best predictor of future behavior is past behavior” appears to be
supported by the research. See, e.g., MONAHAN, supra note 250, at 71 (“If there is one
finding that overshadows all others in the area of prediction, it is that the probability of future
crime increases with each prior criminal act.”). The difficulty lies in discriminating between
those who may continue to commit non-violent offenses and those who will re-offend
violently.
285. Although research exists for both groups, a significant majority of research on
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between juvenile delinquency,
number of prior arrests,
prior
288
289
incarcerations, previous arrest for violent crime, and self-report of
290
violence to be predictive of future violent acts.
Severity of violence at the index offense has unexpectedly been
291
found to be inversely correlated with future violence.
The counterintuitive relationship between severity and future violence may have
accounted for a number of the clinical prediction errors of firstmentally disordered samples has failed to consider the impact of criminal history variables on
violent recidivism. See, e.g., Janofsky et al., supra note 276; Owen et al., Repetitively Violent
Patients, supra note 278. But see Klassen & O’Connor, supra note 276. Results from a recent
meta-analysis indicate “that risk assessments of mentally disordered offenders should pay
close attention to the general offender prediction literature.” James Bonta et al., The
Prediction of Criminal and Violent Recidivism Among Mentally Disordered Offenders: A
Meta-Analysis, 123 PSYCHOL. BULL. 123, 137 (1998). The failure to attend to these factors
may be the result of the clinicians’ reluctance to address static variables whose association
with risk is not modifiable with treatment.
286. See, e.g., Pamela K. Lattimore et al., Predicting Rearrest for Violence Among
Serious Youthful Offenders, 32 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 54, 76 (1995) (“The majority of
these variables are significant in our analysis of youthful recidivism, suggesting that each
provides additional predictive power.” (describing measures of juvenile offending)); Bonta et
al., supra note 285, at 128–34 (describing the criminal history variables generally, and juvenile
delinquency variables specifically, as predictors of violent recidivism); see also David P.
Farrington, Childhood Aggression and Adult Violence: Early Precursors and Later-Life
Outcomes, in THE DEVELOPMENT AND TREATMENT OF CHILDHOOD AGGRESSION 5
(Debra J. Pepler & Kenneth H. Rubin eds., 1991); David P. Farrington, Explaining the
Beginning, Progress, and Ending of Antisocial Behavior from Birth to Adulthood, in 3 FACTS,
FRAMEWORKS, AND FORECASTS: ADVANCES IN CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 253 (Joan
McCord ed., 1992).
287. See, e.g., Klassen & O’Connor, supra note 279, at 79 (reporting a significant
correlation between arrest record and future violence in a cross-validation sample of .26);
Grant T. Harris et al., Violent Recidivism of Mentally Disordered Offenders: The Development
of a Statistical Prediction Instrument, 20 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 315, 318–21 (1993) (describing
criminal history variables as significant predictors of violent recidivism); Klassen &
O’Connor, supra note 276 (reporting that the best predictor of subsequent arrests is the
number of prior arrests).
288. See, e.g., BAXSTROM STUDY, supra note 245; Lattimore et al., supra note 286, at 64;
Bonta et al., supra note 285.
289. See, e.g., Klassen & O’Connor, supra note 283, at 151 (reporting a significant effect
size (.14) between arrests for violent crimes within the last year and violent recidivism);
Marnie E. Rice & Grant T. Harris, A Comparison of Criminal Recidivism Among
Schizophrenic and Nonschizophrenic Offenders, 15 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 397 (1992).
290. See, e.g., Klassen & O’Connor, supra note 283, at 154; Owen et al., Repetitively
Violent Patients, supra note 278, at 1460–61 (reporting that inpatient violent recidivists gave
warning signs, but that their threats were not taken seriously by hospital staff); Plutchik & van
Pragg, supra note 282.
291. See QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 33, at 147 (describing the negative correlation
between the severity of index offense and future violent recidivism as -.16); cf. Bonta et al.,
supra note 285, at 128 (“Neither a violent index offense . . . nor a sexual index offense
predicted future violent behavior.”).
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generation research, as examination of the decision-making policies of
clinicians revealed that they relied heavily on the characteristics of the
292
index offense to predict future violence.
Taken together, criminal history variables have consistently been
correlated with violent recidivism in both mentally and non-mentally
disordered offenders in virtually every study in which they have been
293
assessed; however, the strength of this relationship can be described
294
Thus, researchers and clinicians must consider the
only as “small.”
impact of other variables to increase the predictive accuracy of violence
predictions.
2. Demographic and Case History Variables
295

A second group of static predictors, including sex, socioeconomic
296
297
298
status,
educational attainment,
marital status,
employment

292. See, e.g., BAXSTROM STUDY, supra note 245 (describing an analysis of the
clinicians’ decision-making policies and their reliance upon the characteristics of the index
crime as evidence for predictions of violence). To the extent that second-generation studies
rely upon clinicians that are unaware of this relationship, they too are likely to have elevated
prediction errors.
293. See supra notes 276–79 and accompanying text.
294. Univariate correlations are in the .15 to .25 range, while those studies reporting
effect sizes identify magnitudes within the .15 range. While statistically significant, the
practical significance of this relationship remains questionable. See JACOB COHEN,
STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 24–27 (2d ed. 1977)
(proposing the following interpretation of effect size: .2 considered a small effect, .5
considered a medium effect, and .8 considered a large effect).
295. The weight of the evidence suggests that men are more likely to behave violently
than women. See, e.g., Melvin S. Heller & Saundra M. Ehrlich, Actuarial Variables in 9,600
Violent and Non-Violent Offenders Referred to a Court Psychiatric Clinic, 4 AM. J. SOC.
PSYCHIATRY 30 (1984); Dale E. McNiel et al., Predictors of Violence in Civilly Committed
Acute Psychiatric Patients, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 965, 966 (1988). But see James E.
Hastings & L. Kevin Hamberger, Sociodemographic Predictors of Violence, 20 PSYCHIATRIC
CLINICS N. AM. 323, 327 (1997) (“[T]he bulk of the research seems to show that men have a
greater tendency to behave violently; however, in some samples, especially those with serious
psychiatric diagnoses, the rate of violence among women may approach that of men.”);
Charles Lidz et al., The Accuracy of Predictions of Violence to Others, 269 JAMA 1007, 1010
(1993) (describing a sample in which violence among women was higher than among men).
296. See, e.g., David A. Pritchard, Stable Predictors of Recidivism: A Summary, 17
CRIMINOLOGY 15 (1979) (reporting that in a number of studies, low pre-prison income level
was predictive of failure on parole); Swanson et al., supra note 279, at 764 (reporting that of
the 10,000 subjects in the Epidemiologic Catchment Area (“ECA”) Survey, the rate of
violence in the low socioeconomic status (“SES”) group was three times higher than the
violence rate of the upper SES group).
297. See, e.g., Harris et al., supra note 287, at 318 (reporting data to suggest that on
average violent recidivists completed one grade less than did non-recidivists).
298. See, e.g., id. (describing a significant difference between recidivists and non-
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history, criminality of family members, history of childhood abuse,
302
303
elementary school maladjustment, and childhood aggression, have
been consistently correlated with future violence, although, again, the
304
The relationship between
strength of the relationship is small.
305
306
violence and other demographic variables, including age and race,

recidivists on “never married” variable); Wagdy Loza & Gurmeet K. Dhaliwal, Psychometric
Evaluation of the Risk Appraisal Guide (RAG): A Tool for Assessing Violent Recidivism, 12 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 779, 781 (1997) (describing items on a risk assessment
instrument including “marital status at time of index offense”). The marital status variable
has been construed as an index of individuals’ general ability to form lasting interpersonal
relationships with others. Those who do not engage in these relationships tend to recidivate
at higher rates than those who have.
299. See, e.g., Bonta et al., supra note 285, at 133 (describing a significant effect for
employment problems in a meta-analysis); Harris et al., supra note 287, at 318 (describing
employment history as a variable capable of discriminating between recidivists and nonrecidivists); Klassen & O’Connor, supra note 283, at 77.
300. See, e.g., Harris et al., supra note 287; Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., Violent Juvenile
Delinquents, 18 J. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 307 (1979) (reporting that violent juvenile offenders
reported witnessing extreme violence more frequently than did non-violent or less violent
offenders); Jerome A. Yesavage et al., Family Conflict, Psychopathology, and Dangerous
Behavior by Schizophrenic Inpatients, 8 PSYCHIATRY RES. 271 (1983) (reporting that parental
fighting with someone outside the family was correlated with both violence prior to admission
and inpatient violence).
301. Proponents of a modeling explanation for violence have cited evidence that
children who are abused engage in an increased frequency of violent acts. See, e.g., Klassen &
O’Connor, supra note 283, at 152 (reporting that being injured by a sibling before age fifteen
was predictive of violence for both schizophrenic and non-schizophrenic male inpatients);
Lewis et al., supra note 300, at 307 (reporting that childhood abuse differentiated between
more-violent and less-violent juvenile offenders).
302. See, e.g., Deborah M. Capaldi & Gerald R. Patterson, Can Violent Offenders Be
Distinguished from Frequent Offenders: Prediction from Childhood to Adolescence, 33 J. RES.
CRIME & DELINQ. 206, 225 (1996) (“Compared with the rest of the sample, violent and
nonviolent arrestees appeared to be at considerable risk at Grade 4 in family background,
their own antisocial behavior, and overall adjustment.”); Loza & Dhaliwal, supra note 298, at
781.
303. See, e.g., LEFKOWITZ ET AL., GROWING UP TO BE VIOLENT: A LONGITUDINAL
STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF AGGRESSION (1977); Capaldi & Patterson supra note 302;
Lattimore et al., supra note 286; R. Loeber & T. Dishion, Early Predictors of Male
Delinquency: A Review, 94 PSYCHOL. BULL. 68 (1983) (citing early youth behavior problems
and aggression, later youth aggression, and antisocial behavior as consistent predictors of
subsequent delinquency).
304. Univariate correlations for this class of variables have been in the .22 (“parents had
physical fights with others”) to the .28 (“injured by a sibling before age 15”) range. See
Klassen & O’Connor, supra note 283, at 151 tbl.1; see also Harris et al., supra note 287, at 324
(reporting univariate correlation between violent recidivism and elementary school
maladjustment at .31; the highest correlations then account for 9% of the total variance).
305. A majority of the research has reported a consistent inverse relationship between
age and subsequent violent offending. See, e.g., Jessica M. Tanner, “Continuing Threat” to
Whom?: Risk Assessment in Virginia Capital Sentencing Hearings, 17 CAP. DEF. J. 381, 384
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remains less clear.
3. Dispositional Variables
Dispositional risk factors are those individual traits or styles that are
307
considered relatively enduring personal characteristics. This category
308
309
includes risk factors such as anger, impulsivity, and psychopathy or
(2005); Swanson et al., supra note 279, at 764 (noting that younger people accounted for seven
times as much violence as did older individuals); Loza & Dhaliwal, supra note 298, at 789–90
(describing violent offenders as being significantly younger at the time of the index offense
than non-violent offenders); Harris et al., supra note 287, at 318 (reporting the average age of
recidivists as six years younger than non-recidivists (23.5 to 29.7, respectively)). But see
Robert Menzies & Christopher D. Webster, Construction and Validation of Risk Assessments
in a Six-Year Follow-up of Forensic Patients: A Tridimensional Analysis, 63 J. CONSULTING &
CLINICAL PSYCH. 766, 772 (1995) (reporting “individuals 30 years or older at time of
assessment were involved in more transactions than their younger counterparts, b = -.21, p <
.01—a finding that contradicts the general expectation of an inverse correlation between age
and violence propensity”); Heller & Ehrlich, supra note 295 (reporting that subjects who had
committed multiple violent acts were significantly older than nonviolent defendants or those
who had only committed only one violent crime). While Hastings and Hamberger, supra note
295, at 326, dismiss these findings as “anomalies,” another researcher has hypothesized that
the sometimes-inconsistent findings may be due to an interaction between risk factors. See
Dale E. McNiel, Correlates of Violence in Psychotic Patients, 27 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 683,
686–87 (1997).
306. The effect of race is another variable for which findings have frequently been
contradictory. Some research has indicated a slight but significant relationship between race
and violence. See, e.g., Steadman et al., supra note 281, at 274 (suggesting that AfricanAmericans accounted for a significantly greater number of arrests for violence than would be
expected); Maureen S. Baum et al., Predicting Violent Behavior Within a Medium Security
Correctional Setting, 3 INT’L J. ECLECTIC PSYCHOTHERAPY 18, 21 (1984) (reporting that race
differentiated violent from non-violent inmates). But see Swanson et al., supra note 279, at
764 (reporting that race was unrelated to violent crime in the ECA sample when
socioeconomic status was controlled for). Others have suggested that membership in a
violence-accepting subculture (e.g., some gangs) may provide a better explanation than the
more heterogeneous classification of race. See McNiel, supra note 305, at 687.
307. See VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DISORDER: DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT,
supra note 281, at 19 (describing dispositional risk factors as “those that reflect the individual
person’s predispositions, traits, tendencies, or styles”).
308. Until recently the construct of anger has been conceptualized as an everyday
experience, and anger assessment procedures have been developed in primarily non-clinical
populations.
As a consequence, instruments were unavailable to differentiate the
dysfunctional elements of anger and its relationship to violence. See Raymond W. Novaco,
Anger as a Risk Factor for Violence Among the Mentally Disordered, in VIOLENCE AND
MENTAL DISORDER: DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 281, at 21, 21. Some
research has found a relationship between anger and violence. See, e.g., Thomas J. Craig, An
Epidemiologic Study of Problems Associated with Violence Among Psychiatric Inpatients, 139
AM J. PSYCHIATRY 1262 (1982) (reporting that anger was the factor most strongly associated
with patient violence in a study of 1,033 psychiatric patients); Stanley R. Kay et al., Profiles of
Aggression Among Psychiatric Patients, 176 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 547 (1988)
(indicating that anger was one of the strongest predictors of violence in a group of
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Debate continues about the utility and

hospitalized psychiatric inpatients); see also Robert A. Baron, Magnitude of Victim’s Pain
Cues and Level of Prior Anger Arousal as Determinants of Adult Aggressive Behavior, 17 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 236, 239 (1971) (reporting that angered subjects delivered
more intense shocks to subjects than did non-angered subjects).
Although research suggests that anger may be predictive of violence, no published
research studies have incorporated a measure of anger within a comprehensive assessment.
An assessment instrument has been developed to assess the role anger plays in violence,
however. See Mills et al., supra note 277, at 247 (describing the Novaco Anger Scale as “an
effective measure of anger in an offender population”). The MacArthur Risk Assessment
Study currently underway has included this measure in an attempt to determine the predictive
validity of anger as a factor in future violent acts. See Henry J. Steadman et al., Designing a
New Generation of Risk Assessment Research, in VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DISORDER:
DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 281, at 297. In the future, other research
programs should incorporate this factor into risk assessment in an effort to improve the
prediction of dangerousness.
309. Impulsiveness is “related to the control of thoughts and behavior[s].” See Ernest S.
Barratt, Impulsiveness and Aggression, in VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DISORDER:
DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 281, at 61, 61. The failure to inhibit
aggressive behaviors has been hypothesized to relate to certain types of violence. See, e.g.,
G.V. Caprara et al., Indicators of Impulsive Aggression: Present Status of Research on
Irritability and Emotional Susceptibility Scales, 6 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL
DIFFERENCES 665, 666–67 (1985); G.V. Caprara et al., Instigation to Aggress and Escalation of
Aggression Examined from a Personological Perspective: The Role of Irritability and of
Emotional Susceptibility, 9 AGGRESSIVE BEHAV. 345 (1983). Problems with assessment
instruments have once again limited the assessment of this factor in violence prediction
research. The MacArthur Risk Assessment Survey researchers have developed an
instrument, the “Barratt Impulsiveness Scale,” that shows promise in elucidating the
relationship between violence and impulsiveness. See Barratt, supra, at 63.
310. Personality disorders have been described as “an enduring pattern of inner
experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of the individual’s
culture, is pervasive and inflexible, has an onset in adolescence or early adulthood, is stable
over time, and leads to distress or impairment.” DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-IV-TR 287–88 (4th ed. 2000); Stephen D. Hart et al.,
Psychopathy as a Risk Marker for Violence: Development and Validation of a Screening
Version of the Revised Psychopathy Checklist, in VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DISORDER:
DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 281, at 81, 81.
Interpersonally, psychopaths are grandiose, egocentric, manipulative,
dominant, forceful, and coldhearted. Affectively, they display shallow
and labile emotions, are unable to form long-lasting bonds to people,
principles, or goals, and are lacking in empathy, anxiety, and genuine guilt
or remorse. Behaviorally, psychopaths are impulsive and sensationseeking, and tend to violate social norms; the most obvious expressions of
these predispositions involve criminality, substance abuse, and a failure to
fulfill social obligations and responsibilities.
Id. The Psychopathy Checklist (“PCL”) (and subsequent revisions) was developed to assess
psychopathy, and reliability and validity of the measure appears to be good. See, e.g., Robert
D. Hare et al., Psychopathy and the DSM-IV Criteria for Antisocial Personality Disorder, 100
J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 391 (1991); Robert D. Hare et al., The Revised Psychopathy
Checklist: Reliability and Factor Structure, 2 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 338 (1990).
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meaningfulness of these factors, but generally findings suggest that they
311
have some predictive validity within limited populations.
4. Clinical Variables
This category encompasses the relationship between diagnosis or
symptomology of various types of mental disorders and violence. The
312
impact of diagnostic categories including schizophrenia and mood
Subsequent research has demonstrated a relationship between psychopathy and violence.
See, e.g., QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 33, at 147 (reporting that scores on the PCL-R were the
single best predictor of violent offending, obtaining a correlation of .34 with violent
recidivism); Grant T. Harris et al., Psychopathy and Violent Recidivism, 15 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 625, 632 (1991) (describing the rate of violent failure to be significantly higher in
psychopaths at 77% compared to only 21% of nonpsychopaths); Stephen D. Hart et al.,
Performance of Male Psychopaths Following Conditional Release from Prison, 56 J.
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 227 (1988) (reporting that offenders who scored in the
top third of the PCL distribution were three times more likely to violate the conditions of
release, and approximately four times more likely to commit a violent offense than those in
the bottom third of the distribution). This research suggests that psychopathy is an important
construct to consider when predicting violent recidivism; however, two recent meta-analyses
reported less impressive results.
Paul Gendreau et al., Is the PCL-R Really the
“Unparalleled” Measure of Offender Risk? A Lesson in Knowledge Cumulation, 29 CRIM.
JUST. & BEHAV. 397 (2002) (reporting phi coefficients of .23 and .21 for general and violent
recidivism, respectively). Glenn D. Walters, Predicting Criminal Justice Outcomes with the
Psychopathy Checklist and the Lifestyle Criminality Screening Form: A Meta-Analytic
Comparison, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 89 (2003) (examining only prospective studies of adult and
juvenile offenders and reporting a weighted r of .26 for general recidivism). A subsequent
study revealed that Factor 2, which assesses social deviance and antisocial behavior, appeared
to be more strongly correlated with both general and violent recidivism (rw = .32 and .26,
respectively) than did Factor 1, which taps the affective and interpersonal components of
psychopathy (e.g., callousness and superficial charm). See Glenn D. Walters, Predicting
Institutional Adjustment and Recidivism with the Psychopathy Checklist Factor Scores: A
Meta-Analysis, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 541, 541–51 (2003).
311. Additional research addressing the impact of these constructs on violence is an
important next step in improving the accuracy of predictions. Researchers or clinicians who
fail to consider the impact of dispositional factors will likely experience increased error
compared to those who take a more comprehensive approach.
312. Public perception of the mentally ill as dangerous has long been the norm. In
contrast, mental health professionals, motivated by the desire to reduce the stigma associated
with mental illness have historically dismissed the connection between psychiatric disorder
and violence. See, e.g., NAT’L MENTAL HEALTH ASSOC., STIGMA: A LACK OF AWARENESS
AND UNDERSTANDING (1987) (pamphlet claiming that “people with mental illness pose no
more of a crime threat than do other members of the general population”); MONAHAN, supra
note 250, at 19. Recent research challenges this assertion and has demonstrated a small but
consistent finding of increased risk of violence in the mentally ill when compared to the
general population. See Swanson et al., supra note 279, at 768–69 (“The ECA data clearly
demonstrate that individuals in the community with psychiatric disorders are more likely to
engage in assaultive behavior . . . than those who are free of mental illness and substance
abuse.”); Bruce G. Link et al., The Violent and Illegal Behavior of Mental Patients
Reconsidered, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 275, 290 (1992) (“[T]he simple assertion that mental patients
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313

disorder, as well as the relationship between symptoms such as
314
delusions and hallucinations, on violent recidivism has been explored.
315
316
The presence of neurological impairment, low intelligence, and
and former mental patients are on average no more dangerous than nonpatients is
incorrect.”). Currently, researchers and clinicians concede there exists a “weak association”
between mental illness and community violence but stress that other factors, for example,
substance abuse, are much more strongly correlated with violent acts. See John Monahan &
Jean Arnold, Violence by People with Mental Illness: A Consensus Statement by Advocates
and Researchers, 19 PSYCHIATRIC REHABILITATION J., Spring 1996, at 67, 70.
313. Affective or mood disorders include depression, mania, and bipolar disorder.
Researchers have reported an increase in the prevalence of mood disturbances in violent
individuals. See, e.g., Swanson et al., supra note 279, at 765 (“The prevalence of affective
disorder was three times higher among respondents who were violent (9.37 percent) than
among those who were not (2.95 percent).”); see also Renée L. Binder & Dale E. McNiel,
Effects of Diagnosis and Context on Dangerousness, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 728 (1988);
Jerome A. Yesavage, Bipolar Illness: Correlates of Dangerous Inpatient Behaviour, 143 BRIT.
J. PSYCHIATRY 554 (1983) (reporting correlations between violence and the manic phase of
bipolar illness).
314. The exploration of relationships between violence and delusional content is a
relatively recent development in the literature. Delusions and hallucinations occur while
individuals are in an actively psychotic state and are defined as a pathological distortion in
beliefs or sensory experiences. Research suggests that delusions are the most widely
experienced positive symptom of people with schizophrenia, with 90% of individuals
diagnosed with schizophrenia experiencing delusions at some point during the course of their
illness. See, e.g., Pamela J. Taylor et al., Delusions and Violence, in VIOLENCE AND MENTAL
DISORDER: DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 281, at 161, 165; Pamela J.
Taylor et al., Handedness and Schizophrenic Symptoms, 55 BRIT. J. MED. PSYCHOL. 287
(1982). Preliminary research suggests an association between delusional content and
violence. See, e.g., John Junginger et al., Delusions and Symptom-Consistent Violence, 49
PSYCHIATRIC SERV. 218, 220 (1998) (reporting results that suggest “evidence for a moderate
risk that delusions would motivate violence at some time during the course of a violent
subject’s illness”); see also J. Arturo Silva et al., Delusional Misidentification and
Dangerousness: A Neurobiologic Hypothesis, 38 J. FORENSIC. SCI. 904 (1993). Research
efforts have been hampered, however, by the absence of a reliable and valid measure of
delusional content. MacArthur Risk Assessment Survey researchers have attempted to fill
this void by developing the Maudsley Assessment Delusion Schedule (“MADS”). See Taylor
et al., Delusions and Violence, supra, at 178. Initial research appears promising; however, the
ability of this instrument to improve the predictive accuracy of violence prediction remains
unknown.
315. See, e.g., McNiel, supra note 305, at 684–85 (describing the association between
head injury and aggressive behavior both in the first few days following the injury, and
subsequently in the context of the irritability associated with post-injury personality change).
He also reports data to suggest brain lesion in the temporal and orbitomedial part of the
frontal lobe may elicit aggression. Id.; see also Menahem Krakowski, Neurologic and
Neuropsychologic Correlates of Violence, 27 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 674 (1997); Menahem I.
Krakowski et al., Neurologic Impairment in Violent Schizophrenic Inpatients, 146 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 849 (1989).
316. See, e.g., MARTIN WOLFGANG ET AL., DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT (1972)
(describing the relationship between low intelligence and violence); Travis Hirschi & Michael
J. Hindelang, Intelligence and Delinquency: A Revisionist Review, 42 AM. SOC. REV. 571
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317

alcohol or substance abuse has also been correlated with violence.
Research demonstrating the relationship between clinical variables and
violence has been equivocal, and generally clinical variables are
considered poorer predictors of violent recidivism than are the
318
preceding categories.
This may change, however, as methodological
refinements in assessment instruments increase the ability to distinguish
between violent and non-violent offenders.
5. Situational/Contextual Variables
A number of authors have strongly advocated for the use of
319
320
Home environment,
situational factors to predict future violence.
(1977) (describing the relationship between low intelligence and criminal behavior); Klassen
& O’Connor, supra note 276 (predicting low intelligence to be related to violent recidivism).
317. The association between alcohol or substance abuse and violence is a consistent
finding throughout the studies reviewed. See, e.g., QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 33, at 147
(reporting the correlation between alcohol abuse score and violent recidivism to be .13);
Richard Heyman et al., Alcohol and Aggressive Personality Styles: Potentiators of Serious
Physical Aggression Against Wives?, 9 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 44, 52 (1995) (discussing the finding
that “husbands’ problem drinking is significantly, albeit moderately, related to serious
husband-to-wife aggression in young married couples”); Andrew Johns, Substance Misuse: A
Primary Risk and a Major Problem of Comorbidity, 9 INT’L. REV. PSYCHIATRY 233, 235
(1997) (asserting that “alcohol consumption is a major risk factor for violent offending” and
that female substance abusers are equally likely to engage in violent acts as their male
counterparts); Klassen & O’Connor, supra note 283, at 151 (reporting a significant correlation
between “assaultive when drinking or using drugs” and violent recidivism of .16); Swanson et
al., supra note 279, at 765 (“Substance abuse was by far the most prevalent diagnosis among
those who were violent; 41.64 percent had alcohol or drug abuse disorders, compared with
only 4.93 percent of the nonviolent respondents.”).
318. See Bonta et al., supra note 285, at 132 (reporting a mean effect size of -.03 for
clinical variables, and concluding that many of the diagnostic categories were either unrelated
to violence (mood disorders) or negatively related to violence (psychosis)). But see Susanne
Strand et al., Clinical and Risk Management Factors in Risk Prediction of Mentally Disordered
Offenders—More Important Than Historical Data?, 4 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL.
67, 74 (1999) (reporting results from a Swedish study of an actuarial instrument to predict
violent recidivism in which clinical and risk management factors were more predictive of
violent recidivism than were historical variables).
319. See, e.g., Megargee, supra note 13, at 6 (opining that “knowledge of both
personality and situational variables was essential for accurate prediction”).
320. Research indicates that a chaotic home environment contributes to violent
behavior. See Sue E. Estroff & Catherine Zimmer, Social Networks, Social Support and
Violence Among Persons with Severe, Persistent Mental Illness, in VIOLENCE AND MENTAL
DISORDER: DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 281, at 259, 259–60 (“Chaotic,
violent family environments where there was alcohol or substance abuse, an ongoing history
of conflict among family members, and a controlling atmosphere were associated with
violence.”); Klassen & O’Connor, supra note 283, at 152 (reporting significant correlations
between violent recidivism and measures of dissatisfaction and conflict in the home).
Homeless, mentally ill individuals are also at increased risk of violence. See, e.g., McNiel,
supra note 305, at 687 (“Previous research has indicated that the mentally ill among the
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322

quality of interpersonal relationships,
social support,
treatment
323
324
compliance,
and presence of therapeutic alliance
have been
investigated to determine their association with future violence. Until
recently, these variables had been excluded from research because they
demand more frequent data collection and increasingly complex
325
Thus, findings regarding these variables are
statistical analyses.
preliminary, and additional research is needed before a consensus
concerning their impact on the predictive validity of violence prediction
can be achieved.
The explosion in second-generation violence prediction research
resulted in a number of philosophical and methodological problems
unanticipated by researchers, scholars, or commentators.
D. Methodological Problems of Second-Generation Research
Arguably, the single most significant problem impacting this body of
research is the failure of researchers to communicate or coordinate
326
research efforts.
Uniform definitions of predictor variables are
homeless are more likely to engage in violent behavior and felonious criminal behavior.”).
321. See, e.g., Klassen & O’Connor, supra note 283, at 151 (reporting significant
correlations between violence and a number of interpersonal factors including “how long ago
last sexual intercourse,” “dissatisfaction with siblings,” and “how long ago last relationship
with a woman”).
322. See Estroff & Zimmer, supra note 320, at 288, 291. Estroff and Zimmer conclude
that social supports are related to violence and suggest, “One way to think contextually about
the risk for violence is to consider that the social network represents the opportunity to
engage in violence, and social support or quality of relationships the source of provocation or
perceived need for such behaviors,” but acknowledge that none of the instruments alone
yielded information that was a reliable predictor in who would be violent. Id.
323. The impact of medication compliance on violent recidivism by psychotic patients
has been established. See, e.g., Alec Buchanan & Anthony David, Compliance and the
Reduction of Dangerousness, 3 J. MENTAL HEALTH 427 (1994); Antonio Convit et al.,
Characteristics of Repeatedly Assaultive Psychiatric Inpatients, 41 HOSP. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 1112 (1990); Jerome A. Yesavage, Correlates of Dangerous Behavior by
Schizophrenics in Hospital, 18 J. PSYCHIATRIC RES. 225 (1984).
324. See Estroff & Zimmer, supra note 320, at 275 (reporting a significant bivariate
relationship between involvement with mental health professionals and violence).
325. See, e.g., Mossman, supra note 274, at 783–86 (describing the receiver operating
characteristic (“ROC”) analysis to evaluate attempts to predict violence). Asymptomatic
receiver operating characteristic (“AROC”) methods describe accuracy “with indices of
performance that are unaffected by base rates or by clinicians’ biases for or against Type I or
Type II prediction errors.” Id.; see also QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 33, at 50–54.
326. See John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman, Toward a Rejuvination of Risk
Assessment Research, in VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DISORDER: DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK
ASSESSMENT, supra note 281, at 1, 12.
This fragmentation of research efforts has seriously hindered the
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virtually non-existent, follow-up periods vary considerably, and cross327
validation studies are rarely undertaken.
Inconsistent findings result
in reduced confidence in both the validity and generalizability of results.
The absence of consensus concerning the appropriate measures for
evaluation and communication of research findings is another
328
impediment to the development of accuracy in violence prediction.
Failure to recognize a standard statistic for use in analyzing and
reporting results has made comparison of research findings difficult,
thereby suppressing discourse and debate among mental health
329
professionals.
development of knowledge of the actuarial correlates of violence. The
fact that each research site idiosyncratically defines its predictor and
criterion variables and rarely replicates the measures used by others
drastically reduces the confidence with which findings can be generalized
and impedes the cumulative development of knowledge.
Id.
327. See, e.g., Norman G. Poythress, Expert Testimony on Violence and Dangerousness:
Roles for Mental Health Professionals, 5 FORENSIC REP. 135, 143 (1992) (describing
idiosyncratic predictor variables, limited cross-validation studies, and the need for larger
sample, multisite research).
328. The importance of a common metric to facilitate discourse cannot be understated.
An increasing number of researchers have proposed abandoning the dichotomous predictions
of the past and adopting receiver operating characteristic analysis. See, e.g., QUINSEY ET AL.,
supra note 33; Douglas Mossman, Dangerousness Decisions: An Essay on the Mathematics of
Clinical Violence Prediction and Involuntary Hospitalization, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE
95, 99 (1995); Mossman, supra note 274, at 783; cf. Stephen D. Hart et al., A Note on
Portraying the Accuracy of Violence Predictions, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 695, 696 (1993)
(describing problems with two-by-two contingency tables as a method of evaluating violence
predictions).
329. An illustrative example involves the way in which researchers have defined the
false-positive rate as a measure of predictive accuracy. In his influential monograph,
Professor Monahan calculated the “percent false positives” in five first-generation studies.
See MONAHAN, supra note 250, at 48. He calculated this percent by first taking all cases
predicted to be violent and determined the percentage correctly predicted (true positives)
and the percentage incorrectly predicted (false positives). See id. He then divided the sum of
the false-positives by the sum of the true-positives plus the false-positives and multiplied this
sum by 100, resulting in the proportion of people predicted to be violent who were not violent
at follow-up. See id.
Professor Randy Otto summarized second-generation research initiated after 1981 and
concluded that accuracy had improved. See Otto, supra note 268. He based this opinion on
his calculation of false-positive error rates, a concept that is mathematically dissimilar from
that used by Monahan. Id. Professor Otto divided the number of individuals predicted to be
violent but not violent at outcome (i.e., the false positives) by the sum of the false-positives
and the true-negatives—those people predicted to be non-violent who had not been violent at
follow-up. Id. Monahan’s method yields higher figures than that of Otto and has led to
confusion in the literature. See also Hart et al., supra note 328, at 697; Douglas Mossman,
Further Comments on Portraying the Accuracy of Violence Predictions, 18 LAW & HUM.
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330

Reliance upon weak criterion measures, impoverished predictor
331
variables, and constricted validation samples has also been identified
as an ongoing methodological concern that must be addressed if
332
substantial improvements in predictive accuracy are to occur.
Methodological deficiencies notwithstanding, researchers have used
information gleaned from projects examining the “cues,” or predictors
333
of violence, to inform two very different methods of decision making.
In first-generation research, clinicians who were studied relied solely
upon clinical judgment to identify dangerous offenders. Proponents of
this method have continued with efforts to inform clinical judgments by
educating clinicians about potential variables’ predictive power and base
rate estimates, then evaluating subsequent predictive efficiency of
334
clinical judgments. Another contingent of investigators has combined
the information gathered about individual predictors and used these
335
in the effort to improve
cues to develop actuarial techniques
prediction accuracy. An overview of the decision-making strategies and
BEHAV. 587 (1994).
330. A number of research studies have continued to rely on “official” measures of
recidivism and thus are likely underestimating violent recidivism. See, e.g., Menzies &
Webster, supra note 305, at 769 (describing reliance upon re-arrest and hospitalization data).
See generally Mulvey & Lidz, supra note 280 (discussing the ways to improve methodology
and criterion variable measurement).
331. The continued reluctance of researchers to include situational or contextual
variables has contributed to this methodological deficiency.
332. See John Monahan, Violence Prediction: The Past Twenty and the Next Twenty
Years, 23 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 107, 115–17 (1996) (describing necessary advances, including
“[a] rich array of theoretically chosen risk factors in multiple domains,” “[r]isk must be
treated as a probability estimate that changes over time and context,” and “[l]arge and
broadly representative samples of patients at multiple, coordinated sites must participate in
the research”).
333. “Clinical” judgment refers to the informal, intuitive means of combining
information “in one’s head,” while “actuarial” refers to a more formal, explicit decisionmaking strategy that combines data using a predetermined equation, table, or algorithm.
334. See, e.g., William Gardner et al., Clinical Versus Actuarial Predictions of Violence in
Patients with Mental Illness, 64 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 602 (1996); Janofsky et
al., supra note 276 (indicating that psychiatrists significantly under-predicted violent behavior
in a group of inpatient admissions). “We found the doctors had no ability to predict battery
. . . .” Janofsky et al., supra note 276, at 1093. False-negative errors are unusual in clinical
prediction literature and may have resulted from clinicians attempting to adjust their
judgment to correspond with the relatively low base rate of violence for this population of
voluntary inpatients. A small sample of only forty-seven patients also likely contributed to
the error. See id.
335. Actuarial methods also involve gathering information in a similar way but rely on
variables that have been predetermined to have some statistical correlation with future
violence. These variables are then combined using a mathematical formula to produce a
numerical probability that the individual will be violent during some specified time period.
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their impact on accuracy follows.
VI. CLINICAL PREDICTION
336

Clinical judgment in the traditional sense involves the means by
337
which clinicians aggregate the data they gather through personal
interview or collateral sources concerning life history, psychometric test
338
scores, and diagnostic impressions.
The judgments derived from this
method are often described as intuitive, and clinicians have rarely been
339
asked to explicitly detail the processes by which they estimate risk. In
336. It is important to note that first-generation research studies relied solely on clinical
judgment for prediction decision-making. Actuarial instruments were generated by secondgeneration studies that identified variables correlated with violence. It is also important to
clarify that the term clinical judgment refers to the method of aggregating data and does not,
as used by Meehl and others, “denote the judgments, inferences, observations, and practices
of clinicians.” See Drew Westen & Joel Weinberger, When Clinical Description Becomes
Statistical Prediction, 59 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 595 (2004). A separate body of research
examines the accuracy of clinicians’ observations, thought processes, and diagnostic
capabilities.
337. While clinical and actuarial methods refer to the means for combining the data, a
separate, but often misunderstood, issue involves the character of the data itself. Information
concerning the prediction of violence has been dichotomized into “hard” variables (those
data that are relatively unambiguous and can be easily scored based on verifiable information
such as age, number of prior arrests, sex, or marital status) and “soft” variables (usually
nonpsychometric findings that may include diagnostic impressions, clinician ratings on
psychometric instruments, or other qualitative judgments). Methods that include only hard
data are less susceptible to reliability challenges than those that incorporate soft factors.
However, it is incorrect to assume that the decision-making strategy necessarily restricts the
type of information used. Many clinical and actuarial techniques use both hard and soft data
in predicting dangerousness. But cf. Slobogin, supra note 224, at 117–19 (describing “hard”
actuarial data).
338. See PAUL MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION 3–4 (1954);
William M. Grove & Paul E. Meehl, Comparative Efficiency of Informal (Subjective,
Impressionistic) and Formal (Mechanical, Algorithmic) Prediction Procedures: The ClinicalStatistical Controversy, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 293, 294 (1996) (“[T]he other method
relies on an informal, ‘in the head,’ impressionistic, subjective conclusion, reached (somehow)
by a human clinical judge.” (describing clinical judgment)); Westen & Weinberger, supra note
336, at 595 (“Although psychologists have revisited the question of clinical versus statistical
prediction many times since Meehl’s book, . . . the weight of the evidence remains the same as
it was in 1954: In the vast majority of studies, a good formula matches or trumps an intuitive
clinical soothsayer . . . .”).
339. See Mossman, supra note 328, at 100 (reporting what he considers a noncontroversial assumption that the “clinical decision process that is often governed by implicit
assumptions or unconscious heuristics”); Alec Buchanan, Risk and Dangerousness, 29
PSYCHOL. MED. 465, 466–67 (1999) (“Clinicians, on the other hand, are seldom required to
describe in detail the processes by which they estimate risk.”). Empirical research suggests
that we have very little awareness of factors that influence our judgments. See, e.g., Eugene
F. Gauron & John K. Dickinson, Diagnostic Decision Making in Psychiatry, 14 ARCHIVES OF
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 225 (1966); Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson, Telling More Than
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this method, the focus is on the unique features of the individual for
whom predictions are being made beyond the individual’s membership
340
in a broad class or classes.
Historically, clinicians have pointed to their experience and training
as justification for claims of accuracy concerning predictions of
dangerousness; in fact, the presumption that expertise is developed
through experience and training has long been accepted by the general
341
public and the judiciary alike.
Nonetheless, empirical research has
failed to demonstrate the relationship between experience and expertise
342
on virtually any prediction task.
Rather, actuarial methods have
343
consistently outperformed human judgment.
To understand the reasons why clinical prediction and, specifically,
violence determinations present such a formidable challenge, it is
important to explore the impediments to accurate clinical judgment.
We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 231 (1977).
“Heuristics” is a phrase coined by cognitive psychologists to “refer[] to implicit thinking
devices that individuals use to oversimplify complex, information-processing tasks.” See
Mossman, supra note 328, at 100 n.32. Use of these procedures often leads to “systematically
erroneous decisions.” Id. For an overview of heuristics and their impact on accurate decision
making, see also HOWARD N. GARB, STUDYING THE CLINICIAN: JUDGMENT RESEARCH
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT 182–206 (1998), and infra note 352 and accompanying
text.
340. See DAWES, supra note 19.
341. See, e.g., Robyn M. Dawes, Experience and Validity of Clinical Judgments: The
Illusory Correlation, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 457, 458 (1989) (“It was simply obvious to everyone
involved (except me) that clinical experience was a sound basis for clinical judgment and that
personal contact with people is the sine qua non for understanding what they are like.”); see
also Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
342. See, e.g., JERRY S. WIGGINS, PERSONALITY AND PREDICTION: PRINCIPLES OF
PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 131–35 (1973); AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOC., REPORT OF THE
TASK FORCE ON THE EVALUATION OF EDUCATION, TRAINING AND SERVICE IN
PSYCHOLOGY (1982) (noting that there is no evidence that professional training and
experience are related to professional competence); Harold N. Garb, Clinical Judgment,
Clinical Training, and Professional Experience, 105 PSYCHOL. BULL. 387 (1989) (concluding
that there is no relationship between years of clinical experience and accuracy of judgment).
343. See Grove & Meehl, supra note 338, at 296–300. These authors performed a metaanalysis of the existing prediction literature, and “[o]f the 136 studies [included in the
analyses], 64 favored the [actuarial methods], 64 showed approximately equivalent [results],
and 8 favored the clinician[’s judgments].” Id. at 298. This discrepancy occurred in spite of
the fact that a majority of the research favored the clinician by providing them with more data
than used in the actuarial method. Id. at 299. No pattern emerged concerning the small
number of studies favoring the human judges, and, in fact, fewer studies favored the clinician
than would be expected by chance. See id. Earlier empirical analysis of this body of literature
reported remarkably similar results. See also Janus & Meehl, supra note 11, at 48–49
(“[C]linical judgment is at best as good as, but often worse than, actuarial methods.”). See
generally MICHAEL WIERZBICKI, ISSUES IN CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY: SUBJECTIVE VERSUS
OBJECTIVE APPROACHES (1993).
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Clinical prediction of violence is a complex task that involves a two-part
process of identifying relevant risk factors or variables within the
information provided and then assigning the appropriate weight to those
344
“People . . . have great difficulty
factors within the prediction task.
combining qualitatively distinct” variables with knowledge about the
345
distributions and the predictability of each predictor.
Research into
these processes has led Paul Meehl to conclude, “There are no strong
arguments . . . for believing that human beings can assign optimal
weights in equations subjectively or that they apply their own weights
346
consistently . . . .”
Cognitive psychologists have identified many specific impediments
347
to the decision-making process; for example, preconceived notions or

344. See Buchanan, supra note 339, at 466.
345. See DAWES, supra note 19, at 99–100; Robyn M. Dawes, Probabilistic Versus
Causal Thinking, in THINKING CLEARLY ABOUT PSYCHOLOGY 235, 252–61 (Dante Cicchetti
& William M. Grove eds., 1991).
346. Paul E. Meehl, Causes and Effects of My Disturbing Little Book, 50 J.
PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 370, 372 (1986). A significant majority of academic and research
psychologists have accepted Dr. Meehl’s argument, first articulated in the 1950s. See, e.g.,
Judith V. Becker & William D. Murphy, What We Know and Do Not Know About Assessing
and Treating Sex Offenders, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 116, 124 (1998) (“We do not want
to belabor the point, but, as Meehl pointed out in his classic text, actuarial prediction
continues to outperform clinical prediction.”) (citations omitted); Eugene W. Wang &
Pamela M. Diamond, Empirically Identifying Factors Related to Violence Risk in Corrections,
17 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 377, 377 (1999) (“However, ‘informal’ (clinical, subjective,
impressionistic) predictions have historically been extremely poor in all domains, including
aggression.”); Hart et al., supra note 328, at 696 (1993) (“In the context of psycholegal
assessments, unwillingness to qualify one’s confidence in violence predictions or failure to
make probabilistic statements regarding the likelihood of future violence is, at best, poor
practice; at worst, it is simply unethical.”); Monahan & Steadman, supra note 326.
Nevertheless, commentators have acknowledged the failure of practitioners and
clinicians to accept these assumptions concerning clinical judgment. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER
D. WEBSTER ET AL., THE HCR-20 SCHEME: THE ASSESSMENT OF DANGEROUSNESS AND
RISK v (1995) (“The great challenge in what remains of the 1990’s is to integrate the almost
separate worlds of research on the prediction of violence and the clinical practice of
assessment. At present the two domains scarcely intersect.”); see also Randy Borum,
Improving the Clinical Practice of Violence Risk Assessment: Technology, Guidelines, and
Training, 51 AM. PSYCHOL. 945, 947 (1996) (describing the failure to incorporate research
findings into a “useful, empirically based framework for clinical assessment”); Christopher D.
Webster & David Cox, Integration of Nomothetic and Ideographic Positions in Risk
Assessment: Implications for Practice and the Education of Psychologists and Other Mental
Health Professionals, 52 AM. PSYCHOL. 1245, 1246 (1997) (describing the difficulties in
achieving the true “scientist-practitioner”).
347. See Hal R. Arkes, Impediments to Accurate Clinical Judgment and Possible Ways to
Minimize Their Impact, 49 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 323 (1981); Michael J. Saks
& Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 L.
& SOC’Y REV. 123, 130 (1980–1981).
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expectancies have been demonstrated to impede accurate processing of
348
information by experienced clinicians.
Additional research indicates
that preconceived notions also influence the perception of current data,
349
as opposed to recalled data.
350
351
Overconfidence,
hindsight bias,
and the inability to assess
352
covariation accurately have all been identified as obstacles to accurate
prediction. Although some recommendations concerning methods of
348. See Loren J. Chapman & Jean P. Chapman, Genesis of Popular but Erroneous
Psycho-Diagnostic Observations, 72 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 193 (1967) (presenting drawings
paired randomly with personality traits, presumably characteristic of the individual who drew
the picture). Subjects fabricated illusory correlations between drawing features and
personality traits (for example, large eyes were reportedly drawn by suspicious people). Id. at
194. Researchers proposed that the illusory correlations were influenced by a prior
association between eyes and suspicion. Id.
349. See Arkes, supra note 347, at 325.
It is quite likely that all subsequent data gleaned from the client will be
biased by whatever opinions have been formed during this brief initial
period. Data consistent with the tentative diagnosis will be given added
credence; data inconsistent with the hypothesis will be disregarded. The
fact that the initial hypothesis or diagnosis is merely tentative does not
decrease its biasing influence.
Id.; see also Lee Ross et al., Social Explanation and Social Expectation: Effects of Real and
Hypothetical Explanations on Subjective Likelihood, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
817 (1977).
350. Research has consistently demonstrated the significant overconfidence clinicians
have in their diagnoses. See, e.g., Stuart Oskamp, Overconfidence in Case-Study Judgments,
29 J. CONSULTING PSYCHOL. 261 (1965) (suggesting that providing a judge with more
information increases confidence without necessarily increasing accuracy); see also James
Quintar Holsopple & Joseph G. Phelan, The Skills of Clinicians in Analysis of Projective
Tests, 10 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 307, 316 (1954) (reporting that the most confident judges tend
to be the least accurate).
351. This refers to the tendency of judges, when provided information about a certain
outcome, to rate the probability that they would have predicted that outcome substantially
higher than if they had had no information concerning the outcome. See Arkes, supra note
347, at 326 (describing this phenomenon); see also Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight ≠ Foresight:
The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288 (1975).
352. See Arkes, supra note 347, at 323 (describing the tendency of judges who are
interested in a particular symptom to only attend to those individuals who have the symptom
and either do or do not develop the disease). However, in order to make an accurate
determination concerning whether or not the symptom is related to the disease, the clinician
must also look to the number of cases in which the symptom is absent and the disease does or
does not occur. Only by considering all four groups can the hypothesis—that the symptom is
predictive of the disease in this case—be adequately tested. See GARB, supra note 339
(providing an excellent discussion of cognitive biases, heuristics, and knowledge structures
that affect the accuracy of clinical judgment, as well as identifying the representative,
availability, anchoring and adjustment, and past-behavior heuristics).
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rehabilitating clinical judgment have been proposed, a recent review
of the judgment research has failed to demonstrate judgment accuracy
354
equivalent or superior to actuarial methods.
Proponents of the clinical judgment method have articulated a
355
number of responses to critics who suggest abandoning this model.
Perhaps the most frequently cited argument has become known as the
356
“broken leg countervailings” phenomenon.
Specifically, clinicians
357
argue that, by virtue of their training and experience, they are
uniquely qualified to assess the idiosyncratic factors that alter violence
and subsequently incorporate these variables into the final
358
Philosophical problems concerning the
determination of risk.
legitimacy of predicting ideographic outcome from nomothetic data
359
have also been acknowledged.
The convincing argument that
unambiguous “facts” are rarely present in the prediction of human
behavior, especially when coupled with the failure of empirical results to
demonstrate improved efficacy in clinical prediction despite their ability
360
to attend to these variables, has remained unanswered.
353. Arkes, supra note 347, at 327–29 (suggesting that clinicians receive additional
instruction in Bayesian statistics and reduce their reliance on memory, which leads to illusory
correlations becoming more pronounced); see also David Faust & Jay Ziskin, The Expert
Witness in Psychology and Psychiatry, 241 SCI. 31, 34 (1988).
354. See Grove & Meehl, supra note 338, at 320 (referring to clinical judgment as the
“less efficient of two prediction procedures”).
355. See, e.g., Hillel J. Einhorn, Accepting Error to Make Less Error, 50 J. PERSONALITY
ASSESSMENT 387, 388–89 (1986); Thomas R. Litwack et al., The Assessment of Dangerousness
and Predictions of Violence: Recent Research and Future Prospects, 64 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 245,
262–69 (1993); Mossman, supra note 274, at 783.
356. See MEEHL, supra note 338, at 25 (using an analogy to acknowledge that clinicians
can detect statistically rare events—such as a broken leg—that would significantly alter the
probability of an event, yet fail to be detected by an actuarial instrument). But see QUINSEY
ET AL., supra note 33, at 181 (rejecting the assertion that detection of “unique psychological
qualities” justifies abandonment of actuarial techniques).
357. See supra notes 341–42 and accompanying text.
358. DAWES, supra note 19, at 79 (asserting that “professional psychologists claim to be
able to make predictions about individuals that transcend predictions abut ‘people in general’
or about various categories of people”); Lisa Tsoi Hoshmand & Donald E. Polkinghorne,
Redefining the Science-Practice Relationship & Professional Training, 47 AM. PSYCHOL. 55, 60
(1992) (reporting that experts’ knowledge is comprised of practice and experience that
“involves accommodating previous understanding to the uniqueness of a particular clinical
situation”).
359. See, e.g., QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 33, at 180 (“People routinely use information
about groups to make individual decisions.”); Grove & Meehl, supra note 338, at 305 (making
the point that while actuarial or statistical prediction is, by nature, probabilistic rather than
deterministic, statistical information can inform decision-making).
360. See QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 33, at 181 (rejecting the “broken leg
countervailings” argument and providing anecdotal evidence of a case in which a serious
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Others have argued that appropriate actuarial formulas do not exist
361
for the population of offenders for which they make predictions, that
their skill as clinicians is greater than that of clinicians participating in
362
the prediction research, or that actuarial instruments have not been
363
sufficiently evaluated to justify widespread use. The debate continues
to rage concerning the appropriateness of clinical judgment as a
364
In spite of these concerns, reliance on clinical
prediction strategy.
physical disability—blindness—failed to incapacitate a released offender as clinicians had
predicted, and the legally blind offender committed murder).
361. This argument is based on the notion that the “slight nonoptimality of beta
coefficients or other statistical parameters due to validity generalization . . . would liquidate
the superiority of the actuarial over the impressionistic method.” Grove & Meehl, supra note
338, at 301–02 (suggesting that “it does not make mathematical sense for those predictive
tasks where the actuarial method’s superiority is rather strong”). Grove and Meehl conclude
that if an actuarial equation predicts something with 20% greater accuracy than clinicians,
and there are “no affirmative reason[s] for thinking that one’s patient group is extremely
unlike all other psychiatric outpatients, . . . it is improbable . . . that a decrement of [even]
10% for the actuarial method will reduce its efficacy to the level of the clinicians.” Id. at 302.
Others have suggested that it is unethical to apply a prediction scheme to one’s clients
without validation; however, this argument is illogical if one accepts that clinical prediction
relies on invalidated anecdotal evidence in the same circumstance. Id. (“Clinical experience is
only a prestigious synonym for anecdotal evidence when the anecdotes are told by somebody
with a professional degree and a license to practice a healing art.”).
362. The underlying basis for this argument is professional arrogance. Research studies
examined professional judgment from some of the most well-respected clinicians, often by
those who specialized in performing these kinds of assessments, and failed to demonstrate
greater accuracy than actuarial methods. Clinicians who use this argument should be
challenged to produce empirical evidence of their claim or recognize that they will be
discounted.
363. See supra notes 191–212 and accompanying text for a discussion of the validation of
actuarial instruments. Additionally, the logic of this argument fails to demonstrate
superiority of clinical judgment unless the clinician in question has performed some kind of
outcome assessment to determine the validity of his clinical judgment; otherwise, the accuracy
of both types of decision-making models remains unknown.
364. See, e.g., Kirk Heilbrun et al., Sexual Offending: Linking Assessment, Intervention,
and Decision Making, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & L. 138, 152 (1998) (describing the “early
debate on clinical versus statistical prediction, for which research has convincingly
demonstrated the superiority of actuarial prediction across a range of studies”) (citations
omitted); Grove & Meehl, supra note 338, at 320 (“To use the less efficient of two prediction
procedures in dealing with such matters is not only unscientific and irrational, it is unethical.”
(referring to clinical judgment)); Grisso & Appelbaum, supra note 13, at 623–29 (suggesting
that clinicians should avoid dichotomous, yes-no predictions of dangerousness and should
instead attempt to make actuarially based risk assessments); cf. Litwack et al., supra note 355,
at 262 (rejecting research that has questioned the legitimacy of clinical assessments of
dangerousness and instead asserting that “[w]e believe that any such conclusions would be
seriously misguided and would reflect a misreading of the actual findings—and lack of
findings—of recent (and prior) research”); Buchanan, supra note 339, at 468 (“Mathematical
methods have yet to provide clinicians with information of a quality to challenge the clinical
judgment.”).
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judgment has historically been the normative method of decision
365
making in violence predictions.
VII. ACTUARIAL PREDICTION
Actuarial or statistical methods involve the use of automatic decision
366
rules to determine probabilities. Variables that have been statistically
correlated with violence in the past are used to predict future violent
367
acts. Information regarding the subjects’ response to these variables is
entered into an equation that produces a predicted likelihood of
368
violence for that individual.
Therefore, the resultant probability
figure is a function of the degree of correspondence between his profile
on previously identified factors and that of similar persons whose level
369
of violence had been previously determined.
Critics of the actuarial method have generally focused on its
“inflexibility” or failure to consider important, case-specific
370
information; however, consideration of these factors has failed to
371
demonstrate substantial improvements in predictive accuracy.
A third type of decision making involves using actuarial prediction
372
Proponents of actuarial
to inform or anchor clinical prediction.
365. Cf. William Gardner et al., A Comparison of Actuarial Methods for Identifying
Repetitively Violent Patients with Mental Illnesses, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 35, 35 (1996)
(“[B]ut in practice actuarial methods seem to be used rarely.”).
366. See MEEHL, supra note 338, at 3 (“The mechanical combining of information for
classification purposes, and the resultant probability figure which is an empirically
determined relative frequency, are the characteristics that define the actuarial or statistical
type of prediction.”).
367. Regression is the most common type of equation for prediction. In this method the
identified variables are first converted into a numeric form. Predictions are then made by
using the regression equation to develop weighted averages of the numbers. These weights
are chosen to yield the best possible prediction of future violence. See, e.g., Buchanan, supra
note 339, at 466; DAWES, supra note 19, at 80–81.
368. See Stephen D. Gottfredson & Don M. Gottfredson, Violence Prediction Methods:
Statistical and Clinical Strategies, 3 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 303, 308–11 (1988) (describing the
more commonly used statistical methods of prediction including additive linear models,
clustering models, and multidimensional contingency table analysis).
369. Actuarial instruments assume that errors will be made and work to reduce that
error to the smallest possible percentage. Similarly, they cannot predict whether a particular
individual will commit another violent offense, but they can offer an estimate of the increased
likelihood that persons with similar characteristics have engaged in violence in the past.
370. See, e.g., Buchanan, supra note 339, at 468; Gottfredson & Gottfredson, supra note
368, at 313. Note that this argument is essentially the “broken leg countervailings” rephrased.
See supra notes 356–60 and accompanying text.
371. See generally Grove & Meehl, supra note 338.
372. See, e.g., MONAHAN, supra note 250, at 81–90 (suggesting clinicians improve
predictive accuracy by using statistical data); Gottfredson & Gottfredson, supra note 368, at
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prediction who contend that introducing unaided clinical judgment into
the prediction invariably reduces predictive accuracy have rejected this
373
“hybrid” method.
A. Overview of the Judgment Literature
Second-generation research has attempted to demonstrate improved
efficacy in clinical judgment with mixed results. Jeffrey Janofsky and his
colleagues evaluated psychiatric predictions of violence in patients
374
Results
admitted voluntarily to a university-based inpatient unit.
indicated that physicians demonstrated no ability to predict battery or
375
suicide in their patients.
Dale McNiel and Renée Binder assessed the accuracy of short-term
clinical predictions of the potential for violence by physician and nursing
376
staff.
They concluded that staff demonstrated a moderate ability to
accurately categorize patient risk but conceded that overprediction of
377
violence continued to influence outcome.
In a unique study, researchers at the University of Pittsburgh School
of Medicine compared an actuarial method to clinical judgment of
378
dangerousness.
Patients presented at a psychiatric emergency room
were evaluated independently by clinicians and followed for six months
379
in the community following discharge.
An actuarial instrument
assessing correlates of violence was also completed using information

318 (“[P]rediction may be improved through a combined use of methods.”).
373. The ability of clinical adjustments to improve on the predictive accuracy of an
actuarial prediction instrument depends upon the amount of remaining variance after the
actuarial method is used, and how accurately clinicians can deal with the residual
individuating information. Little evidence supports an optimistic point of view. See
QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 33, at 65.
374. See Janofsky et al., supra note 276, at 1091–94. Following an intake interview that
included historical and demographic data, as well as a mental status exam, psychiatrists
predicted whether the patient would engage in battery or threatening or suicidal behavior
over the course of the next seven days. Id. at 1091.
375. Id. at 1093. Researchers reported a slight correlation between predictions and
subsequent threatening behavior, although the increased frequency of this behavior likely
accounts for the correlation. Id.
376. See McNiel & Binder, supra note 278. Upon admission, nurses and physicians
independently ranked the potential for violence of the patient using an overt aggression scale.
Id. at 1319. Although the authors report a moderate level of reliability for predictions, they
acknowledge that “probability estimates appeared to overpredict the rate of inpatient
violence.” Id. at 1320.
377. Id. at 1320.
378. See Gardner et al., supra note 365.
379. Gardner et al., supra note 334, at 602.
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from the patients’ medical records, along with interview data.
Statistical analysis indicated that the actuarial instruments resulted in
significantly lower false-positive and false-negative rates than clinical
381
judgment.
B. Development of Actuarial Instruments
382

The Dangerous Behavior Rating Scheme (“DBRS”) has been
recognized as the first systematic attempt to develop an actuarial
383
instrument to predict future violence. Based partially on a theoretical
384
the semi-structured
framework developed by Edwin Megargee,
interview included personality attributes, situational factors, and
385
perceived facilitators and inhibitors of violence.
Researchers were
able to achieve only modest correlations with future violence, however,
and were generally pessimistic about the possibility of predicting future
386
violence.
McNiel and Binder developed a screening checklist for assessing the

380. Id. at 602–03.
381. Id. at 609. Researchers compared clinical judgment to actuarial predictions using
the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve Analysis and concluded, “Even simple actuarial
models, such as those presented here, are substantially more accurate than unaided clinical
prediction.” Id.
382. See Robert Menzies et al., The Dimensions of Dangerousness Revisited: Assessing
Forensic Predictions About Violence, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 2–4 (1994).
383. See Borum, supra note 346, at 948–49.
384. See Megargee, supra note 13.
385. See Menzies et al., supra note 382, at 10 tbl.2 (including passive aggressive, hostility,
anger, rage, emotionality, guilt, capacity for empathy, capacity for change, self-perception of
dangerousness, control over actions, tolerance, emotional stress, environmental support,
dangerousness increased with alcohol, dangerousness increased with drugs, and
manipulative). This instrument has been considered a “hybrid” model, as it included both
clinical and actuarial components. See also John Kip Cornwell, Confining Mentally
Disordered “Super Criminals”: A Realignment of Rights in the Nineties, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 651,
713 (1996).
386. Menzies et al., supra note 382, at 17–18 & tbl.5 (reporting correlations between
DBRS and violence at one to six years ranging from .10 to .20, leading researchers to
conclude, “the accuracy of both single-item and scalar predictions, as with the original study,
remained decidedly unimpressive when validated against aggregate general incidents,
criminal charges, and violent transactions”). The researchers went on to opine that in the
1990s, there remains “a dearth of statistically verifiable and clinically operational assessment
criteria.” Id. at 25. This failure to achieve improvements in predictive accuracy may be a
result of the instruments’ reliance upon clinical or impressionistic type data that have not
been correlated with violence in the past. See Borum, supra note 346, at 948–49 (suggesting
that the failure to operationalize item definitions may also have contributed to error in the
instrument).
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387

risk of violence at the time of psychiatric admission.
Using a simple
388
equally weighted linear model,
they developed a five-item
389
that demonstrated some predictive accuracy in
instrument
390
distinguishing between violent and non-violent offenders.
In one of the largest, most comprehensive studies of actuarial
prediction methods to date, Canadian researchers developed the
391
Violent Risk Appraisal Guide (“VRAG”).
Hailed by Professor
Monahan as “[a] major advance in the development of actuarial risk
392
assessment,” the instrument was developed on a combined sample of
offenders, half of whom were admitted for treatment in a maximum
security psychiatric institution, and half of whom were admitted only for
393
Participants were 618 serious offenders,
a brief pretrial assessment.
387. See Dale E. McNiel & Renée L. Binder, Screening for Risk of Inpatient Violence:
Validation of an Actuarial Tool, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 579 (1994).
388. See Robyn M. Dawes, The Robust Beauty of Improper Linear Models in Decision
Making, 34 AM. PSYCHOL. 571 (1979) (contending that in many clinical situations, “improper”
linear models, in which each variable is weighted equally, typically perform almost as well as
“proper” linear models and require much simpler calculations). Proponents of actuarial
methods have generally considered the more complex calculations an obstacle to clinical
utilization of actuarial prediction. See, e.g., Gardner et al., supra note 365, at 35–36
(describing obstacles to the clinical use of actuarial methods). “First, clinicians may be averse
to actuarial predictions because the calculations required by, for example, a regression-based
method may be hard to understand and hard to perform in a clinical setting.” Id. Thus, any
method to simplify the approach may result in wider acceptance of the method.
389. By combining clinical judgment and research, the authors selected the following
five items: (1) “History of physical attacks and/or fear-inducing behavior within two weeks
before admission”; (2) “Absence of suicidal behavior (attempts, gestures, or threats within
two weeks before admission)”; (3) “Schizophrenic or manic diagnosis”; (4) “Male gender”;
and (5) “Currently married or living together.” Each item was phrased so that a positive
answer would increase the probability of violence (scored “one”) “whereas a negative answer
was scored as a ‘zero.’” McNiel & Binder, supra note 387, at 581.
Interestingly, several of these items appear to have tapped variables whose relationship
to violence remains less than clear. For example, female inpatients with serious psychiatric
diagnoses have, in some studies, engaged in violence at about the same rates as their male
counterparts. See Johns, supra note 317, at 235.
390. “When the outcome variable was limited to physical attacks, the screening checklist
had a sensitivity of 55.0%, a specificity of 64.0%, a false positive rate of 67.9%, a false
negative rate of 18.0%, a positive predictive value of 41.1%, a negative predictive value of
82.1%, and a total predictive value of 61.8%. The likelihood ratio was 1.52. The screening
checklist had a 25.0% relative improvement over chance in classifying which patients would
become physically assaultive. McNiel & Binder, supra note 387, at 583.
391. See QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 33; Harris et al., supra note 287.
392. See Monahan, supra note 332, at 113.
393. Constructing the sample in this way allows researchers some latitude in generalizing
results to both forensic psychiatric patients as well as non-mentally disordered offenders who
may be referred to forensic clinicians for assessment of dangerousness or pretrial assessments.
See Harris et al., supra note 287, at 317–19.
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85% of whom had been charged with at least one violent offense. The
outcome or criterion variable was defined as “any new criminal charge
395
for a violent offense.” Initially, researchers began with approximately
396
fifty predictor variables and examined univariate correlation for each
397
predictor.
A least squares stepwise multiple regression was used to
select variables that contributed independently to the prediction of
398
399
Twelve variables remained in the prediction
violent recidivism.
equation that calculated weighted variables on their deviation from the
400
base rate. Scores on the VRAG ranged from B28 to +33, with scores
divided into nine groups or “bins” of eight points each. With an average
follow-up of 81.5 months, the instruments’ classification accuracy was
401
In numerous replication studies, the VRAG continued to
76%.
394. Generalizability is limited, however, to those with serious criminal histories, and
“cannot be expected to generalize to offenders with less serious criminal histories or, of
course, to persons without any criminal conduct.” Id. at 320.
395. See QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 33, at 142 (defining violent offense as: “homicide,
attempted homicide, kidnapping, forcible confinement, wounding, assault causing bodily
harm, . . . rape,” “armed robbery,” and all sexual assaults involving physical contact).
396. Including “sociodemographic . . . (e.g., socioeconomic status, age, marital status,
educational attainment, employment history); childhood problems (e.g., DSM-III conduct
disorder items, [intact biological family until age sixteen], criminal history of parents and
siblings, [etc.]); adult adjustment ([e.g.], psychiatric history, criminal record, . . . alcohol use,
social supports . . . ); characteristics of the index offense (e.g., offender’s relationship to the
victim, . . . weapon used, sex of victim, motive for the index offense); and psychological
assessment variables (e.g., IQ, MMPI results, Level of Supervision . . . items, . . . PCL-R score,
[etc.]),” and clinical variables (e.g., expression or remorse, “insight,” etc). See id. at 143.
397. Variables without a significant univariate correlation were dropped from
consideration. In the few pairs of variables that were highly correlated, such as a prior
criminal charge and prior convictions for violent offense, the variable with the lower
correlation to violent recidivism was dropped. Id. at 145–46.
398. Id. at 146 (conceding that more sophisticated statistical modeling such as event
history analyses, for example, which take into account the length of time until recidivism,
exist; however, application of these models found few differences in the final predictor list
that was generated by the simpler method); see Marnie E. Rice & Grant T. Harris, CrossValidation and Extension of the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide for Child Molesters and
Rapists, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 231, 231–32 (1997).
399. The variables were: Revised Psychopathy Checklist Score (.34); elementary school
maladjustment (.31); meets DSM-III criteria for any personality disorder (.26); age at the time
of index offense (-.26); separation from either parent (except death) under age 16 (.25);
failure on prior conditional release (.24); nonviolent offense history score (using the CormierLang scale) (.20); never married or equivalent (.18); meets DSM-III criteria for schizophrenia
(-.17); most serious victim injury (from index offense) (-.16); alcohol abuse score (.13); and
female victim in the index offense (-.11). See QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 33, at 147.
400. See J. NUFFIELD, PAROLE DECISION-MAKING IN CANADA: RESEARCH TOWARDS
DECISION GUIDELINES (1982) (discussing the method of anchoring weights to deviations
from base rate response).
401. No other instrument has reported such a high degree of predictive accuracy.
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perform well with no appreciable decrement in predictive validity.
Perhaps the most significant concern related to the VRAG is the failure
of independent clinicians and researchers to demonstrate validity of the
instrument; however, the instrument’s accuracy has been robust, and
without an “affirmative reason” for why the instrument would not
apply, its application to other serious offender populations appears
justified.
A second instrument, the HCR-20, is a violence risk assessment
scheme that the authors contend has potential applicability to a variety
403
of settings.
The HCR-20 assesses past, present, and future indicators
of risk and includes empirically derived factors to assess both static and
dynamic variables associated with increased violence. The ten historical
factors include items related to criminal history, demographic and case
history, and individual disposition (including psychopathy) that are
404
relatively immutable, while the five clinical items are intended to
405
reflect current, dynamic correlates of violence, and the five risk
management items address environmental, post-assessment factors that
406
may either aggravate or mitigate risk. Research in a variety of settings
suggests that the HCR-20 demonstrated predictive utility with a variety
407
of groups, including male and female civil psychiatric patients, forensic
Additionally, the instrument enables clinicians to provide specific numerical probabilities or
range of values, along with normative information about how this individual’s risk score
compares to other offenders. Thus, clinicians using this instrument can avoid the ethically
questionable practice of providing testimony in conclusory terms, see, e.g., Grisso &
Appelbaum, supra note 13; Poythress, supra note 327, but can instead leave the
determination of the appropriate level of risk to require intervention up to individuals elected
or appointed to do so.
402. See, e.g., Marnie E. Rice & Grant T. Harris, Violent Recidivism: Assessing
Predictive Validity, 63 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 737 (1995); Rice & Harris,
supra note 398 (considering this study to be a cross-validation study in that it evaluated sexual
offenders not previously included in the construction sample); Vernon Quinsey et al.,
Actuarial Prediction of Sexual Recidivism, 10 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 85 (1995). But
see QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 33, at 153–55 (failing to recommend use of the VRAG with
fire setters without additional empirical study).
403. See WEBSTER ET AL., supra note 346; see also CHRISTOPHER WEBSTER ET AL.,
HCR-20: ASSESSING THE RISK FOR VIOLENCE (VERSION 2) (1997).
404. The ten historical factors are: previous violence, young age at first offense,
relationship instability, employment problems, substance use problems, major mental illness,
psychopathy, early maladjustment, personality disorder, and prior supervision failure.
WEBSTER, supra note 403.
405. The five clinical items are: lack of insight, negative attitudes, active symptoms of
major mental illness, impulsivity, and unresponsive to treatment. Id.
406. The five risk management items are: plans lack feasibility, exposure to destabilizers,
lack of personal support, noncompliance with remediation attempts, and stress. Id.
407. See, e.g., Kevin S. Douglas et al., Assessing Risk for Violence Among Psychiatric
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psychiatric patients, and incarcerated offenders; however, more
recent research findings have suggested that the HCR-20’s predictive
410
accuracy diminishes in restrictive settings.
In summary, the HCR-20
has been praised for its empirical basis, operationally defined coding
411
system, and practical use, but critics note that a majority of the
research studies using the HCR-20 have been conducted abroad, and
thus, questions remain about the applicability of findings to U.S.
offenders.
C. Summary and Conclusions
Empirical evidence fails to support that clinicians can predict
violence in either an inpatient or community setting with accuracy
412
equivalent to or exceeding simple actuarial instruments.
We agree
with William Grove and Paul Meehl’s suggestion that “a practitioner

Patients: The HCR-20 Violence Risk Assessment Scheme and the Psychopathy Checklist:
Screening Version, 67 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 917 (1999) (reporting data on
193 patients followed for an average of 626 days, finding that AUCs ranged from .76 for any
physical violence to .80 for a violent offense and that patients scoring above the median on
the HCR-20 were six times more likely to commit any act of physical violence and thirteen
times more likely to commit a violent crime in the community than persons who scored under
the median); Tonia Nicholls et al., Comparing Risk Assessments with Female and Male
Psychiatric Outpatients; Utility of the HCR-20 and Psychopathy Checklist: Screening
Version, Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the American Psychological
Association (1997).
408. See, e.g., Henrik Belfrage, Implementing the HCR-20 Scheme for Risk Assessment in
a Forensic Psychiatric Hospital: Integrating Research and Clinical Practice, 9 J. FORENSIC
PSYCHIATRY 328 (1998); Mats Dernevik, Preliminary Findings on Reliability and Validity of
the Historical-Clinical-Risk Assessment in a Forensic Psychiatric Setting, 4 PSYCHOL. CRIME &
L. 127 (1998).
409. See, e.g., Henrik Belfrage et al., Prediction of Violence Within the Correctional
System Using the HCR-20 Risk Assessment Scheme, 11 J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 167 (2000);
Kevin S. Douglas & Christopher D. Webster, The HCR-20 Violence Risk Assessment Scheme:
Concurrent Validity in a Sample of Incarcerated Offenders, 26 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 3
(1999).
410. See, e.g., Mats Dernevik et al., Violent Behaviour in Forensic Psychiatric Patients:
Risk Assessment and Different Risk-Management Levels Using the HCR-20, 8 PSYCHOL.
CRIME & L. 93 (2002).
411. See Borum, supra note 346, at 950.
412. But see Thomas R. Litwack, Actuarial Versus Clinical Assessments of
Dangerousness, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 409 (2001). Litwack suggests that “[a]lthough
. . . actuarial predictions have been demonstrated to be superior to clinical predictions for a
fairly wide range of prediction tasks,” it is not clear they are superior for dangerousness
predictions. Id. at 410. “If actuarial instruments . . . are to be used in the fairest and most
effective manner, they must be validated in a far more precise manner than has occurred.”
Id. Thus, Litwack concludes that “it is premature to substitute actuarial for clinical
assessments of dangerousness.” Id.
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who claims not to need any statistical or experimental studies but relies
solely on clinical experience as adequate justification, by that very claim
is shown to be a nonscientifically minded person whose professional
413
The claim that many clinical
judgments are not to be trusted.”
414
judgments in violence predictions remain untested is not a compelling
argument for their continued use in a variety of legal contexts. Untested
assumptions, supported only by guesswork or speculation, are
415
appropriately prohibited under the Federal Rules of Evidence. In the
next Part, we will evaluate this assertion by examining the evidentiary
admissibility standards prescribed in the Federal Rules of Evidence and
Daubert.
VIII. EVIDENTIARY ADMISSIBILITY ANALYSIS
The Court in Daubert interpreted the Federal Rules to imply a
mandate that members of the federal judiciary perform a “preliminary
assessment” to determine whether the proffered testimony meets a
standard of evidentiary reliability through which scientific evidence
416
Courts, however, have been reluctant to apply
must pass.

413. Grove & Meehl, supra note 338, at 320.
414. See, e.g., Litwack et al., supra note 355, at 247 (suggesting that the “validity of
clinical assessments of dangerousness in a variety of important contexts remains untested”).
415. But cf. Thomas R. Litwack, Communications Regarding Risk, 52 AM. PSYCHOL.
1245 (1997) (“In any event, the necessity of relying on categorical and unproven (although
hopefully informed and rational) clinical judgments regarding many groups of individuals
(e.g., many civil committees, or potential civil committees, and insanity acquittees)
remains.”). Professional standards have also addressed limits on prediction testimony. See
AM. PSYCHOL. ASSOC., ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDUCT
§§ 2.04(b), 7.04 (Section 2.04(b) states, “Psychologists recognize limits to the certainty with
which diagnoses, judgments, or predictions can be made about individuals,” and section 7.04
states, “Whenever necessary to avoid misleading, psychologists acknowledge the limits of
their data or conclusions.”); see also Committee on Ethical Guidelines for Forensic
Psychologists, Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 655,
665 (1991) (requiring forensic psychologists to be “aware that their own professional
observations, inferences, and conclusions must be distinguished from legal facts, opinions, and
conclusions.” They must further be “prepared to explain the relationship between their
expert testimony and the legal issues and facts of an instant case.”). The Association for the
Treatment of Sexual Abusers (“ATSA”) also issued a cautionary statement. See ASSOC. FOR
THE TREATMENT OF SEXUAL ABUSERS, ATSA PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK 2, 20 (1993)
(instructing its members to “avoid drawing conclusions or rendering opinions that exceed the
present level of knowledge in the field or the expertise of the evaluator,” and to “be very
cautious in offering predictions of criminal behavior for use in imprisoning or releasing
individuals.”). ATSA further requires that prediction testimony include “the acts being
predicted; the estimated probability that these acts will occur during a given period of time;
and the facts on which these predictive judgments are based.” Id.
416. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993). The Court
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admissibility criterion to expert psychological testimony.
Professor
Slobogin hypothesized that the courts readily except psychological
418
testimony because it has not been regarded as “novel.”
Recent
rulings, however, have rejected the view that evidentiary admissibility
419
standards apply only to novel testimony.
A second reason that courts may have been reluctant to apply
admissibility criteria to psychological testimony is that the justice system
has become dependent on psychologists “‘to establish the presence or
absence of mental disorders and the causal connections between such
420
disorders and criminal or tortious conduct.’”
The sentiment that the
421
courts are unwilling to “disinvent the wheel” is pervasive and difficult
described the duty of the trial judge as follows:
Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, the trial judge
must determine at the outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a), whether the expert
is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the
trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. This entails a
preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology
underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that
reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.
Id. at 592–93.
417. One notable exception was In re Wilson, 33 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2115 (D.C.
Super. Ct. Apr. 14, 1983). In this case, the District of Columbia Superior Court applied the
Frye “general acceptance” test to dangerous testimony and held that because professional
organizations, including the American Psychiatric Association and the American
Psychological Association, questioned the reliability of prediction testimony, it should not be
admissible in civil commitment proceedings. Id.; see Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.
Cir. 1923); cf. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 901 (1983) (noting that “[n]either petitioner
nor the [APA] suggests that psychiatrists are always wrong with respect to future
dangerousness, only most of the time” and incredibly upholding the admission of Dr.
Grigson’s testimony).
418. See Slobogin, supra note 224, at 138 n.155 (“One reason testimony by mental health
professionals is accepted so readily by the courts is that is has never been regarded as ‘novel’;
it has long been an everyday feature of the justice system.”).
419. See Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 721 (Tex. 1998)
(finding that the rules of evidence regarding admission of expert scientific testimony should
not apply only to evidence deemed novel or unconventional, but ruling that all scientific
expert testimony must meet reliability and relevancy requirements). The court supported this
position on several grounds: first, that differentiating between novel and conventional
evidence would be a difficult task; second, that it would be illogical to require some expert
opinion testimony to be reliable but other not; and third, that the majority of federal courts
have applied relevancy and reliability requirements to all expert testimony. Id. at 721.
420. See James M. Doyle, Applying Lawyers’ Expertise to Scientific Experts: Some
Thoughts About Trial Court Analysis of the Prejudicial Effects of Admitting and Excluding
Expert Scientific Testimony, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 619, 623 (1984) (quoting Comment, The
Psychologist as Expert Witness: Science in the Courtroom?, 38 MD. L. REV. 539, 544–46 (1979).
421. See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 896.
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to counter. The analysis provided in this Article does not support a
wholesale exclusion of predictions of dangerousness; rather, only
unreliable or speculative predictions would be deemed inadmissible.
This moderate position should make the adoption of admissibility
analysis more probable.
A final reason that psychological testimony may have been excused
from the admissibility standards is the belief that expert testimony of
this kind does not sway the trier of fact as easily as does more complex,
422
This argument is not credible in light of the
less intuitive testimony.
423
weight of evidence indicating the contrary.
Judges have been assigned the gatekeeping role. The arguments for
failing to perform admissibility assessments are not compelling. Courts
have begun to recognize the importance of applying the standards to all
types of testimony, and as this trend continues, experts should expect to
demonstrate predictive accuracy or have their testimony excluded.
Judges and attorneys must also be prepared to appropriately challenge
proffered expert testimony of this kind. In the last Part, we will review a
few circumstances in which this testimony would likely be presented and
emphasize the admissibility criterion that might be at issue.
IX. STANDARDS OF PROOF
In the second component of this Article, we have expressed a clear
preference for prediction testimony informed by actuarial data. In this
final Part, we will analyze the most significant prediction context in
which dangerousness testimony is frequently offered—capital
punishment—and we will discuss the admissibility and standard of proof
issues likely to arise when the trier of fact evaluates this type of evidence
in a capital sentencing case.
“Future dangerousness” is currently identified as a statutory
424
In all of these
aggravating factor in capital cases in seven states.
422. See Slobogin, supra note 224, at 138 n.155.
423. See, e.g., Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 916 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (describing an
“impressionable jury” influenced by the “inevitable untouchability of a medical specialist’s
words”); People v. Murtishaw, 29 Cal. 3d 733, 774 (1981) (holding that expert predictions of
future dangerousness are prejudicial and unduly influence the lay jury).
424. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515(9)(h) (2001) (“The defendant, by prior conduct
or conduct in the commission of the murder at hand, has exhibited a propensity to commit
murder which will probably constitute a continuing threat to society.”); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 701.12(7) (West 1983) (“The existence of a probability that the defendant would
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.”); OR.
REV. STAT. § 163.150(1)(b)(B) (1996) (“Whether there is a probability that the defendant
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.”);
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jurisdictions, the state must demonstrate future dangerousness “beyond
425
426
a reasonable doubt” to secure a death sentence. The quantification
associated with each burden of proof becomes critical when judges
evaluate prediction testimony based on actuarial instruments. As an
illustrative vehicle, we will review a hypothetical case using Wyoming’s
capital sentencing statute, which requires jurors to be convinced
“beyond a reasonable doubt” that a defendant will “likely” commit
427
continued acts of criminal violence.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(2)(b)(1) (West Supp. 2006) (“[W]hether there is a
probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2(1) (2004) (“[T]here is a
probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing serious threat to society.”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(h)(xi) (2007) (“The
defendant poses a substantial and continuing threat of future dangerousness or is likely to
commit continued acts of criminal violence.”). In Washington, the future dangerousness
factor is considered only after a defendant is convicted of aggravated first-degree murder by a
finding of at least one other aggravating factor. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.020
(West Supp. 2002) (listing the other aggravating factors for aggravated first degree murder);
Id. § 1095.070(8) (“Whether there is a likelihood that the defendant will pose a danger to
others in the future.”).
425. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (addressing the standards of proof
and opining, “The standard serves to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to
indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision.”). Attempts to quantify
the burden of proof have resulted in some general parameters (for example, beyond a
reasonable doubt = 95% chance of future violence; clear and convincing evidence = 75%
chance of future violence; and preponderance of the evidence = 51% of the evidence). See
C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional
Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1322, 1327 (1982) (discussing the differences between
“beyond a reasonable doubt” at 95% versus 99% certainty). This author went on to survey
members of the judiciary to determine their understanding of the probability attached to each
designated burden of proof. Judicial consensus appears to be that “reasonable doubt” rests
somewhere between 80% to 100%. Id. at 1324–27.
426. Several authors have considered the ethics of participation in capital sentencing
hearings. See, e.g., Dix, supra note 27 (concluding that expert predictions of dangerousness in
capital sentencing hearings violate evidentiary and constitutional standards); Barefoot, 463
U.S. at 916 (Blackman, J., dissenting).
In the present state of psychiatric knowledge, this is too much for me.
One may accept this in a routine lawsuit for money damages, but when a
person’s life is at stake[,] . . . a requirement of greater reliability should
prevail. In a capital case, the specious testimony of a psychiatrist, colored
in the eyes of an impressionable jury by the inevitable untouchability of a
medical specialist’s words, equates with death itself.
Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 916 (Blackman, J., dissenting)
427. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(h)(xi). For the purposes of this exercise, we will
assign “likely” to 70% probability. As the specificity of scientific evidence increases,
legislators should be encouraged to be more specific in statutes incorporating dangerousness
as a criterion. These statutes should include the type of harm that is being predicted
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Suppose that a psychologist proffers testimony in a capital
sentencing hearing concerning the defendant’s risk of future violence
428
based on his score of the Violence Risk Assessment Guide.
She
opines that “[t]he defendant’s score places him in the sixth category, or
third from the highest risk group. Among offenders in prior studies,
approximately 42% reoffended violently within an average of 10 years
following release.” The probability estimation generated by quantifying
the burden of proof standards indicates that, in this example, the state
429
fails to meet its burden of proof in the case.
Sexual offender civil detention statutes also generally rely on the
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. One of the most significant
questions related to these predictions involves the specificity of the
prediction task. Typically, sexual, rather than general, violence is being
430
predicted; this should be reflected in the expert’s assessment.
(physical, emotional, property); the degree of probability that this behavior will occur (50%,
95%, or more likely than not) and the period of time that risk is predicted to occur (a year,
indefinite). See Slobogin, supra note 224, at 104 n.28.
428. See QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 33.
429. That is, an actuarial prediction of .42 would fail to meet the statutory standards that
“beyond a reasonable doubt” (95%) the defendant would “likely commit a violent act” (70%)
(.95 x .70 = .665; .665 > .42), thus, the aggravating circumstance would not be met. See
Slobogin, supra note 224, at 104 n.28.
This case presumes that the judge had previously conducted an admissibility assessment
on the proffered testimony. In this example, the judge must have previously assessed the
ability of the expert’s opinion to assist the trier of fact and would have determined that the
expert demonstrates some expertise in both prediction of violence and actuarial methods. At
first glance, relevancy and fit appear to be fairly obvious in this case; however, recent research
examining the use of actuarial instruments to predict institutional violence in correctional
settings suggests that predictive accuracy is significantly lower than originally expected and
has led one group of researchers to contend that, at least in the context of predicting violence
by capital defendants, the VRAG, PCL-R, and HCR-20 have resulted in judgments that are
“highly inaccurate” and “gross overestimations of risk.” See John F. Edens et al., Predictions
of Future Dangerousness in Capital Murder Trials: Is It Time to “Disinvent the Wheel?,” 29
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 55 (2005). If these obstacles to admissibility were satisfactorily
addressed, reliability questions would then be significant. The expert must demonstrate that
he used appropriate methodology, that he has a good foundation for the use of this
instrument, and that the use of the instrument is logically connected to the defendant. Jurists
should review the original empirical studies that the expert relied upon as justification for
using this instrument. Differences between characteristics of the defendant (e.g., race, age,
severity of the current offense, length of time since publication of the studies) and
environment (e.g., community versus high security correctional institution) should be
evaluated to determine whether the connective reliability criterion has been met. Judges
should ask about the type of information relied upon in generating this score, paying close
attention to the reliability of the underlying data. Did the expert verify his sources whenever
possible or did he rely on hearsay or other inadmissible evidence?
430. Several new actuarial instruments have recently been introduced to predict future
sexual violence, such as the Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool-Revised (“MnSOST-R”)
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The lowest threshold for predictions of violence involves the
commitment of individuals found “not guilty by reason of insanity.” A
unique aspect of these cases is the shift of the burden of proof from the
state to the defendant. The broad definition of violence established by
431
432
the courts in these cases again should be reflected in the assessment.
This hypothetical case and accompanying summaries illustrate the
433
importance of specificity in sentencing statutes.
Predictions of
dangerousness based on actuarial data preclude attempts by the expert
to usurp the decision maker’s role. The degree of accuracy necessary to
justify a particular judicial action (civil commitment, maximum
sentencing, or even death) is a value judgment best made by elected or
appointed officials, not by an expert whose implicit values are cloaked in
the guise of medical certainty.
X. CONCLUSION
Members of the judiciary face a difficult but important task when
evaluating proffered expert testimony to determine whether it meets
admissibility standards. Legislators and the courts have recognized the
importance of assuring that proffered expert testimony meets minimum
reliability standards. But what our argument attempts to add is
recognition of the importance of perspective and contextual complexity
in assuring that reliability. Nothing in this argument diminishes the
importance of experts; courts very much need the advice of specialized
opinions. But those opinions often have an aura to outsiders, regardless
and the Sexual Offender Risk Appraisal Guide (“SORAG”). See QUINSEY ET AL., supra
note 33, at 119–36. Judges should ascertain the characteristics of the validation sample and
the similarities or differences between study participants and the individual currently being
evaluated. It may be helpful to hear the expert describe and explain discrepancies in risk
assessment on each of the two instruments. See Cornwell, supra note 385 (discussing the
problems with dangerousness prediction in this context). See generally Steven I. Friedland,
On Treatment, Punishment, and the Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders, 70 U. COLO. L. REV.
73 (1999) (questioning the use of violence prediction as a means of social control).
431. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 364–65 (1983) ( “We do not agree with the
petitioner’s suggestion that the requisite dangerousness is not established by proof that a
person committed a non-violent crime against property.”).
432. Judges should pay special attention to the appropriateness of using an actuarial
instrument in these cases. Many of the actuarial data have been collected from individuals
with a history of serious violence. The extent to which the defendant differs in this way
should raise connective reliability concerns.
433. Quantification of this kind may result in statutes being deemed unconstitutional on
the grounds that they are unacceptably vague. See, e.g., Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp.
1529, 1569–71 (E.D. Okla. 1995) (granting writ of habeas corpus in a capital case in which the
statutory aggravating circumstances of future dangerousness, without guidance on the
definition of the language of the statute, was unconstitutionally vague).
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of the acuity of those non-experts in their own realms, which
exaggerates the authority of the expertise.
We have argued here that while, in many instances, prediction
434
testimony based on clinical judgment should be deemed inadmissible,
prediction testimony based on actuarial data can assist the court and
meet admissibility criterion under most circumstances. One caveat to
this admission is that opposing expert testimony must be presented to
prevent the expert’s opinions from being unfairly prejudicial and, thus,
inadmissible.
In the context of reviewing admissibility criterion, members of the
judiciary should conduct a preliminary assessment to ascertain whether
the proffered expert testimony meets the criterion described in the
Federal Rules of Evidence and subsequent case law. Judges should
examine the qualifications of a witness to determine whether he or she
has special expertise in predicting dangerousness; they should determine
whether the testimony is based on clinical or actuarial data, and they
should review the studies and literature that the expert contends support
435
The size of the construction and validation samples,
his opinion.
number of independent validation studies, and degree of similarity
between the study participants and the individual presently evaluated
should all be considered in determining the reliability of the opinion.
Undeniably, these assessments present a daunting task to trial court
436
In spite of the difficulties, members of the judiciary must
judges.
assume this role to protect the reliability and integrity of judicial
decisions.
434. Some have raised the question of whether prediction testimony based on clinical
judgment has been fairly tested. We would agree that methodological problems inherent in
violence prediction studies have limited the generalizability of the research. We concede that
in some instances intuitive clinical judgment will beat actuarial prediction; however, we do
not believe that clinical judges will ever outperform actuarial models. We based this belief on
a very common sense notion of the complexity of decision making and the prevalence of
heuristics. Clinical skill is indispensable in violence prediction, but we conclude that actuarial
combination of that data will be more accurate, and fairer, than any other method.
435. See Christopher D. Webster & Natalie H. Polvi, Challenging Assessments of
Dangerousness and Risk, in COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY
1371, 1381 (Jay Ziskin et al. eds., 1995) (providing an excellent example of the kinds of
questions that judges or attorneys should ask of expert witnesses regarding the prediction of
dangerousness).
436. See Brown, supra note 28, at 784 (“Federal judges ruling on the admissibility of
expert scientific testimony face a far more complex and daunting task in a post-Daubert world
than before.”) (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 311, 315 (9th Cir. 1995);
see also Ronda R. Harrison, Daubert and the Federal Judiciary: Understanding Science
Methodology (1998) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Bowling Green State University) (on file with
author).
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While we appreciate the workload and skill of the judiciary, we still
contend that every opportunity should be seized to benefit from hearing
the arguments of experts from different schools of thought in a specialty
area. Even if no other benefit were achieved from such an effort, the
resulting heightened awareness of the diversity of expertise within a
domain of expertise would give pause to fact finders who otherwise
might be tempted to permit the expert to determine the court’s
judgment. Courts that show their concern for the reliability of experts
by making every effort to hear as many different scientific perspectives
within a realm of expertise as is practical will be putting experts in their
proper epistemological place in our judicial system.

